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 “TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING: BAD 
ECONOMICS, BAD MORALS, AND A BAD 
IDEA FOR A UNIFORM LAW, JUDGE 
EASTERBROOK NOTWITHSTANDING 
Roger C. Bern* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Terms later”1 contracting is bad economics, bad morals, and a 
bad idea for a uniform law. The Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA) expressly embraces it, as do the 
proposed revisions of sections 2-204 and 2-211 of Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The proposed revisions of 
section 2-207 of the UCC eliminate the existing statutory 
provisions that protect against imposition of adverse “terms later,” 
and introduce new provisions that invite courts to give effect to 
that contracting stratagem. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg2 was the first judicial affirmation of the 
“terms later” principle that industry groups were vigorously 
pressing in the drafting process of UCC Article 2B and that 
ultimately came to be the free-standing UCITA. It, for the first 
time, gave the appearance of legal legitimacy to that method of 
transacting business, and thenceforth provided the “legal” authority 
                                                          
 * Roger C. Bern, Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law. I am 
grateful for the excellent work of Bryan D. Smith, who served as my research 
assistant while I was teaching at the Thomas Goode Jones School of Law. 
1 “Terms later” is the shorthand reference used in this article to describe 
those terms that a seller first discloses to the buyer after the buyer has ordered 
and paid for the goods, and typically after the buyer has been given possession 
of the goods by the seller. 
2 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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argument for its proponents.3 It and its initial progeny, Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc.,4 however, have been deservedly and widely 
criticized,5 variously described as a “swashbuckling tour de force 
                                                          
3 See Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution and Other Computer Related 
Issues: Current Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents 
and Software Distribution, Licensing and Copyright Protection Questions, SF74 
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 727, 752 (2001) (demonstrating “well-reasoned economic 
analysis”); Joseph C. Wang, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B: 
Finally, The Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 439, 456 (1997) (as being a “sound decision”); Carey R. Ramos & 
Joseph P. Verdon, Shrinkwrap and Click-On Licenses after ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1996 at 1 (reflecting a “healthy pragmatism 
and appreciation of the commercial realities”); Mary Jo Dively, The Use of 
Standard Form Contracts in the Information Industry, 697 PLI/PAT 573, 579 
(2002) (as showing a depth of understanding of American commerce and 
reasoning that is “illuminating”). Similarly, proponents have been strong in their 
efforts to reflect that principle in UCC 2B and the UCITA. See discussion infra 
Parts V., VI. 
4 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
5 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure In Consumer E-Commerce 
As An Unfair And Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805 (2000); Michael 
H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes in Cyberspace Under E-Sign: “There’s a New 
Sheriff in Town!”, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 943 (2002); Shubha Ghosh, Where’s the 
Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000: Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm 
Creation, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1125 (2000); Robert A. Hillman, “Rolling 
Contracts”, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); Beverly Horsburgh & Andrew 
Cappel, Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1091 
(2000); Lenora Ledwon, Common Sense, Contracts, and Law and Literature: 
Why Lawyers Should Read Henry James, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1065 (2000); David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
241 (2001); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of 
Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869 (2002); Deborah W. Post, Dismantling 
Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank 
Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205 (2000); Lawrence M. Solan, The Written 
Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87 
(2001); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Mark A. 
French, Note, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 811, 
813 (2000); Jody Storm Gale, Note, Service Over the “Net”: Principles of 
Contract Law in Conflict, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (1999); Batya 
Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap 
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319 (1999); Kristin 
Johnson Hazelwood, Note, Let The Buyer Beware: The Seventh Circuit’s 
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that dangerously misinterprets legislation and precedent,”6 a “real 
howler” that is “dead wrong”7 on its interpretation of section 2-207 
of the UCC, a decision that “flies in the face of UCC policy and 
precedent,” a “detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis”8 “contrary 
to public policy,”9 with analysis that “gets an ‘F’ as a law exam.”10 
ProCD and Hill provided the foundational “legal” authority in 
support of “terms later” contracting in the revision process for 
Article 2 of the UCC. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate 
that Judge Easterbrook’s imposition of the “terms later” 
contracting rule in ProCD and Hill was itself devoid of legal, 
economic, and moral sanction. Thus his opinions in those cases 
provide no legitimate support for other court decisions or for any 
uniform law that would validate “terms later” contracting. 
Following a brief introduction, Part I of this article critiques 
Easterbrook’s purported legal analysis in ProCD and Hill. It 
demonstrates that, notwithstanding the cleverness of his opinions 
designed to suggest legal support for his “terms later” rule, there is 
in fact none. It also explores some jurisprudential implications 
suggested by Easterbrook’s ex ante methodology. Part II 
demonstrates that notwithstanding Easterbrook’s window dressing 
of economics, a rule sanctioning “terms later” contracting 
increases information asymmetry, increases transaction costs, 
enhances hold-up and opportunistic behavior by vendors, and 
                                                          
Approach to Accept-or-Return Offers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (1998); 
Jason Kuchmay, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Section 301 Copyright 
Preemption of Shrinkwrap Licenses—A Real Bargain for Consumers?, 29 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 117 (1997); Christopher L. Pitet, Note, The Problem With “Money 
Now, Terms Later”: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of 
“Shrinkwrap” Software Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325 (1997). 
6 Murray, supra note 5, at 905. 
7 Listserve Comment by Professor Mark Gergen, University of Texas 
School of Law, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The Gateway Thread 
AALS Contracts Listserve, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1154 (2000). 
8 Gale, supra note 5, at 585. 
9 Id. 
10 Listserve Comment by Professor Stewart Macaulay, University of 
Wisconsin School of Law, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium: The 
Gateway Thread - AALS Contracts Listserv, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1147, 1148 
(2000) [hereinafter Macaulay, Common Sense]. 
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results in inefficiencies and distributional unfairness by 
systematically redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors. 
Part III demonstrates that a “terms later” contracting rule fails to 
protect the reasonable expectations of buyers while at the same 
time protecting the unreasonable expectations of vendors, thus 
abandoning the only moral justification for courts to enforce 
promises. Additionally, it demonstrates that Easterbrook’s “terms 
later” rule also abandons the principle of impartial treatment of the 
parties (vendors are favored) and abandons achieving justice 
between the parties in order to achieve some perceived greater 
societal good. 
Part IV examines several cases that have followed in lemming-
like fashion ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule in both sale of goods 
and services settings. Part V addresses the provisions of the 
UCITA that reflect the “terms later” contracting rule and traces 
some of the history of that uniform law, including the support it 
garnered from Easterbrook’s ProCD and Hill opinions and its 
ultimate demise. Part VI addresses the proposed revisions of 
Article 2 that embrace or invite courts to recognize “terms later” 
contracting and demonstrates the impact of Judge Easterbrook’s 
ProCD and Hill opinions in the revision process. Part VII 
describes the course of action the author proposes with respect to 
legislative responses to UCITA and the referenced proposed 
revisions of UCC Article 2. Part VIII is a brief jurisprudential 
assessment of Easterbrook’s ProCD and Hill opinions and their 
broader implications for society. 
I. BAD LAW 
ProCD confirms the adage that bad seed produces bad fruit. 
Both ProCD and its initial bad fruit in the form of Hill continue to 
nurture and produce additional bad fruit with respect to contract 
formation and the enforcement of “terms later.” Its fruit includes 
several cases that follow the distorted legal analysis of UCC and 
common law principles exhibited in ProCD/Hill.11 
                                                          
11 Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002); I. 
Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass 
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A. ProCD v. Zeidenberg 
ProCD spent millions of dollars creating in CD-ROM format a 
comprehensive national directory of residential and business 
listings in a product it sold as Select PhoneTM.12 That product 
included over 95,000,000 residential and commercial listings that 
ProCD had obtained from approximately 3,000 publicly available 
telephone books.13 Such information (the data) was not 
copyrightable,14 but copyright protection attached to the software 
component.15 ProCD sought to block the competitive use of the 
data by purchasers of Select PhoneTM through a restrictive use 
contract, which it styled a “license.”16 It did not, however, describe 
the competitive restrictions to purchasers prior to their purchase of 
the product.17 Rather, it encased the restrictions in shrink-wrapped 
boxes containing a user guide and the discs.18 The user guide 
contained the terms of a Single User License Agreement, 
prohibiting copying of the data for other than personal use; and the 
discs were programmed so that upon installation the purchaser was 
alerted that the use of the product and the data was subject to the 
Single User License Agreement.19 One of the terms of the 
agreement provided that by using the discs and the listings the 
                                                          
2002); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 
Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 
519 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. 
Ill. 1999); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54 (2000); 
1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30 (Mass. App. Div. 2003); 
Scott v. Bell Atl. Corp., 282 A.D.2d 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc. 246 A.D. 2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. 1999). 
12 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
13 Id. 
14 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 
340 (1991). 
15 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 647. 
16 Id. at 644. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 644-45. 
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purchaser agreed to be bound by the terms of the license.20 If the 
purchaser did not agree to the terms, he was to promptly return the 
discs and the user guide, along with all copies of the software and 
listings that had been exported, to the place he had obtained the 
product.21 
According to the district court’s findings in ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg, “[t]he Select PhoneTM box mentions the agreement in 
one place in small print . . . . The box does not detail the specific 
terms of the license.”22 Zeidenberg had purchased an earlier 
version of Select Phone at a local retail store and presumably had 
observed the screen warnings on that version.23 Some months later 
he purchased an updated version with the purpose of downloading 
telephone listings from it for use in assembling his own larger 
telephone listings database to be marketed through his newly 
formed corporation.24 He was aware from the computer screen 
warnings that Select PhoneTM was subject to the agreement 
contained in the user guide, but disregarded them because he did 
not believe the license was binding.25 ProCD sought to enjoin that 
competitive commercial use, asserting that such use constituted 
copyright infringement and breach of the license agreement.26 
                                                          
20 Id. at 644. 
21 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644. 
22 Id. at 645. With respect to the size and placement of the notice, one 
commentator has stated: 
When we look at a ProCD box, Judge Easterbrook’s ‘offer’ becomes 
pure fantasy. The notice is printed on the bottom flap of the box, 
flanked by a statement in large type that there are 250 million telephone 
numbers on 11 CD-Roms and the bar code for the scanner. The notice 
is printed in 6-point type in a space 2 3/4th inches by 1 inch. 
Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating On a Sea of Custom? 
Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. L. REV. 
775, 779 n.25 (2000) [hereinafter Macaulay, Relational Contracts]. 
23 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 646. 
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1. The District Court’s Approach 
The district court rejected ProCD’s copyright challenge, 
finding use of the software to access the non-copyrighted listings 
and then subsequently making copies of the listings without further 
use of the ProCD software did not constitute a copyright 
infringement.27 In a well-reasoned opinion resting upon established 
principles of statutory and common law, it rejected the breach of 
contract challenge, concluding that Zeidenberg and his wholly 
owned corporation were not bound by the terms of the license 
agreement, access to which they did not have until after purchase 
of the product.28 
In particular, the district court, relying upon the express 
language of UCC section 2-206 (1),29 found that Zeidenberg’s 
payment for the software constituted acceptance of the retailer’s 
offer to sell by placing the software on the shelf, thus forming a 
contract at that moment.30 Further, it found that if the license terms 
first disclosed after the purchase were treated as a written 
confirmation of the contract, UCC section 2-207 precluded 
                                                          
27 Id. at 648-50. 
28 Id. at 650-56. The court refused to treat the knowledge Zeidenberg may 
have gained from his use of an earlier version of the program as knowledge of 
the restrictive terms for the updated version. It stated: 
Like any other parties to a contract, computer users should be given the 
opportunity to review the terms to which they will be bound each and 
every time they contract.  Although not all users will read the terms 
anew each time under such circumstances, it does not follow that they 
should not be given this opportunity. Defendants cannot be held to the 
user agreement included with the second and third copies of Select 
PhoneTM they purchased merely because they were aware of the terms 
included with the initial version. Each software purchase creates a new 
contract. Computer users should be given a fresh opportunity to review 
any terms to which those contracts will bind them. 
Id. at 654-55. 
29 U.C.C. § 2-206 (1995). Subsection (1)(a) of 2-206 provides: “Unless 
otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an 
offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner 
and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances . . . .” 
30 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 651-52. 
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enforcement of such terms,31 absent express agreement thereto by 
Zeidenberg.32 Alternatively, if the subsequently disclosed license 
terms were treated as a proposal for modification of the contract, 
UCC section 2-209 precluded their enforcement,33 absent express 
agreement thereto by Zeidenberg.34 
The court was reinforced in its conclusion that existing law did 
not support ProCD’s “terms later” argument by the fact that the 
“terms later” proposition was then being considered in the draft 
version of a proposed new UCC section.35 It concluded that such 
proposal “is evidence that the American Law Institute views 
current law as insufficient to guarantee the enforcement of 
standard form contracts such as shrinkwrap licenses.”36 Aware of 
                                                          
31 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995). That section provides: 
(1) A definite and reasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from 
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) The 
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; (b )they materially alter it; or (c)notification of objection to them 
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. (3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale 
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a 
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of 
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with 
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of 
this act. 
Id. 
32 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652-55. 
33 U.C.C. § 2-209 (1995). That section provides in relevant part: “(1) An 
agreement modifying a contract within this title needs no consideration to be 
binding.” Id. 
34 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 652-55. 
35 Id. at 655. The draft of proposed section 2-2203 would make shrink-wrap 
licenses with “terms later” enforceable, i.e., that the buyer would be bound by 
such “terms later” if it failed to reject them by returning the goods. Id. 
36 Id. 
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industry efforts to obtain legislation making “terms later” binding 
on purchasers, the district court nevertheless thoughtfully and 
faithfully applied the existing statutory and common law rules 
precluding such imposition. 
2. Judge Easterbrook’s Approach on Appeal 
Enter Judge Easterbrook who, with a disingenuous and less 
than intellectually honest opinion, deftly discarded clear statutory 
language and foundational common law principles and created in 
their place, virtually out of whole cloth, a new doctrine of contract 
formation.37 Writing for a panel of the Seventh Circuit, Judge 
Easterbrook concluded that no contract had been formed when 
Zeidenberg selected the box of software from the shelf of the 
retailer, paid for it, and left the store with it.38 Rather, the contract 
was formed only after Zeidenberg used the software after seeing 
the screen message referencing the licensing agreement, signaling 
his agreement to ProCD’s restrictive terms.39 
How could Easterbrook conclude that no contract was formed 
until then? Under UCC section 2-206(1)(a), adopted in 
Wisconsin,40 the jurisdiction whose law governed the case, 
“[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or 
circumstances . . . an offer to make a contract shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable 
in the circumstances.”41 Pre-Code Wisconsin case authority cited 
by the district court held that a sales contract results when the 
customer pays the purchase price and departs the store with the 
item.42 Just as other courts that dealt with contract formation issues 
                                                          
37 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
38 Id. at 1453-53. 
39 Id. 
40 WIS. STAT. § 402.206 (1)(a) (1977). 
41 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1995). “Unless otherwise unambiguously 
indicated by the language or circumstances (a) an offer to make a contract shall 
be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium 
reasonable in the circumstances.” Id. 
42 See Peeters v. State, 142 N.W. 181 (Wis. 1913). 
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in the context of retail store sales off the shelf,43 the district court 
held that the retailer’s placing the product on the store shelf 
constituted an offer.44 It also found that Zeidenberg had accepted 
ProCD’s offer to sell in a reasonable manner at the moment he 
purchased the product by exchanging money for the program.45 
Yet, for Easterbrook, the answer was easy. As to the authorities 
upon which the district court relied, he patronizingly observed, 
“[i]n Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract includes only the terms 
on which the parties have agreed.”46 One cannot agree to hidden 
terms, the judge concluded.47 So far, so good, except that one of 
the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by purchasing the software 
was that the transaction was subject to a license.48 Such a statement 
merely begs the legal question raised: whether Zeidenberg could 
have agreed to terms not available to him prior to his purchase. 
Easterbrook solved this question to his satisfaction with a 
rhetorical question of his own: but why would Wisconsin want to 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1979), and 
cases cited therein. The “exploding bottle” cases presented a real dilemma if the 
purchaser were treated as the offeror in response to the retailer’s invitation by 
placing the goods on display. That is because in the event the customer were 
injured by an exploding bottle prior to forming a contract based on his offer to 
buy and the retailer’s acceptance by taking payment, the injured customer could 
have no breach of warranty claim. But for trying to avoid that dilemma, courts 
would probably continue to have applied the common law presumption that 
display of goods for sale was merely an invitation to the customer to make the 
offer by tendering payment. Had that common law presumption been applied 
here, Zeidenberg would have made the offer to purchase and the retailer would 
have accepted by taking his money and delivering the software. Viewed in that 
way, it is clear that Zeidenberg’s offer was not one to purchase for only limited, 
noncommercial use. 
44 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 652 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
45 Id. Additionally, it found payment for the program constituted conduct 
sufficient to create a contract under UCC § 2-204(1) that provides “[a] contract 
for the sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, 
including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
contract.” Id. 
46 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996). 
47 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 645. 
48 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (emphasis added). 
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“fetter the parties’ choice”49 with respect to the way in which an 
offeror could bind the offeree to terms that the offeror wanted? For 
Easterbrook, the implicit self-evident answer is that surely 
Wisconsin would not want to insist that a seller actually disclose 
the terms of sale to the purchaser prior to payment. Interestingly, 
he phrases his question in terms of the “parties’ choice,” but one 
would be hard-pressed to assume that offerees would ever want to 
be bound by terms they could not know of until after they parted 
with their money. 
a. Purported Common Sense Argument 
Easterbrook purports to offer support, but not legal authority, 
for his assumed negative answer to his rhetorical question. His first 
rationale is the supposedly common sense one, that “[v]endors can 
put the entire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by 
using microscopic type, removing other information that buyers 
might find more useful (such as what the software does, and on 
which computers it works), or both.”50 Common sense, however, 
in fact suggests that the difficulty he describes is overstated, 
certainly with respect to the restrictive use term at issue in the 
case.51 Short phrases conveying the restrictive use limitation such 
                                                          
49 Id. at 1450-51. Additionally, it is apparent that the court is not really 
interested in what Wisconsin courts would do in this setting. One commentator 
has observed: 
Over the last two decades, the Seventh Circuit’s reading of Wisconsin 
statutes and cases has been funny or sad, depending on your point of 
view. As was true in the ProCD case, that court often embarks on a 
frolic of its own rather than attempting to do what a Wisconsin court 
would do. 
Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22, at 781 n.36. (citation omitted). 
50 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. Easterbrook elaborates on the assumed 
difficulty by noting, “The ‘Read Me’ file included with most software, 
describing system requirements and potential incompatibilities, may be 
equivalent to ten pages of type; warranties and license restrictions take still more 
space.” Id. 
51 Because of Judge Easterbrook’s commitment to a law and economics ex 
ante perspective, however, the facts that actually frame the issue of the case are 
of but limited significance. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
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as “FOR NONCOMMERCIAL USE ONLY,” or “NO 
DUPLICATION PERMITTED” come to mind. Surely such a 
phrase could prominently be displayed in large type without 
difficulty. 
b. Purported Legal Authority 
Easterbrook attempts to create the impression that there is solid 
legal support for his common sense “terms later” position when in 
fact there is none. This is the first of a series of 
mischaracterizations and distortions of law by which he seeks to 
provide the appearance of legal legitimacy for his opinion. He 
states: 
Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to 
return the software for a refund if the terms are 
unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends), 
may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and 
sellers alike. See E. Allan Farnsworth, 1 Farnsworth on 
Contracts § 4.26 (1990); Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 
211 comment a (1981) (“Standardization of agreements 
serves many of the same functions as standardization of 
goods and services; both are essential to a system of mass 
production and distribution. Scarce and costly time and 
skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than 
the details of individual transactions.”).52 
The references to the Farnsworth treatise and Second 
Restatement do not support the proposition for which they are 
cited. It is true that section 4.26 of the Farnsworth treatise is 
entitled “Standardized Agreements,” and a sentence in that section 
does state, “[a]s with goods, standardization and mass production 
contracts may serve the interest of both parties.”53 Note, however, 
that the proposition for which Judge Easterbrook cited the 
Farnsworth treatise was not merely that standard form contracts 
may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers 
                                                          
52 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
53 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 479 
(2d ed. 1990). 
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alike. Rather, the proposition Easterbrook stated was, “[n]otice on 
the outside, terms on the inside, and the right to return . . . if the 
terms are unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business 
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”54 Patently, section 4.26 of the 
Farnsworth treatise does not directly state or clearly support Judge 
Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition. Actually, the portion of 
section 4.26 of the Farnsworth treatise that addresses the 
effectiveness of terms of an offer of which the offeree had no 
actual awareness at the time he accepted supports a contrary 
proposition: that such terms are not part of the offer. It states: 
 A second judicial technique in dealing with standard 
forms is to refuse to hold a party to a term on the ground 
that, although the writing may plainly have been an offer, 
the term was not one that an uninitiated reader ought 
reasonably to have understood to be a part of that offer. 
This result is especially easy to reach if the term is on the 
reverse side of the form and the reference, if any, to terms 
on the reverse side is itself in fine print or otherwise 
inadequate. In the colorful language of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania: 
One of the most hateful acts of the ill-famed Roman 
tyrant Caligula was that of having the laws inscribed 
upon pillars so high that the people could not read 
them. Although the warrant of attorney [on the back of] 
the numerous sheets of the contract at bar was within 
the vision of the defendant, it was placed as to be 
completely beyond her contemplation of its purport. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The same reasoning has been used where the term was in 
a separate document, not attached to the signed writing but 
incorporated by a reference regarded by the court as 
insufficient. The size of the type and other factors affecting 
legibility of both the reference and the term itself play an 
important part in determining whether such a term is part of 
                                                          
54 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451 (emphasis added). 
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the contract.55 
If the Farnsworth treatise concludes that terms physically, but not 
realistically, available to the offeree for his inspection prior to 
acceptance are not part of the offer, then a fortiori terms that are 
not available at all for inspection prior to acceptance cannot be part 
of the offer. 
The same deficiencies infect Easterbrook’s citation to 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as though it supported the 
“terms later” proposition. The particular comment does address the 
utility of standardization, but does not at all address Easterbrook’s 
novel “terms later” proposition. Furthermore, the entire thrust of 
section 211 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts is antithetical to 
the proposition.56 That section addresses whether standardized 
terms of an offer that are actually available for inspection to the 
offeree prior to acceptance are part of the offer and thus part of the 
agreement resulting from the offeree’s acceptance. Significantly, 
section 211(3) states, “[w]here the other party has reason to believe 
that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew 
that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of 
the agreement.”57 
Section 211 stands for the proposition that a term that is 
physically, but not realistically, available to the offeree prior to his 
apparent manifestation of assent is not part of the agreement where 
                                                          
55 FARNSWORTH, supra note 53, § 4.26, at 483-84 (citations omitted). 
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). 
57 Id. (emphasis added). Comment f. to section 211 explains: 
Although customers typically adhere to standardized agreements and 
are bound by them without even appearing to know the standardized 
terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms which are beyond 
the range of reasonable expectation . . . . [A] party who adheres to the 
other party’s standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party 
has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have accepted 
the agreement if he had known that it contained the particular term . . . . 
Reason to believe may be inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre 
or oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the non-standard terms 
explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant 
purpose of the transaction. The inference is reinforced if the adhering 
party never had an opportunity to read the term . . . . 
Id. at § 211(3) cmt. f (emphasis added). 
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the offeror has reason to believe that the offeree would not have 
assented if he knew that the writing contained such a term. Thus, a 
fortiori it does not directly state or clearly support Judge 
Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition under which a party who 
could have no knowledge of a term prior to his manifestation of 
assent is bound by it. 
Judge Easterbrook’s intellectually dishonest citation to the 
Farnsworth treatise and Restatement (Second) Contracts as though 
each supported his “terms later” proposition brings to mind the rule 
regarding when non-disclosure is equivalent to an assertion, and 
thus a misrepresentation: 
A person’s non-disclosure of a fact known to him is 
equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist . . . : 
(a) where the person knows that disclosure of the fact is 
necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a 
misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material.58 
c. Law and Economics and the ex ante Perspective 
Easterbrook’s next line of purported legal support for his 
“terms later” proposition illustrates the law and economics ex ante 
perspective of decision-making that he brings to his judicial 
process.59 That perspective liberates him from the facts of the case, 
                                                          
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 (a) (1981) Comment a. 
provides that “[a party] may not, of course, tell half-truths and his assertion of 
only some of the facts without the inclusion of such additional matters as he 
knows or believes to be necessary to prevent it from being misleading is itself a 
misrepresentation.” Id. at § 160 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
59 Anthony I. Ogus, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Law, in 2 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 486-91 (Peter 
Newman ed. 1998). Therein the author notes: 
Legal doctrine is shaped by judges resolving disputes in a selection of 
cases, in relation normally to events that have already occurred. The ex 
post appraisal will often lead them to search for ‘just’ outcomes to the 
individual dispute, subordinating to that any concern for the ex ante 
impact of the ruling on future behavior. In Anglo-Saxon legal systems 
this tendency is enhanced by the adversarial culture inherent in the 
judicial process. In contrast, law and economics adopts a predominantly 
ex ante perspective, predicting the impact of a ruling, or of some 
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which are little more than a springboard for his law and economics 
analysis.60 Furthermore, it invites his speculation about the impact 
of his decision on possible future transactions by people other than 
the parties and even upon people who may not be in the affected 
business.61 Easterbrook’s framework of the case allows him to 
reference for support other contracting transactions in the purchase 
                                                          
alternative to it, on aggregate social behavior. Moreover, because the 
data are not limited to those that relate to the legal claim brought in the 
individual case, the analysis can potentially take account of a broader 
range of economic variables. 
Id. at 487. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984) Easterbrook praises the ex ante perspective, noting, 
The first line of inquiry, then, is whether the Justices take an ex ante or 
an ex post perspective in analyzing issues. Which they take will 
depend, in part, on the extent to which they appreciate how the 
economic system creates new gains and losses; those who lack this 
appreciation will favor ‘fair’ treatment [or other ex post arguments] of 
the parties. 
Id. 
60 For Easterbrook, one might more appropriately, but less graciously, 
describe them as “mere fodder,” in light of his previously expressed view 
toward the significance of the parties to a case. See Easterbrook, supra note 59, 
at 10-12. 
Fairness arguments are ex post arguments. . . . The degree to which 
fairness or other ex post arguments dominate in legal decisionmaking 
[sic] is directly related to the court’s assumptions about the nature of 
the economic system. Judges who see economic transactions as zero-
sum games are likely to favor ‘fair’ divisions of the gains and 
losses . . . . Yet if legal rules can create larger gains . . . the claim from 
fairness [or other ex post arguments] becomes weaker. The judge will 
pay less attention to today’s unfortunates and more attention to the 
effects of the rules. 
Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
61 Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 12. 
The people who might be affected by the rules are not before the court 
and may not even be in the affected business (yet). The interests of 
prospective consumers and producers are diffuse, too much so for any 
one person or group to participate in the litigation. The judge is the 
representative of these future interests. 
Id. 
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of insurance, airline tickets, theater tickets, radios, and drugs.62 He 
states, “Transactions in which the exchange of money precedes the 
communication of detailed terms are common.”63 Rather than 
citing legal authority confirming that purchasers in such other 
settings are bound by terms not disclosed or knowable to them 
prior to paying for the service or product, he merely invites the 
reader to “consider”64 various hypothetical illustrative transactions, 
apparently assuming that the self-evident resolution in each 
illustration will confirm for the reader that Judge Easterbrook’s 
“terms later” proposition is a long-standing, accepted contract 
practice. 
The particular illustrations that he invites the reader to consider 
raise other difficulties that undermine the appropriateness of any 
analogy he seeks to make. As has been noted elsewhere, insurance 
and airline tickets “are examples of regulated industries, not 
dependent on market discipline to prevent unfairness.”65 In an 
apparent effort to cause the reader to believe that his airline ticket 
illustration reflects the existence of actual legal authority 
supporting his “terms later” proposition, Judge Easterbrook cites 
two cases,66 neither of which dealt with the imposition of “terms 
                                                          
62 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996). 
63 Id. 
64 “Consider the purchase of insurance. . . . Or consider the purchase of an 
airline ticket. . . . Just so with a ticket to a concert. . . . Consumer goods work the 
same way. . . .” Id. 
65 Braucher, supra note 5, at 1823-24. 
Easterbrook claimed that delayed disclosure is a long-standing, 
accepted contract practice, citing insurance and airline tickets as 
examples. But these are examples of regulated industries, not 
dependent on market discipline to prevent unfairness. In the case of 
insurance, regulators typically have the responsibility of reviewing and 
approving policy terms. In addition, often state law provides for a 
required disclosure form setting forth key policy terms. In the case of 
airline tickets, most of the material in the ticket is dictated by U.S. 
Department of Transportation regulations requiring waivers of liability 
limits provided for in the Warsaw Convention, and by federal 
regulations dealing with overbooking and liability for baggage loss. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
66 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. “To use the ticket is to accept the terms, even 
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later.” In Carnival Cruise, the Court expressly noted: 
[W]e do not address the question whether respondents had 
sufficient notice of the forum clause before entering the 
contract for passage. Respondents essentially have 
conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection 
provision . . . . Additionally, the Court of Appeals 
evaluated the enforceability of the forum clause under the 
assumption, although “doubtful,” that respondents could be 
deemed to have had knowledge of the clause.67 
In Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, the disputed clause appeared 
in a standard form bill of lading, and no suggestion was made in 
the opinion that the party opposing its enforceability was unaware 
of its terms prior to entering into the contract of carriage.68 Thus 
neither case directly states or clearly supports Easterbrook’s “terms 
later” rule of law. 
When it comes to his concert illustration,69 his conclusion that 
what is written on the back of a theater ticket stub is a contractual 
term binding on the patron is contrary to hornbook law.70 At this 
                                                          
terms that in retrospect are disadvantageous. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 . . . (1991); see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. 
M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 . . . (1995) (bills of lading).” Id. 
67 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 590 (emphasis added). 
68 Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 528. 
69 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
Just so with a ticket to a concert. The back of the ticket states that the 
patron promises not to record the concert; to attend is to agree. A 
theater that detects a violation will confiscate the tape and escort the 
violator to the exit. One could arrange things so that every concertgoer 
signs this promise before forking over the money, but that cumbersome 
way of doing things not only would lengthen queues and raise prices 
but also would scotch the sale of tickets by phone or electronic data 
service. 
Id. 
70 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 298 (3rd ed. 1999). 
One of these techniques [for dealing with standardized terms] is to 
refuse to hold a party to a writing on the ground that it was not of a type 
that would reasonably appear to the recipient to contain the terms of a 
proposed contract. Even under the objective theory, it can be reasoned 
that such a writing is not an offer at all. As a New York court said of a 
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point in Easterbrook’s rationale one begins to sense that there is no 
legal support for his “terms later” conclusion, but only a pretense 
of legal support premised on speculation drawn from non-
analogous illustrations. 
The consumer goods illustrations that he suggests support his 
“terms later” proposition are likewise inapposite. In neither of his 
illustrations does a term on the inside of the box diminish the 
contractual rights of the purchaser that would normally flow from 
his purchase of the goods. In his radio illustration, the radio is 
purchased from a retailer and the term in the sealed box is a 
manufacturer’s warranty term.71 In his packaged drugs illustration, 
the drugs are purchased from a retailer and the sealed box contains 
                                                          
claim check given to a patron by a railroad’s parcel checking service, 
“In the mind of the bailor the little piece of cardboard . . . did not arise 
to the dignity of a contract by which he agreed that in the event of the 
loss of the parcel, even through the negligence of the bailee itself, he 
would accept therefore a sum which perhaps would be but a small 
fraction of its actual value.” . . . . The argument that the writing is not 
an offer is particularly compelling with respect to tickets, passes, and 
stubs . . . . 
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. d (1981): 
Non-contractual documents. The same document may serve both 
contractual and other purposes, and a party may assent to it for other 
purposes without understanding that it embodies contract terms. . . . 
[B]aggage checks or automobile parking lot tickets may appear to be 
mere identification tokens, and a party who without knowledge or 
reason to know that the token purports to be a contract is then not 
bound by terms printed on the token. 
Id. 
71 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
Consumer goods work the same way. Someone who wants to buy a 
radio set visits a store, pays, and walks out with a box. Inside the box is 
a leaflet containing some terms, the most important of which usually is 
the warranty, read for the first time in the comfort of home. By 
Zeidenberg’s lights, the warranty in the box is irrelevant; every 
consumer gets the standard warranty implied by the UCC in the event 
the contract is silent; yet so far as we are aware no state disregards 
warranties furnished with consumer products. 
Id. 
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information provided by the manufacturer that describes drug 
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information.72 As 
noted elsewhere, “in . . . indirect marketing, the manufacturer is 
not in privity of contract with the buyer. A third-party 
manufacturer’s warranty can only add to the deal offered by the 
seller, not take away. Manufacturers’ warranties [required by 
governmental regulations regarding disclosure and substantive 
requirements] are not typically products of contract . . . .”73 
Likewise, in the drug illustration the manufacturer is not in privity 
with the consumer, and the manufacturer’s disclosure of drug 
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information is 
supplied because it is mandated by federal regulation for the 
protection of consumers.74 
According to Easterbrook, unless his “terms later” proposition 
was adopted, the buyers in each instance could gain no benefit 
against the manufacturer from such terms because they would not 
be part of the contract, i.e., the contract between the consumer and 
the retailer. That invited conclusion is erroneous. Only by sheer 
force of assertion can illustrations of transactions in which 
consumers gain benefits as a result of governmentally mandated 
terms be analogized to a transaction in which a seller seeks to 
reduce the benefits to the consumer after making the purchase. 
Easterbrook’s final analogies bear at least some resemblance to 
the facts in the case in that they at least deal with software sales. 
The resemblance, however, goes no further than that, and 
                                                          
72 Id. 
Drugs come with a list of ingredients on the outside and an elaborate 
package insert on the inside. The package insert describes drug 
interactions, contraindications, and other vital information—but, if 
Zeidenberg is right, the purchaser need not read the package insert, 
because it is not part of the contract. 
Id. The illustration noticeably understates the nature of the information typically 
found on the on the outside of the box, probably to make the contents on the 
inside appear to be more of a surprise. But even taking the unrealistic facts at 
face value, the illustration does not support Judge Easterbrook’s “terms later” 
proposition. 
73 Braucher, supra note 5, at 1824-25 (emphasis added). 
74 FDA Labeling Requirements for Over-the-Counter Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 
201.66, pt. 201, subpt. C (2003). 
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apparently, his law and economics ex ante analysis requires no 
more.75 Here, he analogizes hypothetical software sales 
transactions that bear little resemblance to the context of the case 
at hand, other than that they involve sales of software. His 
hypothetical sales transactions arise in the context of purchasers 
placing orders by phone or over the Internet,76 even though such 
contexts are unhampered by physical box size limitation, the very 
limitation upon which his first rationale was based. His 
hypothetical software transactions do not explicitly state that the 
seller’s terms were not disclosed until after the purchaser had 
parted with his money and the goods were delivered.77 For these 
terms to have relevance as an analogy he necessarily makes an 
additional assumption. Such supposition, however, would not be 
warranted by the actual practice of sellers selling software over the 
Internet.78 But perhaps this supposition would not even be 
necessary for Easterbrook to think the analogy instructive or at 
least useful to support an additional rationale for “terms later.” 
Perhaps under an ex ante analysis, the larger context of software 
sales generally and the convenience for sellers in operating their 
businesses is the more significant consideration and is sufficient to 
make the hypotheticals relevant. 
Furthermore, the software hypotheticals Easterbrook uses to 
suggest that precluding sellers from a “terms later” practice would 
                                                          
75 Easterbrook, supra note 59. 
76 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52. 
[C]onsider the software industry itself. Only a minority of sales take 
place over the counter, where there are boxes to peruse. A customer 
may place an order by phone in response to a line item in a catalog or a 
review in a magazine. Much software is ordered over the Internet by 
purchasers who have never seen a box. Increasingly software arrives by 
wire. There is no box; there is only a stream of electrons, a collection of 
information that includes data, an application program, instructions, 
many limitations . . . . 
Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Jerry C. Liu, Robert J. O’Connell & W. Scott Petty, Electronic 
Commerce: Using Clickwrap Agreements, 15 NO. 12 COMPUTER LAWYER 10, 
14 (1998); Jennifer Femminella, Note, Online Terms and Conditions 
Agreements: Bound by the Web, 2003 ST. JOHNS J. OF LEG. 87, 95-100. 
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“drive prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horse-
and-buggy age”79 bear no resemblance to the issues in ProCD or to 
the reality of Internet selling. Certainly there is nothing inherent in 
the Internet sales transaction that precludes the seller’s disclosure 
of limited warranty or exclusion of consequential damages terms 
prior to taking the purchaser’s money. After all, this is the 
“information age” and Internet sellers can and do make such pre-
purchase disclosure on a regular basis.80 
When one sorts through all the verbiage, Easterbrook provides 
no legal authority for his conclusion that the express provisions of 
UCC section 2-206 governing offer-acceptance contract formation 
are not controlling in this case. He does not even suggest that the 
unusual manner of acceptance described in the sealed shrink-wrap, 
unknowable to the buyer prior to purchase, “unambiguously 
indicated” that the offer did not invite acceptance in any manner 
reasonable under the circumstances, i.e., as by paying the retail 
seller the purchase price. His refusal to abide by the statute 
conceivably reflects his understanding of the role of the judiciary 
described in his writings.81 As he once observed, “[j]udges 
question the acts of the other branches and on occasion do 
otherwise than these rules command. The judge refuses to abide by 
a statute because he believes that some higher law requires this.”82 
The higher law in this instance appears to be his perception of the 
appropriate balance between optimal creation and optimal use of 
information based on his assessment from a policy-making ex ante 
                                                          
79 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The particular terms in his hypothetical 
transaction are those of a limited warranty and an exclusion of liability for 
consequential damages. The conclusion that Easterbrook invites the reader to 
draw is that an Internet seller would be unable to protect against exposure for 
breach of a broad implied warranty and consequential damages if he could not 
bind the purchaser to his limited warranty and preclusion of consequential 
damages that were not disclosed until after the purchase. But that is not true as 
the practice of Internet sellers is to disclose such terms prior to the purchase 
confirms. 
80 See Liu, O’Connell & Petty, supra note 78. 
81 Frank H. Easterbrook, What’s So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COL. L. 
REV. 773 (1990). 
82 Id. at 777 (emphasis added). 
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perspective.83 
d. Purported Distinguishing of Statute and Precedent 
Easterbrook employs a different approach to the statutory 
prescriptions of UCC section 2-207,84 a section that would appear 
to be an insurmountable hurdle to his “terms later” proposition. 
Rather than merely refusing to abide by the prescriptions of section 
2-207 because they are not practical in this setting, Easterbrook 
                                                          
83 Easterbrook, supra note 59, at 23. 
Problems involving intellectual property present the dichotomy 
between ex post and ex ante perspectives especially starkly. Once 
someone has created information, the cost of using the information is 
small. The information may be used without being used up . . . . 
Because the marginal cost of using information is small or even zero, 
there is a strong case for establishing a system of legal rules that makes 
the information freely available . . . . Yet from an ex ante perspective it 
is necessary to compensate the programmer. Even if a few people 
would write computer programs just for the challenge (or for their own 
use), they would not make those programs available to the rest of us 
without the promise of compensation. Without a doubt thousands of 
people write programs only because of the prospect of reward. Those 
who write increase their productivity as the prospect of reward 
increases. The lower the rewards, the fewer programs there will be and 
the poorer will be the quality of each existing program; it takes a lot of 
time to perfect a program, and again the prospect of reward will 
influence how much time the programmer invests. The problem is that 
if you allow the author to collect a royalty for the effort, you create a 
loss by discouraging use. Higher royalties (up to the monopoly level) 
yield more and better programs at the same time as they yield less 
effective use of programs once the programs exist. The incentives that 
yield optimal creation will prevent optimal use, and the reverse. There 
is no neat solution to this problem . . . . It is hard to understate the 
importance of the way the Supreme Court chooses to deal with the 
difficult choices that influence optimal creation versus optimal use of 
information. An ex post perspective that always favors free use of 
information inevitably leaves us with too little; an ex ante perspective 
that recognizes the difficulties of choice is more likely to be beneficial. 
Id. at 21-23. 
84 U.C.C. § 2-207 (1995). See supra note 31 (setting forth the statute in 
full). 
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summarily disposes of them in another fashion. 
He asserts that section 2-207 is “irrelevant,” because “[o]ur 
case has only one form,”85 and he purports, in a transparently 
disingenuous fashion, to distinguish the relevant section 2-207 
precedent which was directly contrary to his “terms later” 
proposition.86 
As written and uniformly construed prior to Easterbrook’s 
ProCD opinion, section 2-207 provides the controlling law with 
respect to treatment of additional terms that are first disclosed after 
a contract has been formed.87 Pursuant to that section additional 
written terms appearing in confirmation of a contract previously 
made are “to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract.”88 In a contract “between merchants” such additional 
terms will become part of the contract unless either the offer had 
                                                          
85 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. “Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is 
irrelevant.” Id. 
86 Id. Easterbrook asserts: 
[O]nly three cases (other than ours) touch on the subject, and none 
directly addresses it. See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology; Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.; Arizona Retail 
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc. As their titles suggest, these are 
not consumer transactions. Step-Saver is a battle-of-the-forms case, in 
which the parties exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide 
which prevails. . . . Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is 
irrelevant. Vault holds that Louisiana’s special shrinkwrap-license 
statute is preempted by federal law, a question to which we return. And 
Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question, because the court 
found that the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing 
the software. 
Id. (citations omitted). See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text 
(discussing those cases and rebutting Easterbrook’s effort to distinguish them). 
87 U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1995). See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. 
Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman 
Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software 
Link, Inc. 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Winter Panel Corp. v. Reichhold 
Chems., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 963 (D. Mass. 1993); Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han 
Yang Chem. Corp., 813 F. Supp. 310 (D. N.J. 1993); Glyptal, Inc. v. Engelhard 
Corp., 801 F. Supp. 887(D. Mass. 1992). See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual 
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1249-52 (1995). 
88 U.C.C. § 2-207 (2) (1995). 
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expressly limited acceptance to the terms of the offer, the 
additional terms materially alter the contract previously made, or 
they are timely objected to or have previously been objected to.89 If 
the contract is not one “between merchants,” the additional terms 
are mere proposals for addition and like any other offer to modify a 
contract, are not effective unless expressly agreed to by the other 
party.90 Under a fair reading of the facts and law, which the district 
court adopted, the contract was formed when Zeidenberg 
purchased the software at the store.91 The terms that were 
accessible only thereafter were merely proposals for addition to the 
contract previously formed and did not become a part of the 
contract unless they were expressly agreed to, which they were 
not.92 
Easterbrook’s cavalier treatment of both the statute and 
precedent has been roundly and rightly criticized.93 Professor 
Gergen states, “[t]here is one real howler in [ProCD and Hill]—
they say that 2-207 applies only when there are two forms. This is 
just dead wrong.”94 Professor Hillman is unequivocal in his 
condemnation of Easterbrook’s treatment of section 2-207, noting, 
“[he] was plainly wrong about section 2-207’s applicability. 
Nothing in the text of the section limits it to transactions involving 
more than one form.”95 Likewise, Professor Braucher concurs that 
“[n]othing in the language of section 2-207 limits its application to 
two-form situations or even to forms at all,” further noting that, 
“[t]he Pro-CD analysis also is contrary to Comment 1 to Section 2-
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 Id. See also Richard E. Speidel, Symposium: The Revision of Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code: Contract Formation and Modification Under 
Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305, 1323 (1994); Christopher L. 
Pitet, Note and Comment, The Problem With “Money Now, Terms Later”: 
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of “Shrinkwrap” Software 
Licenses, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 325, 338-39 (1997). 
91 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 653-56 (W.D. Wis. 1996). 
92 Id. 
93 See sources cited supra note 5. 
94 Gergen, supra note 7, at 1154 (emphasis added). 
95 Hillman, supra note 5, at 753. 
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207, which refers to one-form transactions.”96 
Judge Easterbrook displays the same intellectual dishonesty 
when “distinguishing” away relevant case authority that applied 
section 2-207 to preclude enforcement of terms a seller first 
disclosed after the buyer made the purchase.97 Although none 
involved a purchase off a retail shelf, two of the three, Step-Saver 
Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology98 and Arizona Retail 
Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc.,99 presented the very issue that 
was before the court in ProCD. In each the issue was whether a 
seller of software could bind the buyer to terms not disclosed to the 
buyer until after purchase by stating in those belatedly disclosed 
terms that opening the shrink-wrap package and using the software 
constituted agreement by the buyer.100 In each case the respective 
court held that such terms were not enforceable, expressly relying 
upon the provisions of section 2-207.101 Only Vault Corp. v. Quaid 
Software Ltd. did not directly address the matter of enforceability 
of “terms later.”102 It did not need to address the issue because it 
                                                          
96 Jean Braucher, UCITA and the Concept of Assent, 673 PLI/PAT. 175, 184 
(2001). UCC § 2-207 (1) expressly includes “a written confirmation which is 
sent within a reasonable time;” and comment 1 states, “This section is intended 
to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written confirmation, where an 
agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence 
between the parties and followed by one or more of the parties sending formal 
memoranda embodying terms not discussed.” U.C.C. § 2-207 (1) and cmt. 2 
(1995); see also James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of 
Contracting Out, 48 LOY. L. REV. 53, 80 n.121 (2002) (collecting cases applying 
section 2-207 to one-writing transactions); see also Klocek v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000) (expressly declining to follow 
ProCD’s reasoning, noting that court’s conclusion about the irrelevance of  
section 2-207 to one-form transactions had been asserted “without support;” and 
further that such conclusion was not supported by the statute or by Kansas or 
Missouri law construing the statute). 
97 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (asserting that “only three cases (other than 
ours) touch on the subject, and none directly addresses it”) (emphasis added). 
98 Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
99 Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. 
Ariz. 1993). 
100 See infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text. 
101 Id. 
102 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 268-70 (5th Cir. 
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found that the Copyright Act preempted the Louisiana statute that 
made shrink-wrap licenses enforceable, upon which the software 
seller premised its contract claim.103 
Easterbrook attempts to distinguish Step-Saver and Arizona 
Retail Systems first because they did not involve “consumer 
transactions,”104 suggesting that section 2-207 is inapplicable to 
                                                          
1988). 
103 Id. at 270. 
104 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. For Code purposes, and particularly for § 2-
207 purposes, a consumer transaction is simply one in which at least one of the 
parties is a “non-merchant” under Code terminology. The typical consumer 
transaction is sale by a business entity (a “merchant”) to a person purchasing for 
personal use. UCC § 2-104 (1) defines “merchant;” UCC § 2-104 (3) defines 
transactions “between merchants;” and comment 2 elaborates on the matter, 
providing in pertinent part: 
The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and 
they are of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 
dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda 
and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought 
to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of 
these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be 
deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who . . . by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices . . . involved in the transaction . . .” since the practices 
involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such 
as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even universities, 
for example, well may be “merchants.” But even these sections only 
apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank 
president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant. 
U.C.C. §2-104 cmt. 2 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 Thus, the typical consumer transaction is one in which the purchaser buys 
for personal, as contrasted with business, use. In concluding that Zeidenberg’s 
purchase was a “consumer transaction,” Easterbrook overlooked the express 
findings that: 
In late 1994, defendant Zeidenberg purchased a copy of Select 
PhoneTM at a local retail store. In February or March 1995, defendant 
Zeidenberg decided he could download data from Select PhoneTM and 
make it available to third parties over the Internet for commercial 
purposes. Zeidenberg purchased an updated version of Select 
PhoneTM in March 1995 and in April 1995, incorporated Silken 
Mountain Web Services, Inc. for the purpose of making a database of 
telephone listings available over the Internet. 
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such transactions; however, that is a clear misinterpretation of the 
language of section 2-207(2)105 and authority interpreting that 
section.106 The first sentence of subsection (2) states the general 
rule with respect to treatment of additional terms in an acceptance 
or confirmation: that they “are to be construed as proposals for 
addition to the contract.”107 Like any other proposal, they have no 
contractual import unless they are actually agreed to.108 The second 
sentence makes an exception to that rule in the case of contracts 
between merchants, creating a presumption that additional terms 
that do not materially alter the contract become part of the contract 
                                                          
Id. at 645 (emphasis added). Because Zeidenberg was purchasing the phone for 
use in his new business, it appears he could have appropriately been considered 
a merchant buyer under the definition of merchant in UCC § 2-104 cmt. 2. If 
Zeidenberg had been treated as a “merchant” for purposes of Easterbrook’s § 2-
207 analysis, then Easterbrook would have had to recognize that he was dealing 
with exactly the same kind of “between merchants” setting that the courts had 
dealt with in Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems. In any event, as discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 108-09, treating Zeidenberg as a consumer rather 
than as a merchant should have resulted in even more protection against 
imposition of “terms later.” 
105 UCC § 2-207 (2) states: 
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them 
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. 
U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
106 See, e.g., McAfee v. Brewer, 203 S.E.2d 129, 131 (Va. 1974); Coastal 
Industries, Inc. v. Automatic Steam Products Corp., 654 F. 375, 378 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1981). See also John E. Murray, Jr., The Definitive “Battle of the Forms,” 
Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. & COM. 1, 7-8 (2000); John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M. 
Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J.L. & COM. 1, 27 
(1999); Mark E. Roszkowski & John D. Wladis, U.C.C. Section 2-207: The 
Drafting History, 49 BUS. LAW. 1065, 1079 (1994); Mark Andrew Cerny, 
Commentary, A Shield Against Arbitration: 2-20’s Role in the Enforceability of 
Arbitration Agreements Included With Delivery of Products, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
821, 833 (2000). 
107 U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1998). 
108 See sources cited supra note 90. 
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unless certain circumstances exist.109 Thus, section 2-207(2) 
provides more protection, not less, against imposition of “terms 
later” in the case of consumer buyers than it does in transactions in 
which both sellers and buyers are merchants. Rather than being 
inapplicable because they did not involve consumer transactions, 
both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems, which held that 
section 2-207(2) precluded imposition of “terms later” against 
merchant buyers, would a fortiori be applicable, powerful 
authority that section 2-207(2) precludes such imposition against a 
consumer buyer. 
Easterbrook’s next purported basis for distinguishing Step-
Saver is to dismiss it as a “battle of forms case, in which the parties 
exchange incompatible forms and a court must decide which 
prevails,” rendering it of no relevance to the decision in ProCD, 
which involved but one form.110 Step-Saver, however, did not 
present an issue of incompatible forms. As cogently noted by one 
commentator, 
[I]n Step-Saver there was a contract by telephone followed 
by a purchase order and invoice that manifested no “battle 
of the forms.” The single document that contained different 
or additional terms was the box-top license arriving after 
the contract was formed. The effort of the Seventh Circuit 
in this regard is, therefore, a consummate illustration of a 
distinction without a difference.111 
                                                          
109 See Murray & Flechtner, supra note 106, at 33. 
[T]he general rule that applies to transactions involving one or more 
non-merchants requires express assent to any additional terms while the 
exception to that rule would allow immaterial additional terms to 
become part of the contract between merchants. Indeed, this is 
precisely how § 2-207(2) has been applied in a transaction between 
non-merchants. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
110 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). 
111 Murray & Flechtner, supra note 106, at 33 (emphasis added). See also 
Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1972). The 
court in Dorton concluded in an alternative holding that if the contract had been 
formed during a telephone conversation, the single form sent thereafter by the 
seller with terms additional to or different from those in the prior oral 
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Easterbrook made it easy for himself to distinguish Arizona 
Retail Systems by merely ignoring part of the holding in that case. 
He asserted, “Arizona Retail Systems did not reach the question [of 
terms later], because the court found that the buyer knew the terms 
of the license before purchasing the software.”112 The district 
court, however, described the issues and holdings of Arizona Retail 
Systems with great thoroughness.113 The decision in Arizona Retail 
Systems addressed two separate categories of purchases: the initial 
one in which the buyer knew the terms of the license before 
purchasing; and the subsequent ones in which the buyer ordered 
software by phone, the seller accepted in the same conversation, 
and thereafter sent the software with the license agreement 
attached to the packaging.114 As to the former, the court held the 
buyer bound by the license terms.115 With respect to the 
subsequent transactions, however, the Arizona Retail Systems court 
stated: 
[T]he court concludes that the terms of the license 
agreement are not applicable. In all material respects, the 
subsequent purchases in this case are equivalent to the 
purchases in Step-Saver. This court finds that regardless of 
whether the terms of the license agreement are treated as 
proposals for additional terms under U.C.C. § 2-207, or 
proposals for modification under U.C.C. § 2-209, the terms 
of the license agreement are not a part of the agreement 
between the parties. . . . Having not expressly agreed to the 
terms of the agreement, [the buyer] was not bound by those 
                                                          
agreement, such form would be treated as a confirmation and a proposal for 
addition of terms to the contract. Under section 2-207(2) such terms would be 
added to the contract if they did not materially alter it since both parties were 
merchants. If they materially altered the oral agreement, however, the buyer 
“could not become bound thereby absent an express agreement to that effect 
(emphasis supplied).” Id. at 1170. 
112 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
113 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 653-54 (W.D. Wis. 
1996). 
114 Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link, Inc. 831 F. Supp. 759, 
760-62 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
115 Id. at 763-64. 
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terms.116 
If a first-year law student were to say that Arizona Retail Systems 
did not address the “terms later” issue because the court found that 
the buyer knew the terms of the license before purchasing the 
software, the student would be given an “F” for demonstrating 
such an utter lack of understanding or extreme carelessness in 
reading the case.117 But when a brilliant federal judge makes such a 
statement with full knowledge of the case’s holdings, it appears to 
reflect something quite different and disturbing—a willingness to 
engage in intentional misrepresentations to advance a personal 
conviction. 
With respect to the inference that the district court drew in 
support of its rejection of ProCD’s “terms later” position from the 
consideration by the American Law Institute of draft section 2-203 
of a new UCC provision, Easterbrook purports to dispatch it with a 
methodology characteristic of that applied throughout the opinion. 
First, he misstates the more limited inference drawn by the district 
court that the proposed draft statute was “evidence that the 
American Law Institute views current law as insufficient to 
guarantee the enforcement of standard form contracts such as 
shrinkwrap licenses,”118 into the larger inference that “the 
American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform Laws have conceded the invalidity of 
shrinkwrap licenses under current law.”119 To some, making note 
of that misstatement of the district court’s rationale may seem to be 
much concern about so small a point. But that misstatement is 
characteristic of the methodology used throughout the opinion—so 
characteristic, in fact, that one cannot dismiss it as mere 
sloppiness. Rather, this is but another example of misstatement by 
design, one of the trademarks of the opinion. 
Then, to dispatch the mis-decsribed rationale he ascribes to the 
lower court, Easterbrook merely asserts that it “depends on a faulty 
                                                          
116 Id. at 766 (emphasis added). 
117 Cf. Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148. 
118 ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655 (emphasis added). 
119 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (emphasis added). 
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inference.”120 To borrow a phrase from Easterbrook, “So far, so 
good—but”121 is there any evidence that there existed a “current 
rule,” albeit one that needed fortifying, that “terms later” are 
enforceable? And among the flux of law review articles discussing 
shrink-wrap licenses, did any state that such terms were currently 
legally enforceable? One would have thought that if there were any 
legal authority for such “current rule” that Easterbrook would have 
cited it. But none was cited, and none existed.122 Likewise with 
respect to scholarly comment, if any actually supported the 
proposition that under then existing law “terms later” were legally 
enforceable, one would have expected that they would have been 
cited.123 But none was cited. Apparently for Easterbrook, the mere 
                                                          
120 Id. 
To propose a change in a law’s text is not necessarily to propose a 
change in the law’s effect. New words may be designed to fortify the 
current rule with a more precise text that curtails uncertainty. To judge 
by the flux of law review articles discussing shrinkwrap licenses, 
uncertainty is much in need of reduction—although businesses seem to 
feel less uncertainty than do scholars, for only three cases (other than 
ours) touch on the subject, and none directly addresses it. 
Id. 
121 Id. at 1450. 
122 The case authority that had addressed the enforceability of “terms later” 
in conjunction with sales of software had denied enforcement. See supra text 
accompanying notes 107-17 for discussion of the ways Easterbrook sought to 
distinguish such authority out of existence. 
123 The scholarly commentary to the contrary was voluminous. See, e.g., 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An 
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 261, 295 (1985); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and 
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1249-52 (1995); Symposium, 
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2432, 2516 n.451 (1994) (“Software producers, frustrated by their inability 
to enforce private restraints on users’ and purchasers’ rights at the federal level, 
have now persuaded the revisors of Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2A, to 
recommend validation of similar constraints, including ‘shrink wrap’ licenses, at 
the state level.”); Pamela Samuelson, Will the Copyright Office be Obsolete in 
the Twenty-First Century? 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 55, 61 n.31 (1994); 
Symposium, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2318 n.26 (1994); Michael D. Scott, 
Frontier Issues: Pitfalls in Developing and Marketing Multimedia Products, 13 
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surmise of some other possible (not necessarily plausible) 
inference is sufficient to make any other a “faulty inference.” 
e. Purported Support from “Master of the Offer” and the 
Objective Theory 
Easterbrook’s suggestion that draft section 2-203 was designed 
to “fortify” a “current rule” of enforceability of “terms later” is 
incredulous. His treatment of UCC section 2-207 and applicable 
authority construing and applying it is indefensible. But it is his 
refusal to abide by the particular contract formation rule of UCC 
section 2-206(1), or to even acknowledge that hornbook law 
explains that section is a qualification124 on the general language of 
UCC section 2-204(1), that opens the door for him to take his 
“master of the offer” step.125 By writing as though the only Code 
provision addressing contract formation was section 2-204,126 he 
asks: 
What then does the current version of the UCC have to 
say? We think that the place to start is § 2-204(1): “A 
contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner 
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
contract.”127 
For Easterbrook it is also the place to end as far as the current 
                                                          
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 414, 444 (1995); Dennis Cline, Comment, 
Copyright Protection of Software in the EEC: The Competing Policies 
Underlying Community and National Law and the Case for Harmonization, 75 
CAL. L. REV. 633, 662-63 (1987). 
124 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
HORNBOOK SERIES § 1-5 at 49-50, (5th ed. 2000). “The Code continues the 
offeror’s common law right to specify that one’s offer may be accepted only in a 
given manner. But if the offeror does not so specify, 2-206 (1) provides that 
offers generally invite acceptance ‘in any manner and by any medium 
reasonable in the circumstances.’” Id. 
125 By refusing to abide by section 2-206 formation rules he was also able 
to ignore section 2-209 and the requirement of express assent to any proposed 
modification of an existing contract. 
126 U.C.C. § 204(1) (1995). 
127 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452 (quoting from UCC section 2-204(1)). 
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version of the Code has anything to say. 
The generality of UCC section 2-204(1) is seized upon by 
Easterbrook as an invitation to draw exclusively from whatever 
general common law principles would be most helpful to his 
“terms later” proposition. The common law principle he seizes 
upon provides: “A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite 
acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of 
conduct that constitutes acceptance.”128 
For his application of that principle to this case, Easterbrook 
treats ProCD as the “vendor” and “master” of the offer.129 The 
actual vendor, however, was the retailer from whom Zeidenberg 
purchased the software. This seems irrelevant to Easterbrook.130 
Yet one wonders by what legal authority a non-party to a sale 
transaction can prescribe the exclusive method of contract 
formation for the parties and even prescribe that method in a 
manner that is unknowable to at least one of the parties prior to the 
exchange of money and goods. A third party may be a beneficiary 
of a contract formed by other parties, but it has never been 
suggested that even an intended third-party beneficiary may 
control how the actual parties form their contract. Easterbrook does 
not address those knotty questions, preferring to treat the case as 
though ProCD had engaged in a direct sale to Zeidenberg.131 
Even if it had actually involved a direct sale by ProCD but 
presentation of the software package on the sale shelf of a retailer 
and exchange of the package in return for payment by the buyer of 
the purchase price, the vendor as master of the offer principle does 
not support Easterbrook’s conclusion. Here again, it is Easterbrook 
suggesting that a rule of law supports his position but failing to 
disclose what the rule of law really is. For such candid disclosure 
would reveal the “rule” is actually of no support at all for his 
position. Easterbrook’s master of the offer theory fails because 
under the objective theory of contracts, it is not the undisclosed 
intention of a party that controls the legal import of his words or 
                                                          
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Zeidenberg purchased the software package at a retail outlet in Madison, 
Wisconsin, rather than from ProCD directly. Id. at 1450. 
131 Id. at 1448-53. 
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conduct, a fact he had previously articulated in such colorful 
language that it found its way into the Farnsworth treatise.132 
Rather, it is the apparent intention manifested by the words or 
conduct of a party, judged objectively, that counts. That is why 
Restatement (Second) Contracts speaks not of actual subjective 
intention, but rather of “manifestation of intention:” 
Many contract disputes arise because different people 
attach different meanings to the same words and conduct. 
The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external 
or objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means that 
the external expression of intention as distinguished from 
undisclosed intention. A promisor manifests an intention if 
he believes or has reason to believe that the promisee will 
infer that intention from his words or conduct.133 
In instances where the parties actually attach different 
meanings to their outward manifestations, Restatement (Second) 
Contracts establishes what may be called the fault principle for 
determining whose meaning is legally operative.134 Applying the 
objective theory of contracts, it provides that the manifestations 
operate in accordance with the meaning attached to them by one of 
the parties if that party had no reason to know of any different 
meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know of 
the meaning attached by the first party.135 This fault basis for 
determining whose understanding of the meaning of manifestations 
of intention is operative, is fundamental in the analysis of 
Easterbrook’s implicit steps on the way to his conclusion that the 
“master of the offer” principle confirms the rightness of his “terms 
                                                          
132 See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6 (2d 
ed. 2001). “By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had 
become ascendant and courts universally accept it today. In the words of a 
distinguished federal judges, ‘intent’ does not invite a tour through plaintiff’s 
cranium, with [plaintiff] as the guide [quoting from Judge Easterbrook’s opinion 
in Skycom. Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987), a case 
applying Wisconsin law].” See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
19 (1981). 
133 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981). 
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(2) (1981). 
135 Id. at § 20(2)(b) (1981). 
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later” proposition. 
With the objective theory of contracts in mind, consider 
Easterbrook’s first implicit step: payment and receipt of the 
purchase price for the software displayed on the sale shelf could 
not have resulted in a contract for sale because ProCD as the 
“master of the offer” had no actual intention to be bound by a 
contract at that point in time.136 But it is hornbook law that there is 
no requirement that a party must actually intend to be legally 
bound before his actions can have that effect.137 Thus, a party will 
be legally bound if he believes or has reason to believe that the 
other party will infer that intention from his conduct.138 “An offer 
is the manifestation of a willingness to enter into a bargain, so 
made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”139 Thus even if 
ProCD did not have in mind that its manifestations had the legal 
effect of being an offer inviting immediate acceptance in any 
reasonable manner, i.e., by paying the purchase price, it would not 
alter the legal effect of its conduct. 
Easterbrook might counter that it was not a matter of ProCD 
                                                          
136 Easterbrook stated that while a contract can be formed simply by paying 
the price and walking out of the store, “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer 
would accept by using the software after having opportunity to read the license 
at leisure.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
137 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, at § 3.7, at 120-21. 
Parties to agreements, especially routine ones, often fail to consider the 
legal consequences of the actions by which they manifest their 
assent . . . . [T]here is no requirement that one intend or even 
understand the legal consequences of one’s actions . . . . This rule, 
making a party’s intention to be legally bound irrelevant, has the 
salutary effects of generally relieving each party to a dispute of the 
burden of showing the other’s state of mind in that regard and of 
helping to uphold routine agreements. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1982). 
139 Id. (emphasis added); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 3.10, at 
132-33. “Conduct that would lead a reasonable person in the other party’s 
position to infer a promise in return for performance or promise may amount to 
an offer. . . . One who holds out goods may be taken to be offering them for 
sale.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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merely being unmindful of potential legal consequences of its 
conduct; rather, ProCD had an actual intent not to permit 
acceptance of its offer to sell to occur when the buyer paid the 
price, and thus an actual intent not to be bound contractually at the 
time of payment. As “master of the offer” it could make 
acceptance effective only by the method it prescribed in its offer 
contained in the license agreement. 
The law is to the contrary, though. First, an actual intention by 
a party not to be bound is of no legal effect unless the other party 
knew or had reason to know of that intention.140 Second, with 
respect to an offeror’s intention to restrict the way the power of 
acceptance may be exercised, the objective theory of contracts puts 
some qualification on the meaning of the “offeror as master of the 
offer.” 
The offeror is often described as ‘the master of the offer.’ 
In the sense the offeror confers on the offeree the power of 
acceptance, the offeror has control over the scope of that 
power and over how it can be exercised . . . . The offeror 
enjoys a ‘freedom from contract’ except on the offeror’s 
own conditions . . . . Under the objective theory, however, 
the question is not what the offeror actually sought, but 
what the offeree had reason to believe the offeror sought, or 
to express it more succinctly, if less precisely, what the 
offer sought.141 
In this regard, Restatement (Second) Contracts is also quite 
explicit. 
The offeror is the master of his offer; just as the making of 
any offer at all can be avoided by appropriate language or 
other conduct, so the power of acceptance can be narrowly 
limited. The offeror is bound only in accordance with his 
manifested assent . . . . But if he knows or has reason to 
know that he is creating an appearance of assent, he may 
be bound by that appearance. The considerations apply to 
the identity of the offeree . . . as well as to the mode of 
                                                          
140 FARNSWORTH, supra note 70, § 3.7, at 121. 
141 Id. § 3.12, at 140. 
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manifesting acceptance . . . .142 
Insistence on a particular form of acceptance is “unusual.”143 
Therefore, the established rule is that “[u]nless otherwise indicated 
by the language or circumstances, an offer invites acceptance in 
any manner and by any medium reasonable in the 
circumstances.”144 UCC section 2-206(1), a section that 
Easterbrook does not apply, puts an even greater burden on an 
offeror to communicate the special manner of acceptance if he 
wants to preclude acceptance in any other reasonable manner.145 It 
provides: “Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances,” an offer “shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance in any manner . . . reasonable in the 
circumstances.”146 
Additionally, the effectiveness of an offeror’s effort to require 
a particular manner of acceptance is judged under an objective 
standard.147 The “offeror is the master of the offer” principle is 
thus “mitigated by the interpretation of offers, in accordance with 
common understanding, as inviting acceptance in any reasonable 
manner unless there is a contrary indication.”148 In particular, 
whether offers are interpreted to have limited acceptance to a 
particular manner is governed by the objective theory of contracts 
and the “fault principle” of Restatement (Second) Contracts section 
20.149 The fault principle makes clear that an offeror cannot defeat 
the reasonable understanding of the offeree that is based on the 
observable circumstances accompanying the offer by merely 
uttering the mantra of “master of the offer” and pointing out that 
after it received the purchase price and delivered to goods it 
prescribed a different manner of acceptance. 
Easterbrook applies a clearly inconsistent analysis with respect 
                                                          
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
143 Id. § 30 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
144 Id. § 30(2). 
145 U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995). 
146 Id. (emphasis added). 
147 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 58 (1981). 
148 Id. § 58 cmt. a (1981) (emphasis added). 
149 Id. § 20(2)(b) (1981). See supra text accompanying notes 134-35 for 
discussion of the fault principle. 
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to the offer and the acceptance in ProCD. His analysis indefensibly 
applies the subjective theory of contracts to make effective 
ProCD’s undisclosed intention that its offer could not be accepted 
by purchase, but rather only by use after purchase.150 At the same 
time he applies the objective theory of contracts with a vengeance 
to declare the purchaser’s use of the product is “acceptance,” 
which for the first time gives the purchaser ownership rights, albeit 
more limited than what he thought at the time he paid his money. 
What purchaser of goods off the shelf would ever think he is 
not entitled to treat them as his own? What purchaser would think 
the person who sold them to him could tell him he could not use 
them without agreeing to objectionable terms he had not seen 
before he paid for them?151 Professor White has fittingly observed: 
                                                          
150 Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22, at 779 n.25. 
When we look at a ProCD box, Judge Easterbrook’s “offer” becomes 
pure fantasy. The notice is printed on the bottom flap of the box, 
flanked by a statement in large type that there are 250 million telephone 
numbers on 11 CD-Roms and the bar code for the scanner. The notice 
is printed in 6-point type in a space 2 3/4th inches by 1 inch. The notice 
that there are terms and conditions inside the box begins in the third 
sentence in this paragraph. Judge Easterbrook relies on U.C.C. § 2-
204(1) that talks about making a contract “in any manner sufficient to 
show agreement.” “Agreement,” however, is a term defined in the 
Code. Section 1-201(3) says, “‘Agreement’ means the bargain of the 
parties in fact . . . .” Using a conventional objective theory, ProCD’s 
officials had no reason to think that the buyers of its software knew of 
the offer that Judge Easterbrook sees them making. Perhaps, as Judge 
Easterbrook says, Article 2 does not require the notice that there is an 
offer inside the box to be displayed prominently. But if we are looking 
for the bargain of the parties ‘in fact,’ it has to be displayed so that a 
reasonable person might find it. If ProCD’s motive had been to hide the 
clause, it couldn’t have done better. 
Id. See also discussion supra, text accompanying notes 56-57 (discussing the 
preclusion of form terms which the profferor of the form has reason to know the 
other party would not assent to if he knew of them). 
151 What, for example, would a purchaser of a new car think if, after paying 
for it and preparing to drive it off the lot, he were told by the sales manager, 
“Oh, by the way, by turning the ignition on you agree that if you drive this 
beyond 500 miles of this location you void the warranty?” If the buyer were to 
tell the manager, in civil terms, to “Jump in the lake; I own this car!” would he 
be surprised to be told that he did not own it because he had not yet accepted the 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
680 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
Contrary to Judge Easterbrook’s suggestion, recognizing 
the offeror as “master of the offer” does not give him the 
power to turn the offeree’s equivocal acts into 
acceptance. . . . [T]he offeror has only limited power to add 
to the acts that the offeree would otherwise intend to be 
acceptance. . . . [A] term that one accepts all of the terms in 
the box by tying his shoelaces the morning after its receipt 
would not be effective. In this setting, use of the product, 
like tying one’s shoelaces, is equivocal. A buyer could 
easily claim that he had earned the right to use by paying 
and that no inference of agreement to other terms should be 
drawn from his use.152 
In this respect, the type of acceptance that Easterbrook’s “terms 
later” proposition permits sellers to impose is even more offensive 
than that attempted by those who sent unsolicited merchandise to 
consumers asserting that the recipient’s failure to return meant the 
recipient agreed to pay for the goods.153 That is because in the 
former case the purchaser has already paid for the goods, 
reasonably believes he owns them, and believes he is legally 
entitled to keep and use the goods. Additionally, because he has 
finished his search costs, made the purchase, and believes the 
transaction has been completed, he does not expect to be 
confronted with a decision whether to purchase the goods albeit on 
less favorable terms. Thus he can be easily blindsided by 
objectionable terms that he may physically receive but is not likely 
to bother examining.154 The legislative response has been to 
                                                          
dealership’s offer to sell, which could only be done by turning the ignition on? 
152 White, supra note 96, at 63. 
153 See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 
Iris Taylor, Directory Scam is Persistent But Preventable, RICHMOND-TIMES 
DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 2003, at D1 (advising complaining customers that 
unsolicited merchandise is theirs to keep), available at 2003 WL 8032051; Ray 
Schultz, Publishers Sued Over Unsolicited Books, DIRECT, April 1, 2003, at 18 
(describing lawsuits by consumers seeking declarations that they can keep 
unsolicited merchandise as gifts), available at WL 8203585. 
154 See infra notes 264-93 and accompanying text (noting the disincentive 
to study terms after the deal is done and the psychology of not wanting to take 
time to try to figure out “legal terms”). 
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condemn the abuses of organizations and individuals who send 
unsolicited merchandise to consumers with the suggestion that 
their failure to return the goods meant they agreed to pay for 
them.155 Further, because of the power of “negative option” plans 
(i.e., you accept unless you affirmatively reject) to produce more 
“acceptances” than would an offer that had to be affirmatively 
accepted, marketing programs using that technique have generated 
significant regulation.156 Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition 
presents the seller with even more power than generic negative 
option plans because his proposition anticipates a very unwary 
purchaser who is most unlikely to affirmatively reject 
objectionable terms by refraining from use of the goods he believes 
he already owns. A purchaser’s use under such circumstances is at 
best equivocal conduct from which no confident inference could 
ever be drawn that he agrees to the objectionable terms.157 
Implicit in the reasonably perceived ownership of the goods by 
such a purchaser is the price that he sees he must pay to prevent the 
objectionable “terms later” from being binding upon him.158 For 
                                                          
155 See, e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (2003) (treating mailing unsolicited 
merchandise and billing for the same as an unfair method of competition and an 
unfair trade practice, and provides the recipient may treat the merchandise as a 
gift); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1584.5 (2003) (providing that recipient may treat 
unsolicited merchandise as a gift, and if the sender continues to bill for it may 
sue to enjoin the conduct and be awarded attorneys fees and costs); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 11-2.2 (2003) (providing that recipient may treat as a gift). 
156 FTC Rules on Use of Prenotification Negative Option Plans, 16 C.F.R. 
§425.1 (2004). See also Owen R. Phillips, Negative Option Contracts and 
Consumer Switching Costs, 60 S. ECON. J. 304-315 (1993), noting: 
The Federal Trade Commission, although voting to permit the use of 
negative option contracts by marketers, has issued detailed guidelines 
about the content of negative option contracts. With respect to book 
and recording clubs, prenotification of shipment is by the vendor is a 
strict requirement in these contracts. Other prominent features of the 
guidelines require vendors to make it plain to the consumer what the 
costs of exit are before the contract is put into place. 
Id. at 314 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
157 White, supra note 96, at 63. 
158 This assumes, of course, that the purchaser actually has become aware 
of the objectionable terms and the requirement that he return the goods to avoid 
being bound by them. But under Easterbrook’s “terms later” proposition it is 
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the choice is not his to merely decline and thus remain in the same 
position as before the objectionable terms were proposed. 
Whatever he chooses will change that position for the worse. Such 
a buyer confronted with objectionable “terms later” is in a 
“lose/lose” situation under Easterbrook’s proposition. If he retains 
the goods, he continues to own them but upon less advantageous 
terms. If he returns them, he gives up his ownership rights and gets 
his money back. In either case, his position is worse than before 
the seller belatedly proposed the objectionable terms. This is a 
matter that Easterbrook treats of no significance, finding that the 
buyer who is confronted after the purchase with an onerous 
demand, for example, “you owe us an extra $10,000,”159 can avoid 
it by returning the item and getting his money back. This, of 
course, ignores the fact that for the buyer to do so is to give up the 
benefit of the bargain he had negotiated and paid for. 
f. Purported Support from UCC Section 2-606 
Moreover, this latter point underscores the utter fallacy of 
Easterbrook’s statement that, “[s]ection 2-606, which defines 
‘acceptance of goods’, reinforces this understanding.”160 His 
explanation for how that section, which states what constitutes 
acceptance of performance under a contract,161 reinforces his 
understanding with respect to what constitutes acceptance of an 
offer for purposes of formation of a contract is a non-explanation 
that attempts to cloud the radical differences between the two uses 
of “accepts.” He states: 
A buyer accepts goods under § 2-606(1)(b) when, after an 
opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective 
rejection under § 2-602(1). ProCD extended an opportunity 
                                                          
sufficient that he could have become aware of them after he bought the product. 
159 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996). 
160 Id. 
161 U.C.C. § 2-606 (1995). Comment 1 to that section makes clear that 
section 2-606 has no relevance to contract formation, stating: “Under this Article 
‘acceptance’ as applied to goods means that the buyer, pursuant to the contract, 
takes particular goods which have been appropriated to the contract as his 
own. . . .” Id. cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
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to reject if a buyer should find the license terms 
unsatisfactory; Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out 
the software, learned of the license, and did not reject the 
goods. We refer to § 2-606 only to show that the 
opportunity to return goods can be important; acceptance of 
an offer differs from acceptance of goods after delivery 
[citation omitted]; but the UCC consistently permits the 
parties to structure their relations so that the buyer has a 
chance to make a final decision after a detailed review.162 
Easterbrook, in an apparently strategic move, does not identify the 
object of the infinitive “to reject” in the second sentence above. It 
is, of course, an offer to form a contract. Had he done so, the 
second sentence above would have alerted even a casual reader to 
the disconnect between the subject matter of the first sentence, 
acceptance of goods due to a failure to reject the tendered 
performance under a contract, and the second, an opportunity to 
reject an offer proposing formation of a contract. The object of the 
first clause of the second sentence is an opportunity to reject an 
offer. The second clause of that sentence is merely a factual 
statement that the buyer did not reject the goods.163 There is a 
world of legal difference between a buyer failing to reject 
nonconforming goods tendered under an existing contract, and an 
offeree failing to reject an offer to enter into a contract. Under the 
former, a buyer is bound to pay for the goods at the contract 
rate,164 but retains a damage remedy for breach of contract.165 
Under the latter, if an offeree fails to reject an offer, the only result 
is that no contract is formed.166 
                                                          
162 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53 (emphasis added). 
163 In the context of this case it would have been even a more accurate 
description of Zeidenberg’s conduct to have said Zeidenberg did not return the 
goods. That is because the “rejection of goods” is a Code concept that has legal 
significance only with respect to instances of breach of contract. Note the title 
of Part 6 of Article 2 is “Breach, Repudiation and Excuse.” U.C.C. intro. Pt. 6 
Article 2 (1995). 
164 U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (1995). 
165 U.C.C. § 2-714 (1995). 
166 FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, § 3.13. “[A]n offer is a manifestation of 
assent that empowers another to enter into a contract by manifesting assent in 
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The third sentence above is most unique in terms of its 
structure and content, but perhaps not without design. Actually it is 
three independent clauses, separated only by semicolons, stating 
three disconnected truisms.167 There is no legal connection 
between an opportunity the Code gives to assess performance of 
the other party under an existing contract on the one hand, and 
rules governing formation of a contract on the other. Easterbrook’s 
best strategy is merely to lump the concepts into the same sentence 
without explanation of their connection. Perhaps then a casual 
reader might be prompted to think their mere physical convergence 
means there is a similarity among them and thus some vindication 
for the “terms later” proposition.168 
                                                          
return. If the offeree exercises this power by manifesting assent, the offeree is 
said to ‘accept’ the offer. This acceptance is the final step in the making of a 
contract” (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id. After a period of time an offer 
not accepted simply lapses, thus precluding formation of contract on the basis of 
the offer. Id. at §3.19. 
167 The truism in the third clause appears to be strategically phrased to 
avoid identifying either what the final decision is that the buyer may make, or of 
what he is to have had an opportunity to make a “detailed review,” i.e., the terms 
of an offer or the conformity of the tendered goods to the terms of the contract.  
The design appears to be to leave these matters cloudy enough that a casual 
reader might infer that the Code equates the effect of an opportunity to review 
an offer to form a contract with the effect of an opportunity to review goods 
tendered under an existing contract to see if they conform to the contract. 
168 After all, a person of Easterbrook’s writing renown would surely not 
leave a sentence unclear without purpose. Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074 
(pointing out that “Easterbrook is a terrific writer.”); see also Mitu Gulati & 
Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the Superstar 
Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1168 
(2002) (characterizing Easterbrook and Posner as “world-renowned academics” 
and surmising that driving the success of their opinions in casebooks is “not 
only their brand of Law and Economics, but also the skill with which they use 
it—the fact that they are skilled writers whose opinions rank among the highest 
on the scales of criteria such as humor, irreverence, and originality.”); Barry A. 
Miller & Thomas R. Meites eds., Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 747 (1994) (describing 
Easterbrook as a “prolific and influential writer.”). 
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g. Purported Support from the Code’s “Separately Stated” 
Terms Provisions 
Easterbrook’s final effort to put forth legal support for his 
“terms later” proposition is derived from the Code’s provisos that 
certain matters must be “conspicuous”169 or “separately stated”170 
to be effective. He suggests the import of such provisos for his 
“terms later” proposition as follows: 
These special provisos reinforce the impression that, so far 
as the UCC is concerned, other terms may be as 
inconspicuous as the forum-selection clause on the back of 
the cruise ship ticket in Carnival Cruise Lines.171 
Zeidenberg has not located any Wisconsin case—for that 
matter, any case in any state—holding that under the UCC 
the ordinary terms found in shrinkwrap licenses require any 
special prominence, or otherwise are to be undercut rather 
than enforced.172 
This conclusion rests on a faulty and unspoken assumption that 
because ordinary terms actually disclosed to the buyer prior to 
purchase, albeit in ordinary font size, are effective, such terms 
concealed from the buyer until after purchase must also be 
effective. 
Notwithstanding his valiant effort to create the appearance of 
                                                          
169 ProCD Inc. v. Zeinberger, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability). 
170 Id. (A firm offer under §2-205 in which the assurance of irrevocability 
is on a form supplied by the offeree, must be separately signed by the offeree to 
be effective. A term excluding oral modifications under § 2-209(2) which 
appears on a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the other 
party to be effective.). 
171 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453 (referring to Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585 (1991)). Lest one get the impression that the forum selection 
clause in Carnival Lines was on the back of some little ticket stub, the opinion in 
the case makes it clear that the ticket was a “three page document;” and further 
that the question whether the Shutes had sufficient notice of the forum clause 
before entering the contract was not addressed because they “essentially ha[d] 
conceded that they had notice of the forum-selection provision.” Carnival 
Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 590. 
172 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453. 
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legal support for his “terms later” proposition, something 
necessary for a legal realist,173 the stark reality is that there is none.  
Rather, his “legal support” is merely an illusion crafted by a 
brilliant federal judge174 known as a terrific writer,175 who is 
willing to cast aside basic intellectual honesty to create an 
appearance of legal support for his novel policy-making. It is a 
demonstration of legal realism that could shock a legal realist.176 
                                                          
173 See Joseph William Singer, Review Essay, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. 
L. REV. 467, 472-73 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). Singer notes: 
A judge can almost always construct arguments for a ruling “on either 
side of a new case.” At the same time, the judge must construct an 
argument based on existing principles of law, and “there are not so 
many that can be built defensibly.” This is because it is not always 
possible to construct an argument that will be plausible—meaning 
persuasive—to other judges and lawyers familiar with the relevant 
precedents. To be persuasive, the argument must tie the proposed result 
to existing practice in a way that appears not to deviate from 
fundamental principles underlying prior law; this is determined partly 
by professional consensus, partly by community views, and partly by 
the substantive content and organization of existing law. Thus, the fact 
that the judge must justify the decision by conventional legal arguments 
constrains her, not because the law itself logically requires the result, 
but because the argument for a change in the law must appear to fit 
with existing practice, and more importantly, the argument must 
persuade a particular audience that is likely to be conservative about 
such matters. 
Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
174 See Marc M. Harrold, Essay, Stripping Away at the First Amendment: 
The Increasingly Paternal Voice of Our Living Constitution, 32 U. MEM. L. REV 
403, 415 at n.42 (2002) (naming Judge Easterbrook as a likely nominee to the 
U.S. Supreme Court if George W. Bush were to win the 2000 Presidential 
election (citing Stuart Taylor Jr., The Supreme QuestionPicking the Next 
Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 23)). 
175 See, e.g., Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074. 
176 Legal realism is a pragmatic movement in the law. Its two major facets 
are: (1) a rejection of a concept of law as grounded in permanent principles and 
realized in logical application of those principles, and (2) a determination to use 
law as an instrument for social ends. LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE: 1927-1960, 3-7 (1986); Richard A. Posner, Symposium on the 
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought: What Has Pragmatism 
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to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1990); Joseph William Singer, 
Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 468-70, 475 (1988) (reviewing 
Laura Kalman, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). Legal realism’s 
pragmatic attitude treats “law as made, not found.” Id. at 474. Singer elaborates 
the point as follows: 
Law therefore is, and must be, based on human experience, policy, and 
ethics, rather than formal logic. Legal principles are not inherent in 
some universal, timeless logical system; they are social constructs, 
designed by people in specific historical and social contexts for specific 
purposes to achieve specific ends. Law and legal reasoning are a part of 
the way we create our form of social life. 
Id. With respect to its first facet, legal realism has had widespread success 
within the profession and within the legal academy, except among the few 
natural law theorists that remain. As to its second facet, among those who 
embrace legal realism’s pragmatic approach there is no disagreement over the 
use of law as an instrument for social ends. The only disagreement is over how 
to determine what the proper social ends are, and as to that the various diverse 
modern schools have markedly different views. Professor Tamanaha captured 
the latter point with this observation: 
One consequence of this shift toward instrumentalism is that the current 
state of U.S. legal theory consists of what some have called 
“postmodern jurisprudence,” a plethora of competing approaches, each 
representing a particular normative or interest group perspective, each 
arguing that law should serve the interests they tout. Legal theory has 
become thoroughly and openly politicized. 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to 
Normative Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, And the Fact-Value Distinction, 
41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 316 (1996) (citations omitted). The core facets of legal 
realism that were embraced in an earlier era by luminaries such as Holmes, 
Cardozo and Pound are now reflected in legal realism’s “refurbished modern 
form.” Posner, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. at 1653. The modern form is often now 
described as Legal Pragmatism, and sometimes as Pragmatic Instrumentalism or 
Legal Functionalism. See, e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in 
Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 
1040-41 nn.17, 18, 19 (1991); and Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic 
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 861, 863-64 n.2 (1981). Under the contemporary umbrella of Legal 
Pragmatism comfortably fit “prominent representatives of the left, center, and 
right in U.S. legal theory—of critical legal studies, critical feminism, critical 
race theory, law and economics, and of the mainstream scholars who otherwise 
hold sharply divergent opinions about law.” Tamanaha, supra, at 316. From 
beneath its broad coverage each can freely argue its perspective for determining 
the proper social ends. See also Post, supra note 5, at 1226. (“The jurisprudence 
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Because the pretense is so apparent, ProCD is a classic example of 
legal realism in operation and supports the assessment of Critical 
Legal Studies theorists that what courts engage in is mere exercise 
of power, not law.177 
B. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 
In ProCD, Easterbrook placed considerable emphasis upon 
ProCD’s extensive costs in developing its software, the essential 
vulnerability of software to copying, and his own perception of the 
necessity of its being able to discriminate in price to most 
effectively profit from its creativity.178 That, coupled with his 
earlier expressions on the special importance of bringing an ex ante 
perspective to intellectual property cases to best assure the proper 
balance between fostering creativity and encouraging free use,179 
may have prompted some to suppose his novel rule about contract 
formation is confined to cases involving the proper use of 
intellectual property. Such supposition was, however, short-lived. 
Seven months later, in an opinion for another panel of the Seventh 
Circuit, Easterbrook announced that the “terms later” rule of 
contract formation annunciated in ProCD was “about the law of 
contract, not the law of software.”180 
1. Judge Easterbrook’s “Terms Later;” Round Two 
In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., Gateway advertised its tenth 
anniversary system in PC World Magazine and other media 
directed at computer buyers.181 The Hills responded to the 
advertising by placing a phone order for the system and paying for 
                                                          
of Frank Easterbrook shocks me because I am, admittedly, a legal realist or at 
least an admirer of the legal realists.”). 
177 See ROBERTO M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A 
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 170-81 (1976). 
178 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996). 
179 See Easterbrook, supra note 81. 
180 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997). 
181 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1996 WL 650631 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
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the same with their credit card.182 Following the phone order and 
receipt of payment by credit card, Gateway shipped the tenth 
anniversary system in a box that also contained a “Standard Terms 
and Conditions Agreement.”183 The Hills had not seen these 
materials before paying for and receiving the system and had no 
prior notice of their content, including the arbitration clause and 
the provision that failure to return the system within thirty days of 
receipt constituted their agreement to all of the terms, including the 
prescribed method for formation of contract.184 When the Hills 
brought a class action suit against Gateway asserting a civil 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim 
and other claims, Gateway moved to require arbitration pursuant to 
the arbitration clause contained in the materials in the box.185 The 
trial court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement.186 
a. ProCD as Precedent 
On the strength of ProCD and his own view of practicality and 
common sense, Easterbrook found the Hills bound by the “terms 
later” that showed up in the box among the packing materials and 
the parts of the computer system.187 For Easterbrook, ProCD 
applied to the dispute in Hill because: 
“A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by 
conduct, and may propose limitations on the kind of 
conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by 
performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as 
acceptance.” [citing ProCD]. Gateway shipped computers 
with the same sort of accept-or-return offer ProCD made to 
users of its software. ProCD relied on the Uniform 
                                                          
182 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 1148 (holding that “the present record is insufficient to support a 
finding of valid arbitration or that the plaintiffs were given adequate notice of 
the arbitration clause”). 
187 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (stating the “[b]y keeping the computer beyond 
30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration clause”). 
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Commercial Code rather than on any peculiarities of 
Wisconsin law [and there is nothing atypical of the UCC in 
either Illinois or Wisconsin]; ProCD therefore applies to 
this case.188 
In Hill, unlike the facts in ProCD, there was no notice, not even 
fine print notice, to alert the Hills prior to the time they ordered 
and paid for the system to expect that other terms were part of the 
sales contract.189 Unlike ProCD, in Hill the seller had not 
configured its system to flash a message across the screen that the 
Hills could not possibly have missed when the system was 
operated (or that otherwise came so unavoidably to their attention) 
alerting them to the consequences of their retaining the system 
beyond thirty days.190 Furthermore, in ProCD the parties agreed 
that the retail seller (ProCD’s surrogate for Easterbrook) was the 
offeror, providing Easterbrook with at least an apparent 
justification to spin his distorted “master of the offer” argument 
upon which ProCD was ultimately based;191 but in Hill the buyers 
made the offer in response to Gateway’s advertisements which 
were nothing more than invitations for offers.192 In Hill it was only 
in response to the buyers’ telephone order that Gateway shipped 
the system, thus triggering UCC section 2-206(1)(b), a Code 
                                                          
188 Id. at 1149. 
189 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Recall that in ProCD 
“[n]otice on the outside, terms on the inside,” was the first ground upon which 
Easterbrook relied to make it appear that existing law supported his “terms later” 
proposition. 
190 In ProCD, Easterbrook noted: “ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer 
would accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the 
license at leisure. This Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software 
splashed the license on the screen and would not let him proceed without 
indicating acceptance.” ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. 
191 Id. at 1452. 
192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b (1981) 
(“Advertisements of goods by display, sign, handbill, newspaper, radio or 
television are not ordinarily intended or understood as offers to sell . . . there 
must ordinarily be some language of commitment or some invitation to take 
action without further communication.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at § 
3.10 at 137 (stating that “proposals made to the public through advertisements, 
posters, circulars, and the like . . . are generally held not to be offers”). 
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formation of contract provision not involved at all in ProCD, and 
which provides: “an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt 
or current shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance 
either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current 
shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods.”193 The facts in 
Hill suggest that Gateway probably accepted the Hills’ offer to 
purchase in the phone conversation by an oral promise to ship. If it 
did not make such a promise, then in any event, as numerous 
commentators have noted, Gateway accepted the Hills’ offer by its 
prompt shipment in response to the order.194 
In applying ProCD’s “terms later” rule to the facts of Hill, 
Easterbrook disregards the actual facts and statutory and common 
law rules related to offer and acceptance and contract formation. 
Instead, the economics/legal realist jurist, emboldened from his 
recent transformation of contract formation law with respect to 
intellectual property, now brazenly imposes his version of 
efficiency on all sales transactions. His peculiar version of 
efficiency is, of course, quite simple: Whatever way vendors prefer 
to operate their businesses and to form contracts is efficient, and 
the law should facilitate that. If a vendor prefers to conceal adverse 
terms of the deal until after the buyer has paid and then also prefers 
to disclose them in a way that only theoretically, rather than 
actually, brings them to the buyer’s attention, and further prefers a 
rule that failure to affirmatively reject by returning the goods and 
giving up the deal means the buyer accepts the terms, then it must 
be efficient and the vendor should be permitted to have his way. 
Therefore, the Code and common law rules of contract 
formation are interpreted to not interfere with efficient vendor 
practices. And the common law rule that assent by a party is 
limited only to terms that the party knew or had reason to know 
does not apply if “vendors” prefer that a party be deemed to have 
assented to terms presented in a fashion designed to avoid 
discovery until too late to object.  Nor does the common law rule 
precluding a party from forcing the other party to affirmatively 
                                                          
193 U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (1995) (emphasis added). 
194 See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 5, at 1820; Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1132-
34; David J. DePippo, Comment, Dear Sir or Madam: You Cannot Contract in a 
Closet, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 445-46 (2001); Gale, supra note 5, at 583. 
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object to a proposed term in order to avoid its imposition apply to 
“vendors” if they prefer to force not merely an affirmative 
objection but rather an affirmative rejection in the form of 
returning the goods and giving up the deal. All of that being so, for 
Easterbrook the distinctions between the facts of ProCD and Hill 
are of no consequence. Thus the fact that in each case the “vendor” 
found it preferable to utilize a “terms later” formation method of 
doing business, ergo it was efficient, was at once the sole fact 
relevant in each, and also the sole fact sufficient to make the 
“terms later” rule of ProCD applicable and controlling in Hill. 
Coupled with his prioritizing the vendor’s preference in the 
name of “terms later” contracting is his folksy, story-style 
description of the facts of the dispute before the court. Only a 
person of Easterbrook’s exceptional writing ability could craft a 
story so artfully as to suggest to the reader the nature of the case 
and what the dispute might be about, without using legal terms or 
even ordinary English words like “called,” “ordered,” “paid for,” 
and “delivered” to describe what happened. 
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and 
gives a credit card number. Presently a box arrives, 
containing the computer and a list of terms, said to govern 
unless the customer returns the computer within 30 days.195 
Did the customer pick up the phone to answer an incoming call, or 
did he pick up the phone to place a call? The story does not tell us. 
Who was on the other end of the line when the customer picked up 
the phone and ordered a computer? Was the order the customer 
made for a trial use of a computer, or was it a commitment to buy 
one? Was the credit card number given for identification reasons, 
for security to show the customer had the capability of paying for 
the computer in case he chose to buy it after a trial period, or was it 
payment for a computer he had just agreed to buy and the 
computer company had promised to sell? No help from the story 
for figuring out the answers to those questions either. Was the 
computer even sent by the person or entity the customer spoke 
with on the phone, or did it come just out of the blue on the front 
step from some other source? One cannot tell from the story 
                                                          
195 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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whether it was an unanticipated arrival or whether it was the 
anxiously anticipated delivery of their new computer for which 
they had already paid more than $4,000. 
Leaving the reader in the dark about the actual facts of the case 
(because they would show a completed sales transaction either 
when the phone conversation ended with an agreement to ship the 
goods in exchange for the credit card payment already received, or 
at the least, when the goods were promptly shipped in response to 
the order), allows Easterbrook to then phrase the issue in a fashion 
designed to make only one answer rational. He phrases the issue 
as: 
Are these terms [that arrive with the box] effective as the 
parties’ contract, or is the contract term-free because the 
order taker did not read any terms over the phone and elicit 
the customer’s assent?196 
Either the contract has terms, i.e., the terms that arrived in the box, 
or the contract is “term-free.” The second choice is patently 
absurd. All contracts have terms. The very expression “contract 
term-free” is an oxymoron. Therefore, the first choice must be 
correct. Easterbrook does not explore whether there was a contract 
with the terms the parties agreed to in the phone conversation, or a 
contract made up of the terms of the offer that was accepted by 
Gateway shipping the computer. Best to just not raise those issues, 
making it easy to move directly to his “terms later” rule of ProCD. 
His “legal analysis” has drawn heavy and well-deserved 
criticism. Professor Macaulay, observed, “Whatever the virtues of 
Judge Easterbrook’s Gateway opinion, it gets an ‘F’ as a law 
exam. It is a pitiful reading of the UCC, ignoring the definition of 
‘agreement’ that was so important to Llewellyn.”197 Professor 
Braucher noted, “[t]his is dubious contract and commercial 
law,”198 pointing out that the analysis did not even cite UCC 
section 2-206(1)(b), the controlling Code contract formation 
section directly applicable to the case, “let alone explain how it 
was ‘unambiguously indicated’ that the Hills’ order did not invite 
                                                          
196 Id. 
197 Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148 (emphasis added). 
198 Braucher, supra note 5, at 1820 (emphasis added). 
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acceptance by a promise to ship or by actual shipment.”199 
Professor Braucher further noted that the analysis erroneously 
disregarded the statutory language of section 2-207, ignored the 
comment language to section 2-207, and also ignored the logic of 
section 2-207.200 
b. Purported Common Sense 
Easterbrook’s practicality and common sense arguments assert 
in essence that “[c]ustomers as a group are better off”201 if 
“vendors” are permitted to impose adverse terms upon them under 
the pretended assent theory of his “terms later” policy. He posits: 
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to 
enclose the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers 
cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers 
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the 
phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway’s had to 
read the four page statement of terms before taking the 
buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would 
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. 
Others would hang up in rage over the waste of their time. 
And oral recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions 
                                                          
199 Id. at 1820-21. 
200 Id. at 1821-23. See also Post, supra note 5, at 1223-25 (emphasis added) 
(“Judge Easterbrook did violence to Article 2 . . . . [He] creates a false 
dichotomy in the first paragraph of the opinion contrasting a contract with ‘no 
terms’—ignoring the terms the statute supplies, including warranties of 
merchantability—with a contract with the terms drafted by the seller.”); Ghosh, 
supra note 5, at 1132 (emphasis added) (faulting Easterbrook for “reconstituting 
the manner in which the contract was formed,” in order to avoid having to 
explain why UCC § 2-206(1)(b) did not compel a decision in favor of the Hills). 
Law student commentators have also participated in the discussion. See, e.g., 
French, supra note 5, at 813 (characterizing the court’s consideration of the 
provisions of the Code as “sloppy”); Gale, supra note 5, at 583 (asserting that 
“Easterbrook[‘s] analysis . . . seems to ignore the basic facts of Hill as well as 
the provisions of the U.C.C.”); Hazelwood, supra note 5, at 1316 (concluding 
that Easterbrook “misapplies and misinterprets the contract formation provisions 
of the [Code]”). 
201 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
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(whether true or feigned) that the clerk did not read term X 
to them, or that they did not remember or understand it. 
Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial 
transactions. Customers as a group are better off when 
vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic 
recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return 
device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, 
read or unread.202 
If the approve-or-return “device” were such a benefit to customers, 
sellers would likely tout it in their promotions. Perhaps the fact that 
Gateway did not do so is an indication that its marketing personnel 
did not believe that advertising it was holding terms back would 
cause potential buyers to think they were getting a better deal. 
After all, it is difficult to imagine a buyer who would think delayed 
disclosure was desirable, or who would think that delayed 
disclosure meant he was getting a lower price either because the 
later disclosed terms would reduce Gateway’s litigation costs or 
because holding back terms reduced its selling costs.203 In fact, as 
                                                          
202 Id. 
203 Of Easterbrook’s assertion that customers as a group are better off if 
sellers hold back terms, Professors Horsburgh and Cappel find Easterbrook’s 
logic problematic, noting “surely, considerations of efficiency dictate that the 
information costs be borne by the seller, the lowest cost avoider. No rational 
consumer would be willing to incur the high social costs involved in acquiring 
information about expensive and complicated merchandise.” Horsburgh & 
Cappel, supra note 5, at 1122 n.117 (citations omitted). Professor Ghosh 
observes: 
The Judge reasons that customers are made better off by the approve-
or-return policy. There is no elaboration on how these benefits arise 
except in reducing the costs to the vendor or engaging in what the 
Judge characterizes as long and ineffective recitation of terms. 
Presumably, these costs are passed on to the consumer. Furthermore, 
the Judge discusses how competent adults are bound by terms, whether 
they are read or not. There is an analogy with market exchange that is 
being made in this discussion. If I pay X dollars for a product, there is a 
presumption that I value the product at X dollars or more. The consent 
principle in contract is a proxy for the efficiency of the contract. The 
Judge is expanding the consent principle quite a bit here and is 
engaging in part in propter hoc reasoning. His logic can be described as 
follows: approve-or-return benefits consumers. Therefore, consenting 
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noted by Professor Ghosh, “[t]he effect of enforcing both the 
arbitration clause and the approve-or-return policy is to protect 
companies that sell products with latent defects which are difficult 
to detect.”204 
Easterbrook is correct in describing Gateway’s practice as a 
“device,” but it is not one with a noble purpose, as the economic 
literature discloses.205 It is a deceptive strategy under the guise of 
efficiency to bind customers to adverse terms concealed from them 
until after they have made the purchase decision and parted with 
their money. One commentator put it this way: “[T]he practice of 
holding back terms until after payment and delivery should be 
deemed an unfair and deceptive practice . . . . This practice inhibits 
shopping and misleads consumers about the nature of the deal at 
the crucial time, which is before psychological commitment.”206 
Another described Easterbrook’s “terms later” ruling in Hill in 
even less flattering terms: “Judge Easterbrook and the judges who 
have followed his opinion tell us that misrepresentation is the oil 
that lubricates capitalism . . . [i]t is okay for Gateway to hide what 
it is doing.”207 
                                                          
to approve-or-return policies would promote efficiency. Since these 
terms arose from an approve-or-return policy, the terms must be 
efficient and enforced. However, there is a presumption of consent in 
this reasoning. There is an even stronger assumption that since consent 
implies efficiency, the efficiency of terms would imply that a customer 
would consent to them. This last point is specious not only because of 
the confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions, but also because it 
is not clear what is the basis for determining that certain terms are 
efficient, other than the court’s ipse dixit. 
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1139. 
204 Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1138. 
205 See discussion infra Part II. 
206 Braucher, supra note 5, at 1827. 
207 Macaulay, Common Sense, supra note 10, at 1148-49. Macaulay also 
comments: 
If we think that choice is an important value, we cannot be content with 
polite evasions such as: there is a duty to read and understand a 
document written in a code (legal English) and buried in a box. The 
doctrine of reasonable expectations exists largely in insurance to limit 
what can be hidden by lawyers in documents which they know will not 
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Easterbrook’s practicality analysis posits that the direct 
marketing vendors can only orally convey terms of the bargain to 
customers prior to purchase. A variety of inexpensive ways are 
available to vendors for written disclosure of terms prior to 
purchase, however, including the very ads and computer 
magazines in which Gateway touted all of the positive features of 
its product and support service.208 In this information age it could 
post all contract terms on its web page for potential buyers to view 
at their leisure. Nor would it require four pages of legalese or even 
a few short sentences over the phone to communicate that 
arbitration is required, that the seller does not promise the product 
will work, or that if the buyer is hurt by the product the buyer 
cannot sue the seller.209 Even the brick and mortar retail store 
                                                          
be read and understood. In an impossibly just world, measured by my 
preferences, this doctrine would apply to all form contracts. Given the 
cost barriers to litigation, it wouldn’t raise the price of goods enough to 
matter. I suspect that the impact would be largely symbolic, but I like 
symbolizing that fraud from fancy offices is a bad thing. It would make 
some corporate lawyers unhappy, but it couldn’t happen to a better 
bunch of people. Instead of the “safe harbors” that they demand, they 
deserve harbors filled with mines put down in random patterns. There 
is a simple safe harbor that they work hard to avoid: don’t try to 
deceive people. 
 You could challenge me: Suppose Gateway advertised in big type as 
they puff their products, and said “if there is trouble, you must trust us 
to fix the computer because you have no legal remedy.” Would it make 
any difference? Wouldn’t customers just accept this? Would any of 
them understand what risks they would be taking? Would competitors 
jump in and advertise that they didn’t take away legal rights? Of 
course, this is but a mind experiment. We’ll never know. Gateway and 
its legal staff work hard to hide that this is what they are doing with 
their arbitration clause that creates a Kangaroo Court. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
208 See Jean R. Sternlight, Recent Decision Opens Wider Gateway to Unfair 
Binding Arbitration, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 129, 132 (1997). 
209 Braucher, supra note 5, at 1828-29. 
Why exactly does Gateway need four pages of terms? Why can’t 
Gateway primarily use the background terms of the U.C.C., which need 
not be mentioned to become part of the contract? There are good 
arguments for disclosure of key terms even in telephone transactions. If 
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operation can spare its cashiers the drudgery and inefficiency of 
reading terms to each customer before taking the payment: If it has 
an arbitration policy it can easily post it in the same places it 
typically posts its policies for returns and charges for bad checks. 
One commentator has characterized Easterbrook’s overall 
analysis in Hill as lacking in imagination,210 an accurate 
assessment with respect to his premise that only oral 
communication of terms is possible, which in turn gives the 
appearance of supporting his “terms later” rule of contract 
formation. But it is not really a matter of lack of imagination but 
rather a lack of honesty coupled with a ruthlessness to employ 
whatever strategy is necessary to facilitate preferred vendor 
practices, or, in Easterbrook’s framework, efficient vendor 
practices.211 
c. Purported Irrelevance of Notice and the Common Sense of 
Ignoring Its Lack 
Easterbrook addresses the issue of providing notice to the Hills 
prior to their purchase by faulting them for not discovering the 
                                                          
a particular term cannot be easily explained, it may be because the term 
is inherently too complex and unfair for a consumer to understand and 
knowingly give assent to it. 
Id. 
210 Post, supra note 5, at 1230-31. “Easterbrook’s analysis lacks an 
appreciation for history and for the values and desires (not translatable into 
dollars and cents) that animate human beings. It lacks the imagination 
(sometimes called empathy) that would allow him to see the full consequences 
of the decision he reached in the Gateway case.” Id. 
211 Id. at 1230. 
Judge Easterbrook employed an “end game” strategy. The subject of 
the dispute, however that is defined—whether it is the quality that a 
consumer can reasonably expect from a computer manufacturer or the 
willingness of consumers to submit disputes to arbitration—has been 
settled with finality. A rule has been stated and the facts constructed—
the vendor is the offeror, the offeror is master of the offer and § 2-207 
does not apply when there is only one form. There can only be one 
outcome. The vendor wins. End of conversation. 
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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adverse terms and objecting to them by returning the computer. 
For him the matter is elementary—the vendor need not give notice 
in advance that other terms governing the transaction are in the box 
because buyers like the Hills know other terms are going to come 
with the box.212 
If Easterbrook is so sure buyers like the Hills know other terms 
governing the transaction will be coming after they pay for the 
goods, therefore obviating any need for notice, one wonders why 
seven months earlier he did not say the same for a buyer like 
Zeidenberg. Surely Zeidenberg must have known that there would 
                                                          
212 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(citation omitted). Putting the onus on purchasers to ferret out undisclosed 
terms, Easterbrook notes: 
Perhaps the Hills would have had a better argument if they were first 
alerted to the bundling of hardware and legal-ware after opening the 
box and wanted to return the computer in order to avoid disagreeable 
terms, but were dissuaded by the expense of shipping. What the remedy 
would be in such a case—could it exceed the shipping charges?—is an 
interesting question, but one that need not detain us because the Hills 
knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would include 
some important terms, and they did not seek to discover these in 
advance. Gateway’s ads state that their products come with limited 
warranties and lifetime support. How limited was the warranty—30 
days, with service contingent on shipping the computer back, or five 
years, with free onsite service? What sort of support was offered? 
Shoppers have three principal ways to discover these things. First, they 
can ask the vendor to send a copy before deciding whether to buy. The 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires firms to distribute their 
warranty terms on request . . . the Hills do not contend that Gateway 
would have refused to enclose the remaining terms too. Concealment 
would be bad for business, scaring some customers away and leading to 
excess returns from others. Second, shoppers can consult public sources 
(computer magazines, the Web sites of vendors) that may contain this 
information. Third, they may inspect the documents after the product’s 
delivery. Like Zeidenberg, the Hills took the third option. By keeping 
the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer, 
including the arbitration clause. 
Id. Easterbrook’s suggestion that it is more efficient for consumers to search out 
terms than for sellers to disclose them is not supported by any empirical 
evidence, nor could it be, and it is contrary to economic reality. See infra Part II 
notes and text relating to transaction costs. 
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be some important terms inside the shrink-wrap or on the disk such 
as installation and operating instructions, or how to obtain help in 
operation and the like. Perhaps the reason is that as a legal realist 
Easterbrook simply made use of what was available to create the 
appearance that his radical “terms later” proposition was dictated 
by well-accepted contract formation principles. After all, the 
shrink-wrap package did make a reference, albeit in fine print and 
perhaps not actually noticed by the purchaser, to a license inside.213 
Of course, to give his “terms later” proposition the appearance 
of law, it was certainly easier to lay the groundwork by saying, 
“Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the 
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the 
license expressly extends) may be a means of doing business 
valuable to buyers and sellers alike.”214 That is what provided the 
opportunity to deceptively suggest that scholarly authority and 
Restatement (Second) Contracts, which rejected such a 
proposition, actually supported it.215 Because as a legal realist 
Easterbrook must always give an appearance of legal authority for 
his legal propositions, “Notice on the outside, terms on the inside,” 
is certainly more strategic that blatantly saying “terms prescribing 
contract formation rules concealed from the buyer until after 
purchase are binding on the buyer.” “Notice on the outside, terms 
on the inside” has a nice ring to it that still conveys the impression, 
along with his misstatements of law, that might persuade some 
readers that “terms later” contract formation was standard legal 
doctrine. And for those who might be skeptical, the significance he 
apparently attached to at least a theoretical warning by the vendor 
of “terms later” might allay their worst fears, persuading them that 
at most this was but a half-step beyond established contract 
formation doctrine, rather than a wholesale abandonment of it and 
the fundamentals of assent. 
By the time the Hills appeared before his court, Easterbrook 
was equipped with the rule of ProCD: Vendors are permitted to 
                                                          
213 Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997). 
214 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. See also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying 
text. 
215 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451. 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
 “TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING 701 
bind buyers to prescribed contract formation rules that they 
conceal until after the buyer has committed to the purchase and has 
paid the price.216 The reason for the rule is efficiency; what is good 
for vendors is good for everyone.217 
Furthermore, because buyers already know vendors are going 
to do this, notice is irrelevant. If Easterbrook’s explanation of the 
difficulties of conveying information about terms to consumers 
lacked imagination, he demonstrated an overactive imagination in 
dispensing with any need for advanced warning of objectionable 
terms. He must imagine that buyers as a class make or endeavor to 
make Kaldor-Hicks efficient bargains and that they thus must 
know contract formation according to vendors’ concealed rules is 
efficient; and that compelling buyers to discover the concealed 
terms is more efficient than requiring that vendors simply disclose 
them prior to purchase; and armed with that knowledge, of course 
they know to expect undisclosed terms and of their duty to search 
for them.218 
                                                          
216 But see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining the 
Restatement (Second) Contracts’ position on “terms later” contracting). 
217 See supra note 203. 
218 Thomas W. Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law: Fear of a 
Normative Planet?, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1037 (2000). Joo notes: 
According to the Gateway court, the Hills should have assented to the 
accept-or-return device because it is efficient; therefore they 
constructively did assent. Could they rebut the presumption of 
majoritarian expectations with proof that they genuinely entertained 
deviant expectations (i.e., unlike most folks, they do not make Kaldor-
Hicks efficient bargains)? Apparently not; the court (like most courts) 
is uninterested in their subjective expectations. Enforcing a contract in 
accord with the expectations of most people rewards conformist 
expectations and punishes nonconformist expectations. As every good 
law-and-economist knows, a judicial decision that sets majority 
sentiment as the default rule today will put all tomorrow’s deviants on 
notice that they should bargain around the default rule; thus future 
deviants who do not explicitly contract around the default rule can be 
presumed, like non-deviants, to have subjectively assented to it. 
However, that theory, even if we accept it, focuses on the contractual 
freedom of future parties and not on that of the Hills and their class—
who are, after all, the parties before the court. It sounds 
communitarian, rather than libertarian, to sacrifice today’s litigants, 
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Only with that kind of imagination can he so easily dispatch 
any need for notice and create a purely artificial assent. As two 
commentators have observed, however, the premise for 
Easterbrook is that consumers in a transaction like that in Hill use 
rationalist seriosymbolic219 reasoning in which they “engage in 
deliberations and carefully consider the consequences of their 
bargains. Yet in ruling against the need for notice, [Easterbrook] 
dispensed with the very means by which this logical and cautious 
style of thought could ensue.”220 Because consumers in 
transactions like that in Hill are most likely to be engaging in 
connectionist reasoning,221 they are all the more vulnerable to 
                                                          
deviant though they may be, to enhance the contractual liberty of future 
parties. 
Id. at 1047-48 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
219 Horsburgh & Cappel, supra note 5, at 1103-04. 
Cognitivists have proposed two distinct types of mental architecture 
that may govern the thought process. The first is that reasoning 
operates by means of seriosymbolic processing, a deliberate, rule-based 
method of thinking and reasoning in which information is coded into 
abstract symbols that are manipulated sequentially, or in a chain of 
steps, according to the formal conventions of logic and grammatical 
syntax. Reasoning is thereby conceived of as the purely formal 
manipulation of abstract symbols representing concepts according to a 
series of logical inferences and rule-governed arrangements. . . . A key 
advantage of seriosymbolic processing is that it is cognitively powerful, 
inasmuch as it can apply to problems in a wide variety of situations. 
Id. at 1103. 
220 Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). 
221 Id. at 1105-06. 
[The second type] of processing system within the mind, [is] termed 
“connectionist.” In a connectionist model, mental processing is 
organized in a network of linked processing units, which—when 
activated—”fire” in a manner analogous to neurons in the human 
brain. . . . Unlike linear seriosymbolic processing, connectionist 
networks are linked in parallel, which allows greater speed and 
flexibility in processing inputs. 
 Connectionist processing can easily accomplish the sorts of cognitive 
tasks that are difficult for seriosymbolic systems. In particular, 
connectionist systems can account for how we acquire cultural 
information, a learning skill that is so problematic for seriosymbolic 
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unusual terms that are not affirmatively and pointedly called to 
their attention.222 
                                                          
processing. In a connectionist system, we internalize implicit cultural 
knowledge by observing and participating in events of daily life. The 
inputs derived from these experiences and from our own reactions to 
these experiences, are processed in a distinctive pattern of network 
activation. As these patterns of observation and action are repeated, the 
weights of the connections between activated units become 
increasingly stronger, until eventually the system solidifies to the point 
that we almost instantaneously comprehend a situation and how to 
respond to it. . . . 
Id. at 1105-06. 
222 Id. at 1114-15. 
Large commercial enterprises typically attempt to act as rational profit 
maximizers. In keeping with this goal, processes of planning, 
production, and marketing are organized along formal, deliberative 
lines; indeed, such firms typically employ a wide variety of specialists 
to apply deliberative expertise to the various facets of running the 
business. . . . Such deliberative seriosymbolic thinking is made possible 
by the fact that the seller is engaged in only a limited number of types 
of sales transactions, and has the resources to employ considerable 
bodies of expert knowledge. 
 In contrast, consumers must handle a multiple number of different 
kinds of sales events encountered in daily living, and are limited to the 
use of their own cognitive faculties. Consequently, they typically make 
use of connectionist reasoning and build up a prototypical cultural 
model of sales transactions. . . . . Recall, however, that there is a price 
to pay for such cognitive efficiency. Because the kind of information 
that is processed must be able to fit within pre-defined abstract 
knowledge categories, there is a tendency to omit information that is 
inconsistent with what is already known and to reinforce familiar 
expectations. Consequently, buyers, who employ a relatively simple 
cognitive model of sales transactions, are not on an equal footing with 
sellers and might well overlook unusual terms in their, agreements 
until a dispute arises that causes them to focus on these terms at some 
later point in time. . . . 
 . . . . 
 A different but related problem exists where the parties do not in fact 
understand the commercial event in the same way, and are operating 
using different cognitive systems. Because consumers are typically the 
parties who are unable to fully process all aspects of an unfamiliar 
transaction, more knowledgeable sellers are in the position to exploit 
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Easterbrook’s suggestion that consumers know that in the box 
they will find warranty and service and support information 
because they know from the vendor’s advertising that such terms 
are part of the deal ignores the fact that in Hill the dispute dealt 
with whether an arbitration clause could be forced on the 
purchasers by their retention of the computer that they had already 
paid for.223 As to that matter, nothing in Gateway’s advertising or 
in its other communications with the Hills had alerted them to be 
on the lookout for remedy limitation terms such as arbitration, or 
even more importantly to be on the lookout for a surprise 
announcement, couched in legalese, that “you do not own this yet 
even though you paid for it and have received it; but you will own 
it subject to a lot of terms adverse to your interests if you keep it 
for more than thirty days.” Justifying his conclusion with an 
analogy to a clearly distinguishable set of facts is typical 
Easterbrook, as one will recall from the analogies he used in 
ProCD.224 He deflects attention from the actual facts of the case to 
hypothetical settings in which his “terms later” rule might seem 
more plausible, or at least more palatable. 
Easterbrook’s speculative assertions about the way consumers 
reason and what they must know suggest there is only one mode of 
human reasoning. 
In the mind of the judge, there is just one mode of 
reasoning (seriosymbolic processing) and just one model of 
human behavior: parties should be mentally prepared and 
constantly on guard to protect their interests in every 
bargaining situation. But it should be clear by now that this 
                                                          
another type of disparity: a cognitive disparity in bargaining power. 
Moreover, it may be difficult (or even impossible) for consumers to 
overcome this disparity by shifting their thinking in specific contractual 
situations to the seriosymbolic mode, and away from the connectionist 
reasoning used in most everyday transactions, especially if they are not 
given adequate notice of the need to do so. For this reason, exploitation 
of cognitive disparity appears to be fundamentally unfair on a deep, 
cognitive level. 
Id. at 1114-15 (emphasis added). 
223 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997). 
224 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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is nonsense. It is simply not possible given the way our 
minds really work.225 
Believing that all actors engage in seriosymbolic processing is 
necessary to argue that at least a trace of assent still undergirds his 
“terms later” contract formation rule. But the assent for 
Easterbrook is an artificial construct—this is underscored by the 
progeny of ProCD/Hill.226 In an even more expansive sense than 
Professor Kessler ever imagined, Easterbrook’s “terms later” 
contract formation rule enables vendors to “legislate by contract 
and . . . to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner without 
using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”227 
Easterbrook purports to clothe this expansive authorization for 
vendors to legislate terms in the garb of common sense. Although 
he uses the word “sense” at only one point in his Hill opinion,228 he 
makes several appeals to common sense to justify his “terms later” 
contract formation rule. His explicit “Where is the sense of that?” 
rhetorical question to the suggestion that ProCD’s holding should 
be limited to software, enables him to quickly paint ProCD’s 
holding broadly as a matter of contract law, while enabling him to 
avoid addressing the significant factual and legal distinctions 
between the two cases. The implicit answer to that rhetorical 
question is that if there is controlling precedent, then follow it.229 
                                                          
225 Horsburgh & Cappel, supra note 5, at 1103-17 (emphasis added). 
226 See, e.g., infra Part IV.B (providing an example of a case that has 
followed ProCD in its erroneous finding of assent). 
227 Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). See also Post, supra 
note 5, at 1232 “Judge Frank Easterbrook is in the vanguard of those who are 
actively working not just to protect a political minority from the consequences 
of the democratic process, but to give that minority the power to dictate the 
terms of their legal relationships.” Id. at 1233. 
228 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
229 Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140. 
The Judge uses “sense” in five different ways in his opinion. The first 
and the fifth ways can be described as ‘process based’ definitions that 
look to case interpretation and precedent in gauging the sense of 
treating ProCD as the applicable precedent. The second way can be 
described as an appeal to empiricism. An act is commonsensical if it is 
similar to acts in other contexts. The third and fourth ways are appeals 
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The appeal to common sense also appears in his assertion that 
“[p]ayment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for 
air transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors,” 
suggesting such regularity of the practice as to validate it.230 
Additionally, he points out “practical considerations,” both with 
respect to what vendors would need to do and what customers 
would have to put up with if the rule were otherwise, and to the 
“benefits” that both vendors and customers experience from 
written disclosure of terms after the sale that they could not have 
had with prior oral disclosure.231 That “[c]ustomers as a group are 
better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as 
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return 
device,” suggests that it would be nonsensical to prohibit its use.232 
Presenting a “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander” 
argument, Easterbrook notes that under his “terms later” rule 
                                                          
to practicality and economic efficiency. Something is commonsensical 
if it generates positive net benefits or efficiencies. In characterizing the 
Hills’ argument as non-sensical, the Judge is affirming several legal 
and market based norms. The first is the norm of judicial craftsmanship 
and common law rule making through precedent. The Judge, by 
appealing to precedent, is asserting its naturalness as the only way of 
determining a particular legal issue. Of course, the Judge also 
overlooks the many ways he has to sidestep precedent to reach the 
result. 
Id. 
230 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. But Professor Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140-41, 
referring to the second norm of “sense,” comments on those analogies as 
follows: 
The second norm is that of practice. The best measure of the right thing 
to do is determining what others have done in similar situations. The 
norm is similar to that of judicial craftsmanship and precedent in that it 
aims at consistency. But while the first norm focuses squarely on 
judicial practice, the second focuses on practice in the marketplace and 
in the community. The difficult question avoided is, what is the 
relevant marketplace and community? The Judge refers to air transport 
and insurance and “other endeavors” without a careful parsing of the 
differences among the various representative markets or communities. 
Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1140-41. 
231 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149. 
232 Id. 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
 “TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING 707 
Gateway is bound by the warranty provision in the box, and the 
Hills want the benefit of that, so it is only fair that the Hills be 
bound by the contract formation terms and the arbitration term.233 
The weakness of that argument is that the Hills could have had a 
claim for breach of warranty without relying on the warranty 
contained in the box. Under the circumstances of this purchase an 
implied warranty accompanied the computer as a matter of law.234 
As to the absence of notice on the outside of the box to alert 
the purchaser that unusual contract formation terms are inside the 
box, Easterbrook suggests it is a most natural (and thus sensible) 
omission. In fact, his description suggests that absence of notice on 
the outside of the box is as natural in the Hill transaction as was the 
presence of a notice on the outside of the shrink-wrap in ProCD. 
The difference is functional, not legal. Consumers 
browsing the aisles of a store can look at the box, and if 
they are unwilling to deal with the prospect of additional 
terms can leave the box alone, avoiding the transactions 
costs of returning the package after reviewing its contents. 
Gateway’s box, by contrast, is just a shipping carton; it is 
not on display anywhere. Its function is to protect the 
product during transit, and the information on its sides is 
for the use of handlers (“Fragile!” “This Side Up!”) rather 
than would-be purchasers.235 
And because the Hills “knew” there would be other terms inside 
the box, no notice on the outside is of no consequence.236 
Easterbrook’s “common sense” rationale for the Hill opinion 
has been specifically subjected to scholarly critique, even 
generating a law review symposium devoted to it.237 Because an 
                                                          
233 Id. at 1149-50. 
234 U.C.C. § 2-314 (1995). 
235 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 (symbols omitted). 
236 Id. 
237 See Symposium, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium, 16 TOURO 
L. REV. 1037 (2000). One of the contributors to that symposium observed: 
Easterbrook is a terrific writer and a good part of his strength comes 
from a style that is invigorated by a “feel” for common sense. Take a 
look at his diction in the [passage where Easterbrook rhetorically asks, 
“Where’s the sense in that?” regarding limiting the holding of ProCD 
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appeal to “common sense” connotes universal acceptance and 
discourages counter-argument, it often provides a powerful 
rhetorical cover for a position that cannot be supported by logical 
argument and persuasion.238 
Where legal analysis fails to illuminate Judge 
Easterbrook’s reasoning, economic analysis provides an 
answer. However, characterizing the Judge’s approach 
either as application of a command mechanism or a 
property right mechanism would miss the heart of the 
opinion. The Judge is not commanding an outcome to be 
enforced by monetary or other sanctions. Nor is he creating 
a property right over which the parties could bargain. In 
affirming ProCD, the Judge is affirming a norm that allows 
the parties to create property rights through contract. Judge 
Easterbrook concludes that the arbitration clause is 
                                                          
to software]: “sense,” “practical considerations,” “benefits,” “simple.” 
This is a passage infused with connotative meanings. The sound 
reinforces the sense. The totality of this passage resonates with the 
rhetoric of common sense or, perhaps more accurately, resonates with 
something believed by certain readers to be common sense. . . . 
Easterbrook’s decision has elements of all four definitions of “common 
sense.” It is similar to the first definition [(phenomenological]) in that it 
lacks a certain quality of imagination. . . As for the second definition 
(normal, average understanding), Easterbrook’s passage evokes a kind 
of practical wisdom, the sort of sensible statement we would expect 
from someone who knows chalk from cheese. Per the third definition 
(the general sense of the community), the passage draws on a bit of old 
fashioned communal well-being: the decision is good for customers and 
good for vendors, both sides benefit and everyone should be happy. 
Finally, in accord with the fourth definition (“primary truths”), the 
argument seems compelling precisely because common sense bypasses 
argument. It is non-deliberative, instinctive, “natural.” Easterbrook’s 
passage commands truth not so much through argumentation but 
through reliance on a common sense that usurps the place of 
deliberation. This also discourages counter-argument, for who, after 
all, can argue with common sense? 
Ledwon, supra note 5, at 1074-75 (emphasis added). 
238 Joo, supra note 218, at 1039. “The argument that contract law should 
follow ‘common sense’ seems rather innocuous, but it often provides rhetorical 
cover for unspoken normative assumptions.” Id. 
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enforceable because the Hills agreed to it. In light of his 
insistence on relying on ProCD and his appeal to “sense,” 
the Judge’s approach can best be described as one of 
seeding norms having to do with contractual transactions, 
especially the norms involving the provision of 
information.239 
And the “seeding” of the norm is done so authoritatively.240 For 
legal realists a court’s dictating of norms is not surprising. 
In the absence of a superhuman normative arbiter, it is hard 
to speak of normative assumptions as anything more than 
fungible preferences. Knowing this, we are usually too 
embarrassed to admit it when we make normative 
assumptions. After all, the Realists have taught us well that 
the winners among such preferences triumph, not from 
logical or “legal” processes, but from sheer political power. 
This, I suppose, helps to explain why secularists find such 
comfort in evidence that our preferred normative schemes 
are consistent with human behavior. The state’s imposition 
of norm X, though by its very nature an exercise of power, 
is a relatively harmless one when its net result is pretty 
much what people would have done on their own 
anyway.241 
As demonstrated by the extensive scholarly critique, the 
normative assumptions Easterbrook makes in ProCD and Hill do 
not simply reflect “common sense;” they attempt to create it.242 
“Easterbrook is not describing what ‘is’, he is describing what 
‘ought to be.’”243 As Professor Leff appropriately noted, 
“[n]ormative preferences are just that; they don’t get any more 
proved by being talked about.”244 Thus when one merely expresses 
                                                          
239 Ghosh, supra note 5, at 1134 (emphasis added). 
240 See supra note 211. 
241 Joo, supra note 218, at 1049-50. 
242 Post, supra note 5, at 1229. 
243 Id. 
244 Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary on Richard A. Posner’s ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 477 
(1974). 
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his normative preferences in a book, they have no coercive impact; 
they are nothing more than ideas that one can accept or not as he 
chooses. But when one in a position of power imposes his 
normative preference on the basis of a distorted “creation” of 
“common sense,” then even legal realists would be hard pressed to 
pass off such exercise of power as merely “a relatively harmless 
one.” 
The norm Easterbrook prescribes has serious consequences for 
Zeidenberg and for the Hills. It defrocks consumers of their 
reasonable assumptions about contract formation and jettisons the 
fundamental common law and statutory rules that had embodied 
and protected those assumptions. Although the scholarly critique 
of Easterbrook’s assumptions about “common sense” in ProCD 
and expanded upon in Hill is powerful, the silliness of his 
assumptions is perhaps most powerfully demonstrated by the 
pejorative treatment they receive as the butt of “Dilbert” cartoon 
humor.245 
                                                          
245 Stephen Y. Chow, Contracting in Cyberspace: The Triumph of Forms?, 
41 BOSTON B. J. 16 (1997). 
John Adams’s “Dilbert” remarked recently: “I didn’t read all of the 
shrink wrap license agreement on my new software until after I opened 
it. Apparently I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in Bill 
Gates’ new mansion.” The scenario is a not-too-absurd extension of a 
commercial law trend towards enforcement of all terms in a form 
“contract,” as exemplified by the recent ProCD and Gateway 2000 
decisions by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, as well 
as by a proposed new Article 2B (Licenses) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”). 
Id. (citations omitted); see also Macaulay, Relational Contracts, supra note 22, 
at 777 n.17. 
Dilbert’s subversive messages are taped and pinned up in many 
business offices as a way of commenting on the absurdity of office 
work in the 1990s. In Dilbert those who know things are powerless; 
those who know nothing run corporations. From time to time Scott 
Adams, who draws Dilbert, deals with matters of interest to contracts 
teachers. Two of my favorites involve contracts created by the magic of 
tearing the shrinkwrap on packages of computer software. In a cartoon 
dated Jan. 14, 1997, Dilbert is talking to Dogbert. He says, “I didn’t 
read all of the shrink-wrap license agreement on my new software until 
after I opened it.” He continues in the next panel: “Apparently I agreed 
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2. Hill and ProCD as Examples of Legal Realism in Operation 
Such humorous ridicule of the absurdity of a decision is 
significant. It indicates the disdain for law that such absurdity 
engenders.246 To the extent that even those outside the legal 
community recognize that these decisions are nothing more than an 
arrogant exercise of power, they present a potentially very serious 
challenge for legal realism. If no standard exists, for validation of 
law higher than the decision-makers themselves expands beyond 
the legal elite to the rest of society (who read “Dilbert”), the 
implications for instability of “law” become more ominous. “Why 
should the public believe the decision makers have made the right 
decisions, or even that they have authority to do so?”247 
                                                          
to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in Bill Gates’ new mansion.” 
Dogbert says, “Call your lawyer.” In the next panel, Dilbert says, “Too 
late. He opened software yesterday. Now he’s Bill’s laundry boy.” 
Dogbert responds: “It must be dangerous for lawyers to iron pants. 
They’d always have one hand in a pocket.” In another dated April 7, 
1997, Dilbert reads: “Software License: By opening this package, you 
agree . . . .” In the next panel, the license terms continue: “[Y]ou will 
not make copies or export to despotic nations. You will submit to strip 
searches in your home . . . .” In the next panel, Dilbert opens the 
package. An employee of the software company is pulling on a rubber 
glove and says, “Frankly, both of us would have been happier if you 
had just walked away.” Purchasers of software can sign a petition 
calling for warranty protection at <http:// 
www.zdnet.com/anchordesk/smbg/ index.html>. Somehow, signing a 
petition on the web hardly seems like the revolution people talked 
about at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the 1960s. 
Id.; see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping And Slouching Toward 
Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation And The Decline Of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1381, 1383 n.6 (1996). 
246 At the very least it appears to reflect the thought expressed by the 
Dickens character, Mr. Brumble, “If the law supposes that, . . . the law is a ass, a 
idiot.” See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed. 
1966).. 
247 Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public 
Policy: With Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and 
Public Policy Issues, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 103, 106 (1995); see also HAROLD J. 
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 39 (1983). In his ABA-award winning book, Berman identifies what 
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This was the very problem identified by Harvard Law School 
Dean Roscoe Pound in 1922, when he acknowledged: 
From the time when lawgivers gave over the attempt to 
maintain the general security by belief that particular 
bodies of human law had been divinely dictated or divinely 
revealed or divinely sanctioned, they have had to wrestle 
with the problem of proving to mankind that the law was 
something fixed and settled, whose authority was beyond 
question, while at the same time enabling it to make 
constant readjustments and occasional radical changes 
under the pressure of infinite and variable human desires. 
248 
In Hill, Easterbrook’s treats the facts of the case and the Hills as 
mere fodder providing the occasion to impose his economic theory. 
It appears that by the time he reaches Hill, his sense of power has 
come to the point where he no longer even wrestles with the 
problem of how to make his decision appear to be adjudicating the 
dispute at hand. 249 He is creating policy because he is in a position 
                                                          
he terms the “crisis of the Western legal tradition”: 
The crisis of the Western legal tradition is not merely a crisis in legal 
philosophy but also a crisis in law itself . . . [A]s a matter of historical 
fact the legal systems of all the nations that are heirs to the Western 
legal tradition have been rooted in certain beliefs or postulates: that is, 
the legal systems themselves have presupposed the validity of those 
beliefs. Today those beliefs or postulates—such as the structural 
integrity of law, its ongoingness, its religious roots, its transcendent 
qualities—are rapidly disappearing, not only from the minds of 
philosophers, not only from the minds of lawmakers, judges, lawyers, 
law teachers, and other members of the legal profession, but from the 
consciousness of the vast majority of citizens, the people as a whole; 
and more than that, they are disappearing from the law itself . . . Thus 
the historical soil of the Western legal tradition is being washed away 
in the twentieth century, and the tradition itself is threatened with 
collapse. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
248 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 3 
(revised ed., 7th printing, 1965). 
249 Joo, supra note 218, at 1039-42, 1045. 
The court attempts to show that the Hills knew that the telephone 
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of power to do so. Justice, or even perceived justice, in a given 
dispute between real parties is, at most, a secondary concern. 
As a policy-maker operating from an ex ante perspective, 
Easterbrook must be forward looking, not backward looking to the 
facts of the dispute presented. It matters not that the Hills, and 
perhaps even Gateway, had no idea at the time of their transaction 
that it would be governed by a new set of rules.250 Although his 
                                                          
conversation did not constitute a contract. Of course, it does not argue 
that the Hills were familiar with the ProCD rule. Nonetheless, 
according to the court, “the Hills knew before they ordered the 
computer that the carton would contain some important terms, and they 
did not seek to discover these in advance.” The court apparently does 
not mean that the Hills actually knew this, but rather that they should 
have inferred it from Gateway’s advertisement . . . [B]ecause 
Gateway’s ads mention warranties and product support, the Hills 
should have surmised that their purchase could be subject to any 
number of other additional terms not mentioned in the ads or by the 
telephone agent. It was up to the Hills to ask the agent about 
undisclosed terms . . . The court implies that contract formation and 
terms are based on whether they make “sense” and not on whether they 
are actually assented to; and, further, that the Hills, as reasonable 
buyers, should have known this. There is no finding that the Hills 
actually knew that efficiency required the telephone clerks to omit 
important terms, that they knew that a judicial analysis of contract 
formation would rely on a principle of wealth maximization rather than 
on the Hills’ own manifestations of assent, or that the Hills based their 
contracting choices on long-term wealth maximization rather than on 
short-term rent-seeking considerations . . . One reason the Hills “knew” 
that additional terms would be in the box was that, according to the 
court, such was the more efficient practice. Thus it is unnecessary to 
examine assent directly. Because freedom of contract results in efficient 
terms, efficiency and assent are effectively collapsed into a single 
inquiry . . . The Gateway opinion refers to the Hills by name, but the 
decision is really not about their individual assent; it about the 
hypothetical rational assent of a hypothetical rational 
plaintiff . . .[A]lthough Rich and Enza Hill are very real people, “the 
Hills” of Hill v. Gateway, and their “subjective assent,” are no more 
than metaphorical constructs. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
250 Id. at 1047-48. 
As every good law-and-economist knows, a judicial decision that sets 
majority sentiment [as stated by the court] as the default rule today will 
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status is described as that of judge, his role is not judging with a 
goal of achieving justice in an individual case. It is a purely 
utilitarian policy-creating role to impose a rule that, according to 
his economic theory, will be good for society. If the parties before 
him find themselves to be the objects of an ex post facto rule, so be 
it. 
Hill, even more than ProCD, exposes the theoretical 
bankruptcy of the current legal system, grounded as it is upon a 
jurisprudence of legal realism. Hill presents an even better 
illustration than does ProCD of the truth expressed by Critical 
Legal Studies theorists that there is no longer law, only power.251 It 
                                                          
put all tomorrow’s deviants on notice that they should bargain around 
the default rule; thus future deviants who do not explicitly contract 
around the default rule can be presumed, like non-deviants, to have 
subjectively assented to it. However, that theory, even if we accept it, 
focuses on the contractual freedom of future parties and not on that of 
the Hills and their class—who are, after all, the parties before the 
court. It sounds communitarian, rather than libertarian, to sacrifice 
today’s litigants, deviant though they may be, to enhance the 
contractual liberty of future parties. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
251 UNGER, supra note 177, at 83, 131-32, 169-81. Noting the contemporary 
rejection of both a Creator God and a created order which reflects regularities in 
nature and social life according to a divine plan, Unger asks: “What happens 
when the positive rules of the state lose all touch with a higher law and come to 
be seen as nothing more that the outcomes of a power struggle? Can the ideals 
of autonomy and generality in law survive the demise of the religious beliefs 
that presided over their birth?” Id. at 83. He notes that when the mentality of 
viewing nature and society “as expressions of a sacred order, and thus self-
subsisting if not self-generating, and independent of the human will,” was 
replaced with a new consciousness that viewed the social order as something 
“that could and indeed had to be devised rather than just accepted ready-made,” 
certain consequences were unavoidable. Id. at 130. One was “to bring out the 
conventional and contingent character of every form of social hierarchy so that 
the exercise of power had to be justified in new and more explicit ways.” Id. at 
129-31. “But whose will was to replace nature as the source of social order? 
Because the crisis was bound up with ever widening disparities among social 
ranks, the source had to be the will of the rulers . . . .” Id. at 132. Unger notes 
that the recognition that the social order is merely the reflection of decisions of 
those in power “ends in the conviction that they are based upon the naked acts 
of will by which people choose among conflicting ultimate values.” Id. at 169. 
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smacks of unchecked and arbitrary exercise of power and of a 
lawlessness foreign to the principles upon which the nation was 
founded. This cannot go unnoticed by the public, especially when 
so many consumers will experience its effect.252 That obviously 
does not bode well for legal realism or a “legal” system grounded 
                                                          
252 Bern, supra note 247, at 106 n.16. 
Critical Legal Studies’ open assessment that contemporary “law” is 
without legitimate foundation reminds one of the candid observation of 
the little child in HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE 
EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES (1949). While all others observing the 
procession pretended they saw beautiful new clothes on the Emperor, 
lest they be thought stupid, the little boy spoke reality; “But the 
Emperor has nothing on at all!” To carry the parallel a step further, 
perhaps the folk tale also suggests the answer to Pound’s question 
whether the legal elite would be able to keep the rest of society 
convinced that contemporary “law” is fixed, settled, and its authority 
beyond question, when it is not. “What the child said was whispered 
from one to another, until everyone knew. And they all cried out 
together, ‘HE HAS NOTHING ON AT ALL!’” 
Id. (internal page references omitted). See also Calvin Woodard, The Limits of 
Legal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968), reprinted 
in HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION, 329 (1972). Professor Woodard, reflecting on the decline of the 
mysterious in law, observes: 
Modern man, no longer sub deo et sub legi, feels himself morally free 
of the demands of externally imposed law that clash with his own 
innermost convictions. Predictably, the result is a generation of law 
teachers who find it difficult to believe—by this I mean profoundly 
believe—in the existence of law beyond what fallible courts say it is; a 
generation of law students who consequently do not learn to be 
restrained in any essential way by the law; and a generation of laymen 
who are markedly uninhibited by, and indeed contemptuous of, the 
sanctions of law. . . .[D]oes the functional approach not teach all 
manner of men to look to law as an instrument for their private or 
personal disposal? Surely no ‘social problem’ could be more critical, or 
chronic, as that of people regarding law first as a means of gratifying 
their own wants, and only incidentally as imposing upon them 
responsibilities towards their fellow men and their society. The appeal 
to a “Rule of Law” under such circumstances is rather pathetic and 
almost hopeless. 
Id. at 378-79. 
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upon it. 
II. BAD ECONOMICS 
Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill “terms later” is not only bad law—it 
is dreadful economics. “Traditional economics is powerful 
precisely because it rests on the simplest possible axioms about 
how people behave.”253 In a bargaining transaction one can expect 
that each party will choose a strategy that advances its own 
interests under the circumstances that exist.254 Information is 
important, “playing a crucial role in the way individuals 
interact.”255 “[W]henever one party possesses private nonverifiable 
information, there is a potential for inefficient outcomes, even 
when parties can negotiate with each other.”256 The private gain to 
one party from hiding information may induce that party to behave 
in a way that, though privately beneficial, is not socially 
optimal.”257 Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule ignores 
human nature and these economic realities. It is based upon a 
surreal bargaining setting created by an artificial attribution of 
knowledge and bargaining behavior to consumers. It also ignores 
                                                          
253 Douglas G. Baird, Game Theory, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 192 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan 
Reference Ltd. 1998). 
254 Id. 
A player will choose a strictly dominant strategy [the best choice for 
that player] whenever possible and will not choose any strategy that is 
strictly dominated by another. Few people would take issue with the 
idea that individuals are likely to choose a strategy when then they can 
always do better in their own eyes choosing that strategy than by 
choosing any other. 
Id. 
255 Id. at 195. 
256 Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 J. OF ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES 113, 115 (1987) “[A] large literature has developed on ‘non-
cooperative’ models of bargaining, formalizing the process of offers and 
counteroffers that we see in real transactions. The main conclusion of these 
models . . . is that bargaining is typically inefficient when, as is likely, each 
bargainer knows something relevant that the other does not. . . .” Id. 
257 Baird, supra note 253, at 196. 
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yet another significant economic reality: transaction costs.258 A 
search by consumers for hidden terms is not a costless one. 
Law and economics is supposed to be able to predict and thus 
produce good policy for society, giving the supposed justification 
for courts operating from an ex ante perspective informed by 
economic reality to create policy.259 Easterbrook should thus have 
been able to predict that his “terms later” rule and creation of a 
new method of contract formation would increase information 
asymmetry, increase transaction costs, enhance hold-up260 or 
opportunistic behavior by vendors,261 and result in inefficiencies as 
                                                          
258 David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 274, 274-75 (Peter Newman ed., Macmillan 
Reference Ltd. 1998). 
259 See Ogus, supra note 59. 
260 Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241, 241 (Peter Newman ed., 
Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). “A hold-up occurs only when a transactor, 
taking these future effects into account, decides it is wealth-maximizing to take 
advantage of contractual incompleteness to expropriate the rents on the specific 
investments made by its transacting partner.” Id. Klein identifies three factors 
that are necessary for the occurrence of a hold-up: (1) the victim’s investment 
must be specific to the circumstances enabling the other party to do the hold-up; 
(2) the contract governing the relationship between the parties must be 
incomplete in the sense that it did not preclude the opportunity for the hold-up; 
(3) the one engaging in the hold-up must find it profitable to do so. Id. He notes 
that his view of hold-up does not necessarily carry the “unsavory” features of 
lying, stealing, cheating, and more subtle forms of deceit such as incomplete or 
distorted disclosure of information that some writers associate with the term 
“opportunism;” but rather may be more often be merely the result of specific 
investment, incomplete contracts and unanticipated events. Id. at 244. Thus 
although in layman’s terms “hold-up” may connote something more 
reprehensible and blameworthy than does the term “opportunistic behavior,” in 
the economic literature the former is considered to be the more benign of the 
terms. 
261 Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunistic Behavior in Contracts, in 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 703-709, (Peter 
Newman ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). Williamson notes: 
Opportunism is a type of self-interest seeking and may be contrasted 
both with stewardship (unself-interest seeking) and with simple self-
interest seeking (look to your interests but keep all of your promises). 
Opportunism contemplates self-interest seeking with guile – to include 
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well as distributional unfairness by systematically redistributing 
wealth from consumers to vendors. 
A. Information Asymmetry and Bounded Rationality 
In bargaining, information asymmetry—the imbalance of 
information known to the parties—is typical.262 If costs for 
searching for information were zero, a purely rational actor 
contemplating a decision would make a comprehensive search for 
relevant information.263 But searches entail costs “in the form of 
time, energy and perhaps money.”264 Further, even if an actor were 
to incur the search costs and thus acquire all of the information 
                                                          
the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise 
confuse. 
Id. at 703 (emphasis added). Williamson also notes that: “[O]pportunism in 
contracts is not a free-standing concept but requires, additionally, that bounded 
rationality and transaction attributes be introduced.” Id. at 704. He identifies a 
number of examples of “asset-specificity” transaction attributes that can give 
rise to bilateral dependency and thus the opportunity for abuse. Id. at 707. All 
have in common the following: “[T]he faceless contracting, out of which 
orthodox economics works, gives way to contracting in which the pairwise 
identity of the parties matters.” Id. In the context of “terms later” offers, the 
situation is loaded with “transaction attributes.” It does matter that the buyer has 
made a specific investment in the form of full payment and has even begun 
enjoying the benefit of the goods before becoming aware the adverse terms 
proposed, and that the “offeror” will get the benefit of the adverse terms unless 
the buyer promptly returns the goods, relinquishing all rights he thought he had 
already obtained in them. Unlike in a “faceless transaction” in which a 
hypothetical offeror offers to sell goods subject to terms adverse to a 
hypothetical offeree who will decide whether to affirmatively accept based on 
the pure merits of the offer, uninfluenced by any “transactional attributes,” in the 
“terms later” setting the “transactional attributes” will powerfully influence the 
offeree’s decision. 
262 Farrell, supra note 256, at 115 (explaining the inefficiency of the 
bargaining process when participants possess an unequal level of relevant 
knowledge). 
263 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cognition and Contract, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 282, 282 (Peter Newman 
ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). 
264 Id. 
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relevant to a transaction, because human information processing 
(evaluating and deliberating on information) is imperfect, he will 
often imperfectly process it.265 It appears that both ProCD and 
Gateway were aware of these economic realities and that they 
respectively used them to their advantage in crafting their “terms 
later” contract formation strategy. They reflect the reality that, 
unlike the hypothetical rational actor that Easterbrook imagines, 
“human rationality is normally bounded by limited information and 
limited information processing.”266 
Commenting on the concept of bounded rationality, Professor 
Eisenberg observes: 
That actors limit search and processing does not necessarily 
mean that they fail to rationally maximize their total utility 
in making decisions. An actor’s total utility from a decision 
depends not only on the substantive merits of the decision, 
but also on the costs of the decision-making procedure. 
Limits on search and processing costs may maximize an 
actor’s overall utility, because the utility gain from 
substituting a lower cost of limited search and processing 
may offset the utility shortfall from substituting a 
satisfactory decision for an optimal decision. However, 
even if actors follow the model of optimal decision-making 
procedure, so that their ignorance of undiscovered 
alternatives and consequences is rational, their calculations 
concerning the alternatives and consequences they do 
consider may not be rational.267 
Elaborating on that latter point, Eisenberg identifies two bodies of 
empirical evidence showing “that under certain circumstances 
actors are often systematically irrational; that is, that they often fail 
to make rational decisions even within the bounds of the 
                                                          
265 Id. 
266 Id. “Most actors either don’t want to expend the resources required for 
comprehensive search and processing or recognize that comprehensive search 
and processing would not be achievable at any realistic cost.” Id. In this sense, 
an actor’s decision to limit search can be characterized as one of “rational 
ignorance.” Id. at 282-83. 
267 Id. at 283 (emphasis added). 
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information they have acquired.”268 The first body of empirical 
evidence concerns “disposition,” showing that “as a systematic 
matter, people are unrealistically optimistic.”269 The second body 
of empirical evidence concerns “defective capability.”270 “Just as 
defects in disposition systematically tilt actors’ judgments toward 
optimism, so defects in capability systematically distort the way 
actors search for, process, and weigh information and 
scenarios.”271 Defects in capability refer to what “cognitive 
psychology has established [with respect to] certain decision-
making rules (heuristics) that real people use and that yield 
systematic errors.”272 Four such defects in capability are 
particularly relevant to contract law. They are defects associated 
with the heuristics known as availability,273 representativeness,274 
                                                          
268 Id. 
269 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Cognition and Contract, in 1 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 282, 283 (Peter Newman 
ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 284. 
When an actor must make a decision that requires a judgment about the 
probability of an event, he commonly judges that probability on the 
basis of comparable data and scenarios that are readily available to his 
memory or imagination. This heuristic leads to systematic biases 
because factors other than objective frequency and probability affect 
the salience of data and scenarios and therefore affect the ease with 
which an actor imagines a scenario or retrieves data from memory . . . 
The availability heuristic concerns the manner in which actors bring 
acquired data to mind and imagine future scenarios. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
274 Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 283. 
The representativeness heuristic “concerns the manner of making 
judgments concerning the adequacy of search. As the concept of 
bounded rationality implies, actors seldom collect all relevant data 
before making decisions. Rather, they usually make decisions on the 
basis of some subset of the data, which they judge to be representative. 
In making that judgment, however, actors systematically and 
erroneously view unduly small samples as representative. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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defective telescopic faculties,275 and defective risk-assessment 
faculties.276 
Eisenberg insightfully notes how closely related and interactive 
the defects in cognition are and their link to bounded rationality.277 
His examination of cognition and contract, written prior to ProCD, 
assessed the combined impact of bounded rationality and cognitive 
defects in the context of standard form contracts presented to 
buyers prior to or at the time of their purchase decision.278 The 
combined effect of those factors is to produce a setting in which 
                                                          
275 Id. “[The faulty telescopic faculties type] concerns the ability of actors 
to make rational comparisons between present and future states. Actors 
systematically give too little weight to future benefits and costs as compared to 
present benefits and costs.” Id. This defect and the following one, faulty risk-
estimation faculties, are exemplified in the observations concerning 
“endowment effect,” “status quo effect,” and “loss aversion,” infra at notes 277-
81 and 282-85 and accompanying text. 
276 Id. at 284. The empirical evidence “strongly suggests that actors 
systematically underestimate most risks, including low-probability risks of 
economic losses.” Id. at 285. 
277 Id. at 285. 
 The defects in cognition are closely related and interactive. For 
example, actors may underweigh future costs in part because the future 
involves a great number of risks, and actors underestimate risks, and in 
part because the present is vivid, concrete, and instantiated, while the 
future is pallid, abstract, and general. Conversely, actors may 
underestimate risks in part because risks are often pallid, abstract, and 
general, and in part because risks relate to the future, and actors give 
too little weight to future costs. 
 These defects in cognition are also closely related to and interact 
with the dispositional problem of unrealistic optimism: If actors are 
unrealistically optimistic, they will systematically underestimate risks. 
If actors systematically underestimate risks, they will be unrealistically 
optimistic. 
 Finally, these defects in cognition are closely tied to bounded 
rationality. Availability and representativeness, for instance, would not 
even come into play if search and processing were unbounded. Only 
where actors rely on selective, incomplete information does undue 
emphasis on available and unrepresentative data pose a problem. 
Id. 
278 Id. at 287-88. 
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consumers are very vulnerable to being overreached by sellers and 
sellers are tempted to act opportunistically.279 In this setting, the 
preprinted terms are typically nonperformance terms in the sense 
that they relate to the future and concern low-probability risks.280 
For that reason, all of the cognitive problems of bounded 
rationality, optimistic disposition, systematic underestimating of 
risk, and undue weight on the present as compared with the future 
are implicated.281 Optimistic disposition and systematic 
underestimating of risk, for example, will prompt a consumer to tilt 
toward believing the product will perform well, and that even if it 
might not, that danger is slight, so any remedy limitation is likely 
to never pose a problem. Visually experiencing the highly touted 
product enhances the natural tendency to give more weight to 
favorable present experience than to potential future problems that 
could emerge from the purchase. 
Compounding those cognitive problems in the setting of 
preprinted terms is the “the phenomenon of rational ignorance 
[that] plays a particularly powerful role, because of the high 
disincentives for the consumer to engage in a serious search 
effort.”282 
                                                          
279 Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 287. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 287. 
282 Id. 
 A form-giver typically offers a package consisting of a physical 
commodity and a form contract that states the terms on which the 
commodity is sold. Each part of the package, in turn, consists of a 
number of subparts. The physical commodity has physical attributes, 
such as size, shape and colour. The form contract has the business and 
legal attributes, such as price, quantity, and limitations on remedies. 
 To make an optimum substantive decision, the form-taker would, at a 
minimum, carefully deliberate on the legal attributes of all the form 
contracts that are coupled with the physical commodities he is 
considering. Analysing legal attributes in this manner, however, will 
often be unduly costly. First, a form contract often contains a very large 
number of legal terms. . . . Moreover, the meaning and effect of the 
preprinted provisions will very often be inaccessible to nonlawyers. In 
part, this is because the terms are often written in exceedingly technical 
prose. Even if the terms are written clearly, however, the form-taker 
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Eisenberg concludes that Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 211, and UCC section 2-207, the respective common law 
and statutory responses that protect against imposition of 
preprinted terms, rest ultimately on the limits of cognition.283 
Under the former, “preprinted terms will not be enforced if the 
form-giver had reason to know the form-taker would not expect the 
term to be included in the contract.”284 Under the latter, a contract 
for the sale of goods will be formed by a response to an offer that 
appears to be an acceptance even though its preprinted terms do 
not mirror those of the offer, thus eliminating the pre-Code last-
shot rule and the “unilateral trick” that it invited.285 
The vulnerability of consumers to overreaching and the 
temptation of sellers to act opportunistically are magnified 
dramatically in the context of a “terms later” rule where the 
standard terms are not disclosed until after the purchase decision 
                                                          
usually will be unable fully to understand their effects, because 
preprinted terms characteristically vary the form-taker’s baseline legal 
rights, and nonlawyers often do not know their baseline legal rights. 
 If all that were not enough, most form contracts are tendered by 
agents who have no authority to vary the preprinted terms, so that 
deliberating on those terms will often be pointless. Furthermore, form-
takers often encounter form contracts under circumstances that 
encourage them to exert only minimal effort to understand the 
preprinted terms. . . . 
 The bottom line is simple. The verbal and legal obscurity of 
preprinted terms renders the cost of searching out and deliberating on 
these terms exceptionally high. . . . [So] a rational form-taker will 
typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms. . . . 
 For the form-taker, any given contract term may be a one-shot 
transaction. . . . For the form-giver, however, a form contract is a high 
volume, repeat transaction. Thus a rational form-giver will spend a 
significant amount of time and money, including money for legal 
advice, to prepare a form contract that is optimal from his perspective. 
These asymmetrical incentives almost always work to slant form 
contracts heavily in favour of form-givers. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
283 Id. at 288. 
284 Id. 
285 Id. 
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and payment have been made, and when, under the Hill version of 
the rule, the disclosure is strategically made in a manner calculated 
to minimize actual awareness of the terms by the purchaser. While 
inclination to search with respect to preprinted terms presented 
prior to or at the time of the purchase decision is small for the 
reasons noted by Eisenberg, it virtually vanishes when the terms 
are held back until after the purchase decision has been made and 
the purchaser has parted with his money. 
Writing even before ProCD/Hill created a rule imposing a 
search duty on buyers for their self-defense against terms that 
reduced the value of their purchases, Professor Shavell concluded, 
“[w]hen information has no social value [i.e., cannot lead to an 
increase in value], acquisition of information after sale has no 
relevance: no buyer would rationally engage in costly acquisition 
of information after making a purchase if it could not be used to 
raise the value of his good.”286 And all of the other cognitive 
defects of optimistic disposition, systematic underestimating of 
risk, and undue weight on the present as compared with the future 
are also dramatically magnified by the double-pronged tactic of 
parting the purchaser from his money and placing the goods into 
his hands prior to disclosure. That tactic enhances the vulnerability 
already inherent in those defects by adding to them the “loss 
aversion” principle that is manifested in the “endowment effect” 
and the “status quo bias.”287 All combine to make it most unlikely 
that a purchaser will send the goods back even if he actually timely 
gains knowledge of objectionable terms. 
B. Loss Aversion, Endowment Effect, and Status Quo Bias 
“Loss aversion” is the term given an asymmetry of value such 
that “the disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility 
associated with acquiring it.”288 One of its manifestations is the 
                                                          
286 Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 
25 RAND J. ECON. 20, 35 (1994). 
287 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: 
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 
193 (1991). 
288 Id. at 193-94 (1991). “One implication of loss aversion is that 
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“endowment effect,” a term that describes the “fact that people 
often demand much more to give up an object than they would be 
willing to pay to acquire it.”289 Those who have conducted 
experiments with respect to the matter have concluded that “the 
main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good 
one owns, only the pain of giving it up.”290 
Another outworking of loss aversion is “status quo bias,” the 
term used to describe “a preference for the current state that biases 
[a person who has purchased an item] against both buying and 
selling [it].”291 The authors who have studied these effects 
conclude: 
A central conclusion of the study of risky choice has been 
that such choices are best explained by assuming that the 
significant carriers of utility are not states of wealth or 
welfare, but changes relative to a neutral reference point. 
Another central result is that changes that make things 
worse (losses) loom larger than improvements or gains.292 
In the context of a Hill setting, the implications are clear. Once 
the purchaser has the computer in hand, even if he knows of the 
objectionable terms in time to resist them, he is most unlikely to do 
so. The downside of parting with “his computer” (including the 
hassle of getting it back into the box and shipping it back), along 
with the need to begin a search for its replacement, loom much 
larger than the possible upside of averting potential remedial 
limitations he may face if by chance the thing does not function 
properly. “Foregone gains are less painful than perceived 
losses.”293 
Additionally, loss aversion reflected in the asymmetry between 
the willingness to voluntarily accept a new risk in contrast to 
merely failing to eliminate an existing one, and its impact on 
                                                          
individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the 
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.” Id. at 197-98. 
289 Id. at 194. 
290 Id. at 197. 
291 Id. at 194. 
292 Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
293 Kahnemann, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 287, at 203. 
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judgments about responsibility, has been confirmed by 
psychological research.294 Examination of studies exploring this 
matter shows that “[this] asymmetry affects both blame and regret 
after a mishap, and the anticipation of blame and regret, in turn, 
could affect behavior.”295 They note that even Justice Holmes 
showed an understanding of that point, albeit in other than 
sophisticated psychological or economic terms, when he observed: 
It is in the nature of a man’s mind. A thing which you 
enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether 
property or opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be 
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to 
defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask 
no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.296 
That reality and its implication for the law appear to have 
escaped Easterbrook. It obviously did not escape ProCD or 
Gateway, who well appreciated the psychological power that 
completing the sale and placing the product in a buyer’s hands 
would have on the buyer’s likely response to the subsequent 
disclosure of objectionable terms. The effort to justify the wisdom 
of the basic purchase and thus to avoid having to admit being 
tricked as to the deal’s real value, when coupled with the other 
cognitive defects, the inconveniences connected with return, and 
the cost of search for a replacement, undermines the supposed 
efficiency of the transaction and benefits for producers and 
consumers. 
C. Silent Acceptance Not Supported by Economics: Professor 
Katz’s Model 
Because the preprinted terms under the ProCD/Hill “terms 
later” rule do not relate merely to substantive entitlements, but 
rather to the very mechanics of contract formation, they implicate 
rules that “are from an economic point of view theoretically prior 
                                                          
294 Id. at 202. 
295 Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
296 Id. at 204 (quoting from Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. 
REV. 728 (1897)). 
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to all other legal rules.”297 Professor Katz underscores the 
fundamental economic importance of legal rules of contract 
formation in the context of his article addressing the issue of 
“silent-acceptance.” Written prior to ProCD, it analyzes the silent-
acceptance issue in its traditional setting, in which an offeror 
announces in advance of payment by the offeree that silence by the 
offeree in the face of the offer will constitute acceptance of the 
terms of the offer. The common law, however, has not 
countenanced forcing silence as acceptance except in very limited 
circumstances.298 Katz concludes that the common law rule 
                                                          
297 Avery Katz, Transaction Costs and the Legal Mechanics of Exchange: 
When Should Silence in the Face of an Offer be Construed as Acceptance?, 9 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 77, 77 (1993). 
298 Id. The limited circumstances in which offerees have been held bound 
by silent-acceptance are those described in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 69, and in section 2-207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
with respect to transactions between merchants in which proposals for addition 
to a contract do not materially alter the contract previously formed. Id. The 
former provides: 
§ 69. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion. (1) Where an 
offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an 
acceptance in the following cases only: (a) Where an offeree takes the 
benefit of offered services with reasonable opportunity to reject them 
and reason to know they were offered with the expectation of 
compensation. (b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree 
reason to understand that assent may be manifested by silence or 
inaction, and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to 
accept the offer. (c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it 
is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not 
intend to accept. (2) An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the 
offeror’s ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the 
offered terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable. But if the act is 
wrongful against the offeror it is an acceptance only if ratified by him. 
Id. at 91 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69). Katz notes that 
the § 69(2) category is in fact acceptance by conduct, rather than acceptance by 
silence. But the kind of conduct from an economic point of view that triggers it 
is incurring some cost or effort “in order to accept, instead of incurring cost to 
avoid accepting.” Id. at 91. It, like the exception for taking the benefit of 
services under § 69(1)(a), also “reflects the principle of restitution.” Id. at 91. 
Neither of those exceptions is implicated by failure to affirmatively reject a 
“terms later” “offer.” Mere failure to affirmatively reject would not trigger an 
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requiring, in all but the few identified special instances, the 
recipient of an offer to respond affirmatively before he is legally 
bound is efficient and is also distributionally fair.299 His insightful 
economic analysis of the common law rule, its efficiencies and 
distributional equities, and of the inefficiencies and distributional 
inequities that would result from a contrary rule, applies with even 
more force to the “terms later” contract formation rule of 
ProCD/Hill. 
Katz acknowledges that the offeror is master of the offer, but, 
unlike Easterbrook, he recognizes the qualification that the law, for 
very good reasons, has put on that concept. He observes: 
 Under the common law rule, the person who proposes an 
exchange has substantial control over the course of 
bargaining—a fact captured by the maxim that “the offeror 
is master of the offer.” The traditional justification for this 
result is the principle of freedom of contract. An offer, by 
its terms, defines the proposed contract in form as well as 
content. In order to have freedom to choose the terms on 
which she is willing to enter into exchange, the offeror 
must have power to specify what kind of response counts as 
an acceptance. For instance, an offeror would ordinarily be 
free to require that acceptance take place by a certain date 
or be communicated by a particular medium. 
 If this logic were taken to the extreme, the offeror could 
provide that the offeree need do nothing at all in order to 
accept. For instance, a seller of goods could send a letter 
                                                          
acceptance under the former. Nor could it be said that a buyer is unjustly 
enriched by retaining goods for which he had paid the full price extracted by the 
seller on a basis that did not include the value-detracting “terms later.”§ 2-
207(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to 
the contract. Between merchants such become part of the contract 
unless: (a) the offeror expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them 
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. 
Id. at 95 (quoting UCC § 2-207(2)). 
299 Id at 97. 
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announcing that a shipment of merchandise will be sent 
unless the recipient objects. Or, the seller could make 
acceptance arise not from inaction, but from some 
affirmative action that the offeree would have taken 
anyway. There are several good reasons for the seller to do 
this. For offers that the buyer would accept anyway, the 
trouble of the extra communication is saved. If the goods 
are shipped along with the offer, the buyer can enjoy their 
use at an earlier time. And putting them in front of the buyer 
may be an effective way to increase his desire for them. 
 On the other hand, such offers raise the potential for rent 
seeking, since any increase in the seller’s profits comes in 
part at the buyer’s expense. The buyer may be induced by 
the trouble of responding to accept an offer he would not 
otherwise entertain. And buyers who reject must pay a cost 
to do so. The principle of freedom of contract is an 
inconclusive criterion for such a case, accordingly, since 
the seller’s freedom to enter into the exchange only on such 
terms as she is willing is incompatible with a similar 
freedom for the buyer. 
 In general, the offeror’s control over the offer gives way 
to the offeree’s right to be let alone. . . .300 
Katz evaluates the consequences of the common law rule 
requiring affirmative acceptance of an offer before the offeree is 
bound and a silent-acceptance rule under which the offeree is 
bound unless he affirmatively rejects. His economic model 
assumes conditions of perfect information, and thus, unlike the rule 
of ProCD/Hill, eliminates the opportunity for the offeror to 
conceal important information prior to payment by the offeree. 
Thus, any tendency under his model for the offeror to engage in 
rent seeking behavior, and its resulting inefficiencies and 
distributional inequities, will pale in comparison with the 
predictable rent seeking behavior and resulting inefficiencies and 
distributional inequities invited and encouraged by the rule of 
ProCD/Hill. He demonstrates that a silent-acceptance rule, where 
                                                          
300 Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
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the buyer must expressly reject to prevent contract formation, 
effectively “converts the buyer’s response cost into an appropriable 
rent. In contrast, the common-law rule prevents this forced 
redistribution, and ensures that both parties share in the surplus 
when there is an exchange.”301 That was the result even with his 
model’s assumption that the buyer’s response cost was the same 
regardless of whether the buyer accepted or rejected.302 
But the cost of rejecting often differs from the cost of 
accepting. Perhaps the most significant reason for this difference is 
that “offerors may deliberately influence those costs.”303 Katz 
suggests how an offeror might do so. 
 The seller can often affect the buyer’s response cost by 
the manner in which she makes the offer—for instance, by 
demanding that response come through some expensive 
medium—and her incentives to do this will depend on the 
legal regime. . . . Under a silent-acceptance rule . . .the 
seller benefits from raising the buyer’s response cost, and 
she has an incentive to try to make it burdensome for him to 
reply. 
 The seller’s ability to raise [response costs] under a 
silent-acceptance rule raises both the likelihood of 
opportunistic exchanges and their cost to the buyer, while 
her ability to lower [response costs] under the common law 
lowers the cost and likelihood of missed efficient 
exchanges. Furthermore, under a silent-acceptance rule, 
distributional gains to the offeror may be dissipated by 
increased rent seeking that raises the cost of making the 
offer. Any resources the offeror invests in raising [response 
costs] is a pure deadweight loss, as are any resources the 
parties might spend competing for the position of offeror in 
the first place. The risk of rent seeking under a silent 
acceptance rule, accordingly, provides an additional 
efficiency argument for the common-law rule.304 
                                                          
301 Id. at 83. 
302 Id. at 80. 
303 Katz, supra note 297, at 84 (emphasis added). 
304 Id. at 84 (emphasis added). 
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Although written prior to ProCD/Hill, it is strikingly prophetic 
with regard to the strategic planning of a Gateway decision maker. 
1. Katz’s Model Applied 
Gateway, like any vendor who would want to make its offer 
effective only after it receives payment and places the goods in the 
buyer’s hands, obviously must make resource investments in 
making such an “offer” that are significantly greater than what 
would be required to make a simple offer that invited acceptance 
by return promise or performance (e.g., paying for the goods). It 
must first identify the particular potential “offeree,” determine that 
potential offeree’s systems requirements, configure the computer 
for that potential offeree, and then ship the computer to that person 
with terms that explain for the first time that an “offer” to form a 
contract for sale is being made and that the offeree is legally bound 
by all of its terms unless he rejects. Then it must make rejection of 
the offer costly, for example by requiring it to be expressed by an 
actual return of the goods within a relatively short period of time. 
The payoff for incurring such costs is apparent. By making 
such an unusual offer that actually places the goods in the offeree’s 
hands, and by requiring that rejection be expressed only by return 
of the goods, a vendor could dramatically increase the cost to the 
buyer of rejecting the offer, and thus dramatically decrease the 
likelihood that the buyer will avoid the objectionable terms. As a 
consequence, a vendor can do so without being saddled with the 
significant up front costs of such an offer by getting full payment 
from the potential offeree before incurring most of those strategic 
costs. 
a. The Vendor’s Perspective Prior to Legal Sanction of “Terms 
Later” Practice 
This strategy, if legally sanctioned, could pay large dividends. 
Whether it pays worthwhile dividends even without the support of 
the legal regime is a significant question to consider in light of the 
fact that ProCD and Gateway employed that business strategy prior 
to being blessed by Easterbrook’s opinions. 
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ProCD and Gateway apparently believed that they improved 
their respective bottom lines by incurring additional costs in 
structuring their respective offers. Consider the possible outcomes 
for the vendors in the face of legal uncertainty. Some buyers may 
actually become aware of the objectionable terms in time to reject 
in the prescribed matter. Factors such as those associated with 
cognitive defects, endowment effect, status quo bias, and basic risk 
aversion make it very unlikely that many will reverse the 
transaction—so few sales will be lost.305 Even with respect to the 
few that will be lost, the cost, basically shipping expenses, will be 
small. In a Gateway-like setting, many, perhaps most, will not 
become aware of the terms in time to reject, thus those sales will 
not be reversed. In many instances no displeasure with the goods 
implicating the terms will arise and the enforceability of the “terms 
later” will not be an issue. Still, that does not change the fact that 
the buyer received a product with terms not bargained for or 
agreed to. 
In some instances buyers will be displeased with the product 
and the “terms later” will be implicated. Some or many who kept 
the product with knowledge of the “terms later” in time to have 
rejected them may believe themselves to be bound by them, and 
thus conform their conduct to them. As to that number, the terms 
have worked for the vendors even without the benefit of the law. 
Some or many buyers who do not become aware of the “terms 
later” until after the time to reject them has passed, and probably 
only after their displeasure with the goods, may also believe 
themselves bound and thus conform their conduct accordingly. 
Again, even without the benefit of law, vendors will have received 
the benefit of the protection of their terms. 
Further, consider instances where a buyer actually believes 
himself not bound by the terms and is dissatisfied with the product. 
Few are likely to be willing to incur the expenses of litigation if 
their personal efforts to get a favorable resolution are rebuffed. Of 
those few who would pursue litigation, they may or may not be 
successful. If they were to draw a court that enforced the common 
law rule reflected in UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207(2) and thus 
                                                          
305 See discussion supra notes 262-96 and accompanying text. 
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precluded imposition of “terms later” on consumers by silent-
acceptance, those particular litigants would avoid the effect of the 
“terms later.” 306 As to those litigants, except for the vendor’s 
litigation expenses, the vendor’s position would be the same as it 
would have been without imposing the “terms later.” It would have 
all of the obligations that the default provisions of the law would 
provide, but nothing worse, and it would have received a price that 
it was able to command because the buyers believed those default 
rights were part of the value they were paying for. Even a ruling 
favorable to such litigants may alter little the perceptions of other 
buyers who read the “terms later” but do not read the cases. Like 
the “salutary” effect achieved by the abuse of including 
exculpatory clauses in contracts by those who know courts will 
refuse enforcement on public policy grounds, the “terms later” 
provisions are still likely to work their practical in terrorem effect 
on numerous buyers. 
If litigating buyers were to draw an Easterbrook-kind of judge, 
they would lose. In that situation, vendors would have collected a 
price that reflected the value buyers thought they were getting, but 
without having to deliver it. From the standpoint of a vendor’s 
bottom line, that would be a wonderful position to be in. And if 
competitors followed the same strategy, or if these were basically 
one-shot transactions with buyers, reputational concerns would be 
minimal. 
b. Societal Perspective—”Terms Later” Rule Does Not 
Maximize Societal Wealth 
A “terms later” rule will not still somehow maximize societal 
wealth,307 despite the predictable inefficiencies Katz identifies that 
                                                          
306 See, e.g., Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S. 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001); 
infra Part IV.H (discussing the Licitra court’s finding that to enforce “terms 
later” would violate UCC § 2-207 and public policy). 
307 Wealth maximization is a theory of welfare that identifies welfare with 
economic surplus. “Economic surplus is the sum of (1) the difference between 
what a consumer must pay and the maximum she is willing to pay for 
something, and (2) the difference between the price a seller obtains for its 
product and the minimum price necessary to sustain the seller in the market.” 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
734 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
are inherent with informational asymmetry and which will only be 
magnified by such a rule. The employment of this stratagem to 
maximize vendors’ wealth is no more a surrogate for the 
maximization of the wealth of society than is maximization of the 
wealth of the fraudfeasors who employ a more traditional form of 
deception. Fraudfeasors, however, must give up their gains when 
they are caught. 
Recall that Katz also concludes that the common law rule 
which precludes forcing offerees to reject to avoid accepting 
offers, reflected in UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207(2), is justified as 
being distributionally fair “because it ensures that both parties to 
the exchange receive some gain and it prevents offerors from 
profiting at the expense of passive offerees.”308 The general 
common law rule “is thus equally well explained by efficiency and 
equity.”309 Elaborating on the distributional fairness of the 
common law rule, Katz notes: 
[Under a silent-acceptance rule] gains are primarily by the 
offeror, who will offer less generous terms under a regime 
in which it is costly to reject, and by those offerees who 
attach a relatively high value to exchange. Offerees who 
attach a relatively low value to exchange are generally 
made worse off by a silent-acceptance rule, for they are 
forced to choose between accepting on terms that yield 
them a negative return and expending resources in sending 
rejections. In either event such offerees are worse off than 
if they had just been left alone. The common law rule, in 
contrast, blocks this redistribution and ensures that both 
parties to the exchange share in any surplus.310 
                                                          
Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 825 
(1990). “[W]ealth maximization is an aggregate concept. That is, it is more 
concerned with societal well-being than with individual welfare. . . . Value is 
measured by a willingness and ability to pay, and the goal of a wealth 
maximizing society must be to maximize aggregate value.” Whitney 
Cunningham, Note, Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization, 81 
GEO. L. J. 141, 143 (1992) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
308 See Katz, supra note 297, at 97. 
309 Id. (emphasis added). 
310 Avery Wiener Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 THE 
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The significance of the choice of contract formation rules from 
the standpoint of distributional equity is concisely captured by one 
writer’s observation that “[l]egal rules . . . do more than simply 
facilitate trade. They may also affect the way the parties divide the 
potential gains from any trade. . . .”311 That latter point illustrates 
why Katz is correct in concluding that from the economic point of 
view, contract formation rules are theoretically prior to all other 
legal rules.312 With the increased bargaining power that the legal 
rule of ProCD/Hill gives vendors, one should not be surprised if 
vendors used it grab as much value for themselves as possible. 
D. The Human Self-Interestedness Tendency for Opportunistic 
Behavior 
A vendor’s behavior to get as much for himself as possible is 
consistent with the “active tendency of the human agent to take 
advantage, in any circumstance, of all available means to further 
his own privileges.”313 This human tendency of “self-
interestedness” is as fundamental to normal economic analysis as 
is the limitation on human cognition.314 That is because together 
they create the potential for “hold-up,”315 or, in its more unsavory 
form, “opportunistic behavior.”316 
1. “Holding-up” the Hills 
Three factors are necessary for the occurrence of a hold-up: (1) 
the victim’s investment must be specific to the circumstances 
enabling the other party to do the hold-up; (2) the contract 
governing the relationship between the parties must be incomplete 
                                                          
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 427 (Peter 
Newman ed., Macmillan Reference Ltd. 1998). 
311 See Baird, supra note 253 at 197. 
312 See Katz, supra note 297, at 77. 
313 See Williamson, supra note 261, at 706 (footnotes omitted). 
314 Id. at 705. 
315 See Klein, supra note 260 (providing Klein’s definition of hold-up). 
316 See Williamson, supra note 261 (providing Williamson’s definition of 
opportunism). 
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in the sense that it did not preclude the opportunity for the hold-up; 
(3) the one engaging in the hold-up must find it profitable, wealth 
maximizing, to do so.317 
In Hill, the victim’s specific investment is obvious—the Hills 
paid full price for the computer prior to its delivery, and prior to 
disclosure of the objectionable terms. The Hills may have believed 
the contract for purchase was completed and the terms were set 
when they put their order in, paid with their credit card, and 
Gateway promised to ship the goods. Under Easterbrook’s “terms 
later” formation rule, however, the contract certainly was 
“incomplete” in the sense that it did not preclude a hold-up. In fact, 
according to Easterbrook, the contract was not merely 
“incomplete,” it was not in existence at all at the time the Hills 
parted with their money.318 It is apparent then that the second of 
the necessary factors for hold-up is also met in the Hill context. 
As for the third factor, the actor in a position to engage in hold-
up will do so only if it is wealth maximizing.319 Put another way, 
the one engaging in hold-up must expect the short-run gains from 
such conduct to outweigh any long-run costs that could be imposed 
by the victim of hold-up by way of retaliation. If, for example, the 
parties have an ongoing relationship that is valuable to the one who 
could benefit from a hold-up, and the victim is likely to retaliate by 
terminating it in the event of hold up, that could prevent a hold-up 
from being wealth maximizing.320 Threat of retaliation by the 
victim is within the larger category of “reputational concerns” 
identified in the economic literature as the most significant 
“private enforcement” restraint against hold-up.321 Engaging in 
hold-up obviously tarnishes the reputation of the one engaging in 
that practice and is likely to sour future relations between the 
parties. But private enforcement capital is limited.322 The larger 
question is whether the reputational damage will be less than the 
                                                          
317 See Klein, supra note 260. 
318 See supra Part 1.A.2 (discussing Easterbrook’s formulation of the 
“terms later” formation rule in ProCD). 
319 See Klein, supra note 260. 
320 Id. at 241-44. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
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gain achieved by the hold-up. 
It is unlikely that Gateway feared that spoiling its reputation 
with the Hills by taking advantage of the hold-up opportunity 
would hurt its bottom line, or that, by using its “terms later” 
strategy, it would it sour its relationship with the Hills so they 
would not buy a Gateway computer in the future. If the computer 
worked as promised, the Hills could care less about the 
objectionable remedies limitations because they would never have 
been confronted with them (and perhaps they would never have 
even known about them). If the computer did not work as 
promised, the bad performance itself would probably have 
prompted the Hills to buy their next computer from Dell or some 
other manufacturer even if they had been able to pursue legal 
remedies against Gateway. 
Even if the bad performance of the computer would not have 
discouraged the Hills from buying another Gateway computer, but 
the unsatisfactory remedy limitations would have, it probably 
would not be enough to deter Gateway from pursuing its “terms 
later” strategy. If a few such future sales were lost, the negative 
effect on the bottom line would be minimal and not enough to 
forego the present gains achieved by doing the hold-up. Gateway 
was able to hold-up the Hills, and was able to profit from that 
strategy by using it to stop the Hills’ litigation efforts cold. In 
typical consumer transactions occurring in markets in which 
purchases by any particular buyer are infrequent one-shot 
transactions, and buyers are isolated and dispersed, reputational 
concerns are not significant deterrents for hold-up.323 
2. Acting Opportunistically against the Hills 
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule satisfies not only the 
requirements for a successful hold-up, but also invites opportunism 
by vendors. Opportunism is not like the more benign hold-up 
                                                          
323 Katz, supra note 310, at 505. Katz makes his observation about the 
insufficiency of reputational concerns in such markets to moderate opportunism 
for drafters of form documents. A fortiori it is insufficient to moderate against 
hold-up made possible by form documents first disclosed after the purchaser has 
paid the full price. 
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situation in which a party advances its self-interest by taking 
advantage of an opportunity that arises after a contract has been 
made and that is made possible by the inherent limits on parties’ 
being able to anticipate all potential future risks and expressly 
guard against them.324 Rather, opportunism is a special culpable 
variety of self-interest seeking. It is self-interest seeking “with 
guile” and includes advancing one’s self-interest by “incomplete or 
distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse.”325 As 
noted in the literature, “opportunism is not a free-standing concept 
but requires, additionally, that bounded rationality and transaction 
attributes be introduced.”326 
The first element of opportunism, bounded rationality, has been 
examined earlier in the larger context of human cognitive 
limitations.327 As has been noted previously, bounded rationality is 
a normal feature present in virtually all bargaining settings.328 
Normally each party possesses incomplete information about one 
another and each party’s respective motivations with respect to the 
transaction are not necessarily disclosed. For example, typically a 
seller does not know exactly the highest price a buyer would be 
willing to pay, nor does the buyer know exactly the lowest price a 
seller would be willing to accept. Still, the dynamics of negotiation 
do not carry overtones of culpability or moral shortcomings. 
The kind of bounded rationality that permits opportunism is 
introduced by design for the very purpose of increasing 
information asymmetry. A number of different methods short of 
actionable fraud are available to a party for decreasing information 
available to the other party. As noted above, they may take the 
form of “incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, 
especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate 
or otherwise confuse.”329 When such methods are employed the 
                                                          
324 Klein, supra note 260, at 241-42. 
325 See Williamson, supra note 261, at 703. 
326 Id. at 704. 
327 See supra notes 262-96 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
329 See Williamson, supra note 325 and accompanying text. 
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resulting contracts will be “strategically incomplete.”330 They are 
not “incomplete” in the sense that the parties could not have 
anticipated the potential opportunism in order to prevent it from 
occurring. Rather, they are “strategically incomplete” because one 
of the parties strategically held back information in order to set up 
the very opportunity to act opportunistically. 
The first element of opportunism is met with Easterbrook’s 
“terms later” rule. In the Hill context, for example, Gateway 
withheld several important items of information from the buyers. 
Notwithstanding Easterbrook’s statements to the contrary, the 
information about the exclusive method of acceptance and the 
arbitration term could have been disclosed as easily prior to taking 
the money from the buyers and delivering the computers as 
after.331 But if it had been disclosed prior to taking the money, 
buyers may have been unwilling to purchase the computers or may 
have been unwilling to pay as much for them. Whatever their 
decisions might have been, at least they would have been operating 
with the same information about formation method and arbitration 
that Gateway was. Thus the Hill setting presents a classic example 
of strategic withholding of information to increase information 
asymmetry. 
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule encourages vendors to 
strategically hold back information to create a setting in which they 
can act opportunistically. It is unlikely, however, that such 
strategic withholding of information will lead to more efficient 
contracts.332 
                                                          
330 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 94 (1989). 
331 Gateway might have efficiently notified of terms in advance, for 
example, by placing them on its web site and mentioning them in its ads, at least 
in summary fashion with a reference to its web site for full terms. 
332 Farrell, supra note 256, at 129. See also Ayers & Gertnert, supra note 
330, at 94. The authors note, “One party might strategically withhold 
information that would increase the total gains from contracting (the “size of the 
pie”) in order to increase her private share of the gains from contracting (her 
“share of the pie”).” Id. They also observe, “[w]hen strategic considerations 
cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve 
contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may 
encourage the revelation of information.” Id. at 128. Although they caution that 
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The second element necessary for opportunism is the 
introduction of “transaction attributes.”333 “Asset specificity” has 
been identified as “the big locomotive out of which transaction-
cost economics works.”334 When a party makes an investment in a 
specific asset, a dynamic is introduced that removes the transaction 
from the realm of “faceless contracting, out of which orthodox 
economics works,” and puts it squarely into the realm where the 
identity and position of the particular parties and their realistic 
alternatives really matter.335 
In the context of a “terms later” offer in a setting like that in 
Hill, the situation is loaded with “transaction attributes.” The buyer 
has made a specific investment in the form of full payment and has 
even begun enjoying the benefit of the goods before becoming 
aware of the adverse terms proposed. The “offeror” will get the 
benefit of the adverse terms unless the buyer promptly returns the 
goods and thereby relinquishes all rights he thought he had already 
obtained in them. Unlike the situation in a “faceless transaction” in 
which a hypothetical offeror offers to sell goods subject to terms 
adverse to a hypothetical offeree, who will decide whether to 
affirmatively accept based on the pure merits of the offer and 
uninfluenced by any “transactional attributes,” in the “terms later” 
setting the “transactional attributes” will powerfully influence the 
buyer’s response to the adverse terms.336 Accordingly, they will 
dramatically increase the likelihood that the vendor will be able to 
obtain both its terms and a price greater than what the buyer may 
have been willing to pay had the terms been disclosed up front. 
Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule disregards both the 
                                                          
lawmakers should not impose penalty defaults indiscriminately, they conclude 
that in some instances penalizing parties who withhold information would likely 
lead to more efficient contracts. Id. One instance is where the private 
information is acquired passively and can be revealed with low transaction costs. 
Id. The information withheld in ProCD and in Hill is that type of information. 
333 See Williamson, supra note 261, at 704. 
334 Id. at 707. 
335 Id. 
336 See supra notes 262-87 and accompanying text (regarding bounded 
rationality); supra notes 288-96 and accompanying text (regarding cognitive 
defects, endowment effect, status quo effect, and loss aversion). 
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fundamentals of self-interestedness and limits on human cognition, 
but not out of ignorance. Less than a year before his ProCD 
opinion he authored an opinion in which he addressed the matter of 
opportunism directly.337 Therein he wrote: 
“Opportunism” in the law of contracts usually signifies one 
of two situations. First, there is effort to wring some 
advantage from the fact that the party who performs first 
sinks costs, which the other party may hold hostage by 
demanding greater compensation in exchange for its own 
performance. . . . Second, there is an effort to take 
advantage of one’s contracting partner “in a way that could 
not have been contemplated at the time of drafting, and 
which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the 
parties.”338 
The conduct that his “terms later” rule authorizes creates the 
first of the two situations for opportunism that he described.339 
Buyers perform first. They engage in search costs, make a decision 
to purchase based on the information they have, and pay in full for 
the product. Only then do vendors endeavor to “wring some 
advantage” from the fact that they have the buyers’ commitment to 
buy. They do so by disclosing the concessions they demand (in a 
way that they will not necessarily actually come to the attention of 
                                                          
337 Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
338 Id. at 129-30 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therein Easterbrook 
shows he is also aware of the human tendency toward self-interestedness. He 
observes, “[p]arties to contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal 
advantage; striving for that advantage is the source of much economic progress. 
Contract law does not require parties to be fair, or kind, or reasonable, or to 
share gains or losses equitably.” Id. at 132. 
339 Only because Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule prevents a contract from 
being formed at the time of purchase, by definition it cannot come within the 
second opportunism setting he describes. The vendors and buyers are not 
technically “contracting partners” at the time the vendors exercise their 
advantage. That does not negate the fact that vendors are endeavoring to take 
advantage of buyers in a way that buyers could not have contemplated at the 
time they purchased. Nor does it negate that fact that buyers were not alerted in 
time to guard against it with contract language. It is merely an acknowledgment 
that it does not fit the technical requirement of his second opportunism setting. 
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the buyers) before they will actually part with ownership by 
mandating that the concessions are accepted unless buyers 
affirmatively “reject” and by assuring the unlikelihood of 
“rejection” by making it costly. 
It appears that Easterbrook, who is perfectly aware of the 
hazards of opportunism, simply shut his eyes to the predictable 
opportunistic behavior his “terms later” rule legalizes and thus 
promotes. Although Easterbrook touts the law and economics ex 
ante perspective for its ability to predict the impact of a ruling on 
aggregate social behavior, he patently disregarded the most 
fundamental matters that guide economic prediction in ProCD and 
Hill. Thus, he rejected any consideration of human self-
interestedness, bounded rationality, transaction costs, limitation on 
human cognition, and loss aversion particularly as it is manifested 
in the endowment effect and the status quo bias. By doing so he 
produced a new legal rule of contract formation that increases 
information asymmetry, increases transaction costs, enhances hold-
up and opportunistic behavior by vendors, and results in 
inefficiencies as well as distributional unfairness by systematically 
redistributing wealth from consumers to vendors. One is greatly 
tempted to characterize Easterbrook’s reasoning and the “terms 
later” legal rule it produced as “anti-economics.” At the very least, 
both the reasoning and resulting rule of ProCD/Hill are bad 
economics. 
III. BAD MORALS 
In addition to being bad law and bad economics, Easterbrook’s 
ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule is also bad morals. It annihilates the 
moral justification for courts enforcing promises. In its place it 
introduces a purely utilitarian rule that permits a court to impose 
obligations on a party whenever a court believes its doing so will 
be best for society. 
A. Moral Basis for Enforcement of Promises: Protect 
Reasonable Expectations 
The moral justification for courts enforcing promises has 
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historically derived from the premise that contractual liability is 
consensual.340 Contract enforcement is promise enforcement. The 
person against whom enforcement is sought has by words or 
conduct made a promise that has instilled in another an 
expectation, a confidence, that it will be kept.341 That expectation 
may be created even if the person against whom enforcement is 
sought did not subjectively intend to make a promise but 
voluntarily uttered words or engaged in conduct that he had reason 
to know would justify another in inferring that a promise had been 
made.342 Protection of reasonable expectations is thus at the heart 
of contract enforcement.343 
That the law enforces only to protect reasonable expectations 
of a promisee is well illustrated by the common law doctrines of 
fraud and duress.344 The fraudfeasor who turns the odometer back 
                                                          
340 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, §§ 1.2-.6; CHARLES FRIED, 
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14-17 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1981); Kevin M. Teeven, The Advent of Recovery on 
Market Transactions in the Absence of a Bargain, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 289, 311-
12, 320-21, 336, 346 (2002). 
341 See, e.g. FRIED, supra note 340, at 14-17. See also Bern, supra note 247, 
at 131-32. Therein Bern observes: 
One of the ways man may more effectively carry out his 
stewardship-dominion duties to God is by entering into agreements 
with his fellows. Such agreements are possible because, in creating 
man in His own image, God has endowed man with language, the 
ability to communicate with words. In particular, He has given man the 
ability to communicate with words of a special quality—words of 
promise. The essence of such words, spoken by one created in the 
image of God, is to instill in the one who hears them a confidence, an 
expectation, that they will be kept. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). The special nature of words of promise as creating an 
expectation in the hearer that they will be kept is also illustrated by the fact that 
promise keeping is a fundamental norm in international law, Pacta sunt 
servanda (see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties/ 
htm), and is limited only by the peremptory norm, Jus cogens. Id. art. 53. 
342 See supra notes 124-49 and accompanying text regarding the objective 
theory of contracts and its protection of reasonable expectations. 
343 FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, § 1.6, at 17. 
344 Id. at § 4.9; Bern, supra note 247, at 144-45. 
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from 200,000 miles to 30,000 miles and on that basis extracts a 
promise from his victim to pay the price for what the latter believes 
is a low mileage car will not get court enforcement of that promise. 
Put simply, the fraudfeasor had no reason to believe the victim was 
really promising to pay that much money for the car the 
fraudfeasor actually intended to deliver, and thus no had no 
reasonable expectation worthy of court enforcement.345 
1. The Common Law (Restatement) Protects Reasonable 
Expectations 
Protection of reasonable expectations is reflected in the 
objective theory of contract law.346 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts section 211(3) captures the theory with respect to terms 
in standardized agreements: “Where the other party has reason to 
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he 
knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not 
part of the agreement.”347 It is also reflected in Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts section 69 which precludes silence or 
exercise of dominion from operating as an acceptance except in 
narrowly circumscribed instances that would give rise to 
reasonable expectations on the part of the offeror that the offeree 
was actually signifying acceptance by silence or exercise of 
dominion, or where the offeree was invited to accept by silence 
and in fact intended to do so.348 
Use of goods that a buyer has purchased and paid for signals 
that the buyer reasonably believes he has ownership rights and is 
exercising them. The seller’s belated insistence that the buyer does 
not own the goods, that he can have no ownership rights in those 
very goods except on less favorable terms, and that his continued 
use of them signifies his agreement to those terms seems 
preposterous. The buyer’s continued use, far from signaling 
agreement to the adverse terms, is more consistent with an 
                                                          
345 Bern, supra note 247, at 144-46. 
346 See supra Part I.A.2.e. 
347 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981). 
348 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). 
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understanding, in accord with the objective theory of contracts, 
that the buyer fully owns the goods and seller is crazy to think he 
can force adverse terms on the buyer. Under those circumstances, 
the seller can have no reasonable expectation that the buyer’s use 
is signaling his agreement to the adverse terms. 
Sections 211(3) and 69 also illustrate the companion principle 
of “freedom from contract.”349 Freedom from contract is as 
foundational a principle as is freedom of contract.350 Freedom from 
contract rests on an understanding of individual autonomy and 
worth, and also, in a sense, of personal liberty and even justice. 
Without freedom from contract, freedom of contract lacks the 
character of a voluntary knowing expression of commitment that 
creates an actual expectation in the party who hears or observes it 
that it will be kept. Thus, without freedom from contract there is no 
moral basis for judicial enforcement. 
2. The UCC Protects Reasonable Expectations 
UCC section 2-206(1)(b) protects reasonable expectations, 
providing, “[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the 
language or circumstances . . . an order or other offer to buy goods 
for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as inviting 
acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or 
current shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods.” It 
eliminates the potential for the so-called “unilateral contract 
trick”351 that had been possible under the common law mirror 
image rule. Under the common law rule, shipment of 
nonconforming goods in response to an offer did not constitute 
acceptance of the offer, but rather was merely a counter-offer. 
Consequently, a seller could intentionally ship inferior goods in 
response to an order, e.g., #2 quality instead of the ordered #1 
quality but at the price for #1, in the hope that the inferior goods 
would be unwittingly received and retained by buyer’s non-
                                                          
349 See Katz, supra note 297. 
350 Id. 
351 John D. Wladis, The Contract Formation Sections of the Proposed 
Revisions To U.C.C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 997, 1004 (2001). 
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decision making employees. Failure of a decision maker to 
promptly notice the defects and order the goods returned would 
constitute acceptance of the counter-offer of #2s at #1 prices. 
Obviously in those circumstances the seller who engaged in such a 
ploy would have no reasonable expectation that such inadvertent 
conduct by the buyer was really a promise by the buyer to pay #1 
price for #2 goods, and UCC section 2-206(1)(b) now precludes a 
seller from benefiting from that kind of trickery.352 
The provisions of UCC section 2-207 also reflect the policy of 
enforcement of promises to protect reasonable expectations. The 
essence of current section 2-207(1) is that a definite expression of 
acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it contains some 
boilerplate terms that are different or additional to the terms of an 
offer.353 It abandons the common law mirror image rule so that a 
response to an offer that, with respect to the dickered terms, looks 
like an acceptance. Such a response matching dickered terms 
creates a reasonable expectation in the offeror that the other party 
has made a commitment to perform as proposed in the offer. That 
expectation is now protected under UCC section 2-207(1); a 
contract between the parties has been formed on the basis of the 
offer and acceptance that matched dickered terms. 
Current section 2-207(2) also protects reasonable 
expectations.354 In transactions involving at least one non-merchant 
(the typical consumer transaction) the terms of the contract are the 
terms that were contained in the offer with which the offeror is 
familiar. The offeror has a reasonable expectation that those are the 
terms of the deal because the offeree manifests agreement to them 
by making a definite expression of acceptance, albeit with some 
other boilerplate terms that the offeror may or may not be familiar 
with. Under the current version of the Code the offeree has no 
reasonable expectation that his boilerplate terms are part of the 
agreement merely because they accompanied his acceptance.355 He 
can have no expectation that the offeror has actually agreed to the 
                                                          
352 Id. at 1004-05. 
353 U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (1995). See supra note 31 for the explicit language. 
354 § 2-206(1). 
355 See id. § 2-207(1). 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
 “TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING 747 
boilerplate terms short of a subsequent affirmative expression of 
agreement by the offeror. Such other terms are nothing more than 
mere proposals to the contract that will simply lapse after a period 
of time unless affirmatively accepted by the other party.356 This 
reflects the general common law rule that precludes forcing silence 
as acceptance. 
Although the current version of UCC section 2-207(2) has a 
special rule for transactions “between merchants,” under which 
proposed additional terms become a part of the contract without 
the need for an affirmative acceptance, even that special rule 
nevertheless gives significant protection to reasonable 
expectations. Such proposed terms do not become a part of the 
contract if they would materially alter it.357 The party proposing 
terms that would materially alter the contract has no reasonable 
expectation that the other party’s silence means he agrees to such 
terms. The party who receives such a proposal has no reason to 
expect that, absent his affirmative agreement to make that kind of 
change in the deal, it can become part of the contract. 
Nor do proposals for additional terms become a part of the 
contract if the offer expressly limited acceptance to the terms of 
the offer.358 In such an instance, the offeror reasonably expects that 
no other terms will become part of the deal and that expectation is 
protected; and the party making the proposal can have no 
reasonable expectation that the offer permits him to force 
additional terms. 
Finally, such proposed terms do not become part of the 
contract if notification of objection to such terms has already been 
given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them has 
been received.359 In both such instances the offeror is reasonably 
expecting because of that action on his part that the proposals will 
not be part of the contract, and the one making the proposals can 
have no reasonable expectation that the other has agreed to be 
bound by them. 
                                                          
356 See supra note 90 and sources cited therein; see also FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 132, at §3.19. 
357 See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b). 
358 See § 2-207(2)(a)-(b). 
359 See § 2-207(2)(a) &(c). 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
748 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
3. “Terms Later” Contracting Does Not Protect Reasonable 
Expectations 
Easterbrook’s analysis that produced the “terms later” rule 
rejects or ignores all of the above rules designed to protect 
reasonable expectations. It does not protect the reasonable 
expectations of buyers that they own goods and can use them as 
their own once they have paid for them and taken delivery. It 
compels such buyers, contrary to their reasonable expectations, to 
give up the deals they thought they had made. While denying 
protection to reasonable expectations of buyers, it rewards the 
unreasonable expectations of vendors that buyers acquire no 
ownership rights when they pay for the goods, and that retention of 
goods by such buyers after they have had time to learn about the 
objectionable terms means the buyers are promising to accept and 
abide by them. Abandoning the only moral justification for courts 
to enforce promises, Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule is ultimately 
validated by nothing more than power, the power of the court to 
pronounce it, for reasons sufficient to the court, and to command 
obedience to it. 
In addition to being the moral undergirding for courts’ 
enforcing promises, protection of reasonable expectations is also 
foundational for accomplishing justice,360 yet Easterbrook ignores 
this. Only by taking into account the reasonable expectations of the 
parties in the contractual dispute before it, can a court do justice 
for the parties, rendering to each his due. The parties are not mere 
grist that affords a court the opportunity to establish some policy it 
perceives will advance some larger good for society or a segment 
of society. Accordingly, the judicial function has traditionally been 
ex post in perspective, with the court adjudicating the particular 
dispute between the parties in a manner to do justice for the 
                                                          
360 A definition of “justice” found in an earlier edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary is, in pertinent part: “In Jurisprudence. The constant and perpetual 
disposition to render to every man his due. . . . Cummutative justice is that which 
should govern contracts. It consists in rendering to every man the exact measure 
of his dues, without regard to his personal worth or merits, i.e., placing all men 
on an equality.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY1002 (4th ed. 1968). 
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parties.361 That is also why litigants like the Hills, who were but 
fodder for an ex ante law and economics court’s pronouncement 
and application to them of a new rule of contract formation, could 
rightly say of their experience with the judicial system, “There is 
no justice.” 
B. “Terms Later” and ex ante Analysis Contra Fundamental 
Principles of Justice 
Easterbrook’s adjudication process and the rule of law it 
produced in ProCD/Hill violate fundamental principles of justice 
in several respects. The author has described the “Requisites for 
Law and Justice,”362 premising his analysis upon the classical 
                                                          
361 See Ogus, supra note 59. 
362 See Bern, supra note 247, at 110-115. 
 Encompassed within the Biblical Model are three components. The 
first, Requisites for Law and Justice, is foundational to the Model. It 
sets forth [four] Biblical requisites for substantive law and for its proper 
administration. It reflects aspects of God’s character and sovereignty 
which are manifested in the perfection of both His law and His 
administration of justice. Put very simply, at the level of human beings 
and institutions, only if these requisites are reflected in law and in its 
administration can there be any hope of achieving justice. 
   . . . . 
 The Psalmist extols God’s law, its perfection and his love for it, and 
proclaims the righteousness of His judgments. Consistent with His 
character, God’s law is the embodiment of truth and His perfect 
administration always produces judgments that are true. Three features 
of God’s law, and requisites for its proper administration, are captured 
by the Hebrew words tsedeq, mishpat, and meshar. 
  . . . [These three Hebrew words taken together] express the thought 
of the evenhanded and impartial application (mishpat) of a righteous 
moral standard (tsedeq) producing an evenness or equality (meshar) in 
outcomes in like cases. While the three Hebrew words are descriptive 
of distinct features of the administration of justice, with respect to the 
nature of substantive law itself, the one word, tsedeq, the righteous 
moral standard, appears to encompass the rule, its scope of application, 
and consequences for violation. The fourth requisite for the proper 
administration of justice is jurisdiction, the authority to determine the 
matter. 
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natural law363 theory articulated by Blackstone.364 Easterbrook’s 
                                                          
Id. at 110-13, 115 (citations omitted). 
363 “Natural law, also called the law of nature, in moral and political 
philosophy [is] an objective norm or set of objective norms governing human 
behavior, similar to the positive laws of a human ruler, but binding on all people 
alike and usually understood as involving a superhuman legislator.” CAMBRIDGE 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 520 (1995). 
364 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 38-42 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803). 
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws 
of his creator, for he is entirely a dependent being. . . . 
   . . . . 
 This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when 
he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, 
established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, 
when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself 
in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human 
nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and 
restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the 
purport of those laws. 
 Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able 
unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his 
creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of 
infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in 
those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent 
to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good 
and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; 
and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are 
necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are 
these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and 
should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts 
Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law. (citation omitted) 
  . . . . 
 This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God 
himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other—It is binding 
over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are 
of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive 
all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from 
this original. 
 But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each 
individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office 
it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs 
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analysis is based on the imagined knowledge of consumers and 
artificial assent on their part to patently objectionable terms and 
thus is the antithesis of a truthful judgment. Further, the “terms 
later” rule violates the tsedeq requisite of justice by withdrawing 
the law’s historic protection of reasonable expectations in order to 
encourage strategic nondisclosure and opportunism by vendors. It 
is thus the antithesis of a righteous moral standard. Finally, the 
“terms later” rule has built within itself an element of favoritism 
                                                          
in every circumstance of life: . . . And if our reason were always, as in 
our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled 
by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or 
intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no 
other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own 
experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of 
ignorance and error. 
 This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of 
divine providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the 
imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at 
sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce it’s laws 
by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we 
call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the 
holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon 
comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they 
tend in all their consequences to man’s felicity. But we are not from 
thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by 
reason, in it’s present corrupted state; since we find that, until they 
were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the 
moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of 
the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and 
perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more 
authenticity than that moral system, which is framed by ethical writers, 
and denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, 
expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by 
the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could 
be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an 
equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition 
together. 
 Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of 
revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should 
be suffered to contradict these. 
Id. at 39-42. 
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for vendors by creating special benefits for them as a class and thus 
violates the righteous moral standard of uniformity of application 
to all without regard to person or situation.365 
The method of adjudication in ProCD/Hill also violates the 
mishpat requisite of justice, the impartial application of the 
underlying law.366 Easterbrook purports to apply established rules 
of contract formation, but in fact applies different theories of 
contract formation to the same contracting transaction.367 Thus, he 
evaluates the legal effect of the vendors’ undisclosed intent under 
the discredited subjective theory of contracts while evaluating the 
legal effect of the buyers’ retention and use of goods they 
purchased under a distorted version of the objective theory of 
contracts. His refusal to afford the purchasers in each instance of 
the clear statutory protection of UCC sections 2-206 and 2-207 in 
order to permit vendors to have their way in imposing terms 
violates the impartiality principle so necessary to achieve justice in 
any given case. 
All of this should not surprise anyone. Easterbrook is simply 
operating in accord with the contemporary legal realism that 
pervades the law schools, the courts, the legal profession, and 
society generally.368 Legal Realism perceives courts as policy-
makers who create law.369 The law is nothing more than what the 
courts say it is.370 Law is instrumental, serving as a tool for 
achieving results.371 Like a good policy maker Easterbrook is most 
concerned with the impact of the rules he makes. Thus the ex ante 
approach is best suited for his creation of legal rules that will 
                                                          
365 Bern, supra note 247, at 115. 
366 Id. at 113-115. 
367 Supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
368 See, e.g., RUDOLPH J GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE AGENDA FOR REFORM 37, 49 (Paul L. Murphy ed., 
Greenwood Press 1989); Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law 
School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 247-50 (1978). 
369 See GERBER, supra note 368, at 33. 
370 See, id. at 37, 49; THOMAS SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 3 
(1987). 
371 See, e.g., GERBER, supra note 368, at 37; Cramton, supra note 368, at 
249-50. 
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benefit society. The matter of rule-making is purely utilitarian, i.e., 
what will be best for society. Any notion of justice for the 
particular parties to the litigation is at best secondary to the larger 
good of society and thus may be readily sacrificed to achieve a 
perceived greater good. 
IV. BAD FRUIT—THE CASE LAW 
Remarkably, several courts have swallowed ProCD/Hill’s 
“terms later” rule in both sale of goods and services settings. In 
lemming-like fashion they have followed Easterbrook’s “terms 
later” rule as though its validity were beyond question.372 None of 
the courts has done the slightest analysis of Easterbrook’s legal or 
economic reasoning.373 None of the sale of goods cases does any 
direct statutory analysis of UCC section 2-206.374 None analyzes 
the implications for the objective theory of contracts precluding 
contract formation at the time of payment and delivery of goods or 
services.375 Only a couple endeavor to engage in even rudimentary 
statutory analysis of UCC section 2-207, and in each instance the 
effort discloses fundamental ineptitude at the task.376 For the most 
part each appears content to quote a few of Easterbrook’s 
arguments, or a few of his illustrations, or merely his conclusions, 
                                                          
372 Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 
2002); Bischoff v. DirecTV, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1105 (C.D. Ca. 2002); 
I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. 
Mass 2002); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics, Inc., 85 
F. Supp. 2d 519, 527 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Kaczmarek v. Microsoft Corp., 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., C.A. No. 
16913, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *9-10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000); 1-A Equip. 
Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913, at *2 (Mass. App. Div. Feb. 21, 
2003); Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 282 A.D. 2d 180, 185 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 250-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 809 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D. 2d 246, 251 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
373 See sources cited supra note 372. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 I.Lan Systems, Inc., 183 F. Supp. at 336-37; Brower, 246 A.D.2d at 250. 
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and deem that sufficient to justify applying the new rule of contract 
formation in its case.377 In one instance a mere citation of the cases 
is treated as sufficient for establishing the correctness of the 
rule.378 
A. Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 
The court in Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the first to embrace 
ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule, accepts Easterbrook’s rationale.379 
It briefly describes the facts and holding in Hill, the facts in 
ProCD, its conclusion that UCC section 2-207 does not apply 
except in a “battle of the forms” setting, and then states 
approvingly that Hill “takes note of the realities of conducting 
                                                          
377 Lozano, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1073; Mudd-Lyman Sales & Serv. Corp. v. 
UPS, 236 F. Supp. 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Peerless Wall & Window 
Coverings, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28. In Peerless Wall & Window 
Coverings, Inc. the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, citing ProCD, Hill, Mortenson, and an unpublished Ohio 
appellate court opinion, applies the “terms later” rule to hold the purchaser of 
cash register software bound by a warranty disclaimer first disclosed to the 
purchaser after order and payment. Id. The terms were printed on the diskette 
envelopes and in the user manuals accompanying the software. Id. Without 
independent statutory and factual analysis, and without any critique of the 
validity of the underlying rationale of those cases, the court concludes, “[t]he 
recent weight of authority is that ‘shrink-wrap’ licenses which the customer 
impliedly assents to by, for example, opening the envelope enclosing the 
software distribution media, are generally valid and enforceable.” Id. at 527. 
Swallowing Easterbrook’s ProCD rationale hook, line and sinker, it 
characterizes Easterbrook’s opinion as “insightful[],”and in an extensive 
quotation from ProCD excerpts virtually every argument Easterbrook had made 
as though each were indisputable, including: the difficulty of including all the 
terms on the outside of a package; how notice on the outside, and terms on the 
inside may be a means of business valuable to sellers and buyers alike; the 
commonness of transactions in which payment precedes terms; the illustrations 
he gave that suggested prices would be driven through the ceiling returning 
transactions to the horse-and-buggy age if “terms later” were not the rule; and 
his vendor, as master of the offer rationale. Id. at 527-8; see also Brower, 246 
A.D.2d at 250-51. 
378 Kaczmarek, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 975. 
379 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) 
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business in today’s world.”380 It then observes that “[t]ransactions 
involving ‘cash now, terms later’ have become commonplace, 
enabling the consumer to make purchases of sophisticated 
merchandise such as computers over the phone or by mail—and 
even by computer,”381 as though without delayed disclosure of 
terms, sellers would not be able to make merchandize available to 
consumers by phone or mail. 
Perhaps the court was unaware that companies like Sears, J.C. 
Penney’s, and others had been offering sophisticated merchandize 
for consumers to order by phone or mail for decades before we 
entered the information age; and they had been able to do it 
without a “terms later” rule of law. In any event, such “reasons” 
are treated as sufficient to prompt the Brower court to voice its 
agreement “with the rationale” of ProCD/Hill.382 
B. Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc. 
The court in Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc. next embraced 
the ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule.383 It also engages in no statutory 
analysis and makes no effort to explore the validity of 
Easterbrook’s assertions or reasoning. 
Unlike the situation in Hill where the Hills were the purchasers 
and were also the ones to whom the computer and the “terms later” 
were delivered, in Westendorf the person who ordered and paid for 
the computer purchased it for delivery to another.384 Even though 
                                                          
380 Id. at 572 (emphasis added). 
381 Id. (emphasis added). 
382 Id. 
383 Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., C.A. No. 16913, 2000 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 54, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000). See also Kaczmarek v. Microsoft 
Corp., 39 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois followed the “terms later” rule of ProCD/Hill in 
a software transaction in which the disputed terms were first presented in a 
2,200 page manual that accompanied the software delivered in response to an 
order from the purchaser and payment in advance. Id at 977-78. The court 
summarily concluded that the terms in the manual were incorporated into the 
contract, citing as its authority ProCD and Hill, making only a brief 
parenthetical reference to the facts and holding in each. Id. 
384 Westendorf, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 54, at *6. 
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Gateway knew that the person purchasing the computer lived in a 
state other than that in which the person to whom the computer 
was to be delivered, it nevertheless did not send the “terms later” 
to the purchaser.385 Rather, it just sent them in the box along with 
the computer to the designated recipient.386 The recipient, 
dissatisfied with the computer’s performance, brought suit against 
Gateway.387 The recipient had received the “terms later” in the 
box, but was not the purchaser and was not a party to any contract 
with Gateway.388 The purchaser, who was the only person with 
whom Gateway had a contract, had never received the “terms 
later.”389 
One might wonder how the purchaser could under these 
circumstances be said to have assented to those terms, and thus to 
have formed a contract that included them. Nevertheless, the 
Westendorf court finds that because the recipient retained the 
computer for more than thirty days, the “same rationale” of Hill 
was applicable in its case where the recipient was suing 
Gateway.390 In doing so the Westendorf court makes explicit what 
had merely been implicit in Easterbrook’s rationale: that the assent 
necessary to bind a purchaser to “terms later” is only an artificial 
construct. Thus, with an apparently straight face, the Westendorf 
                                                          
385 Id. 
386 Id. 
387 Id. at *8-9. 
388 Id. at *5-6. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at *3. The court noted: 
In a separate action, with different underlying facts, a Gateway 
customer challenged the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the 
Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement arguing that it was not 
binding on him because he was not aware of it when he ordered the 
computer. The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, however, and found 
the agreement enforceable as written. Judge Easterbrook, writing for 
the unanimous panel, noted “[b]y keeping the computer beyond 30 
days, the [buyers] accepted Gateway’s offer, including the arbitration 
clause.” Undeniably, plaintiff in the present case retained the computer 
and accessories for more than thirty days. The same rationale, 
therefore, applies to this plaintiff as in the case before the 7th Circuit. 
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
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court can conclude that disclosure of “terms later” only to the 
recipient of the computer, a non-party to the contract, is sufficient 
to find that the purchaser, to whom the terms were not disclosed, 
had assented to their being part of his contact with Gateway. But if 
the bottom line of ProCD/Hill “terms later” is that vendors get 
their way because that will be best for everyone, including 
consumers, then such seemingly bizarre logic need not be 
troubling. 
In giving this full expression to Hill’s “terms later” rule, the 
Westendorf court is compelled to distort basic third party contract 
law principles.391 Thus, the court concludes that because the 
recipient accepted the benefits of her friend’s purchase, “and 
otherwise met the requisite conditions for the agreement to become 
effective,” the recipient was bound by the arbitration agreement 
included in the “terms later.”392 The latter reference to the 
beneficiary meeting conditions for the agreement to become 
effective is a curious one as the legal status of an intended third 
party beneficiary is “created by contract.”393 The beneficiary takes 
the benefits of an existing contract already formed by other parties, 
and is subject to limitations stated in the contract, but that is not 
what makes the agreement effective.394 It appears Easterbrook’s 
“terms later” transformation of contract formation may also have 
some transforming effects on the law of third party beneficiaries of 
contracts. 
C. M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. Timberline Software 
Corp. 
The Washington Supreme Court also welcomed the “terms 
later” rule of ProCD/Hill.395 In an en banc opinion with one 
                                                          
391 Id. at 14-15 (holding that under the specific facts of the case, “both the 
passing of the donor’s rights and donor’s obligations to the donee” are 
warranted). 
392 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
393 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 cmt. a (1981). 
394 Id. § 309(4). 
395 M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 
305 (Wash. 2000). 
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dissent, it applied the rule to preclude a nationwide construction 
contractor who purchased computer software for use in preparing 
bids from suing for consequential damages resulting from the 
software’s defects.396 The software was delivered to the purchaser, 
Mortenson, following Mortenson’s submission of a written 
purchase order and payment for the goods.397 “Terms later,” in 
shrink-wrap form and also programmed to appear on the screen 
during the installation process, accompanied delivery.398 They 
provided that if the purchaser did not agree to the terms he should 
promptly return the software for a refund.399 They further provided 
that use of the software program meant the purchaser 
acknowledged he had read and agreed to be bound by the terms.400 
One of the substantive terms precluded recovery of consequential 
damages, the very kind of damages Mortenson sustained when the 
software caused errors in bids it submitted.401 
The Washington Supreme Court does not inquire into the 
validity of Easterbrook’s rationale for the rule.402 Like 
Easterbrook, it also, without explanation, does not address the 
applicability of UCC section 2-206(1)(a) and (b), provisions 
relevant for assessing contract formation in this instance of a 
written offer to purchase, accompanied by full payment, and 
responded to by prompt shipment by the seller of the ordered 
software.403 
Like Easterbrook, it endeavors to distinguish Step-Saver Data 
                                                          
396 Id. In a compelling dissent Justice Sanders demonstrates the lack of 
analysis of both law and facts by the majority. Id. at 316. 
397 Id. at 307-08. 
398 Id. at 308-09 (providing visual access to the licensing agreement “on the 
outside of each diskette pouch and the inside cover of the instruction manuals 
[as well as on] the first screen that appears each time the program is used”). 
399 Id. at 308. 
400 Id. 
401 M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc., 998 P.2d at 308-09. 
402 The Court of Appeals’ opinion was also devoid of any exploration of the 
validity of Easterbrook’s rationale. See M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. 
Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1999). 
403 See generally M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc., 998 P.2d at 305, in which 
the only reference to UCC § 2-206 is that in the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Sanders, 998 P.2d at 316. 
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Systems, Inc. v. Wyse;404 and similarly, its efforts are distinctions 
without a difference on the basic issue of contract formation.405 To 
distinguish Step-Saver, the court adds a footnote that demonstrates 
its significant analytical shortcomings with respect to dealing with 
the UCC. It states: 
We also note the contract here, unlike the contract in Step-
Saver, was not “between merchants” because Mortenson 
does not deal in software. RCW 62A.2-104 (merchant is 
person who deals in or has particular skill with respect to 
the kind of goods involved in the transaction). RCW 
62A.2-207 does not specify when additional terms become 
part of a contract involving a nonmerchant.406 
Mortenson clearly was a merchant under the Code’s definition. 
The court excerpts only a part of the Code’s definition, apparently 
oblivious to the remainder of the definition in subsection (1),407 the 
                                                          
404 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
405 998 P.2d at 312. 
First, Step-Saver did not involve the enforceability of a standard license 
agreement against an end user of the software, but instead involved its 
applicability to a value added retailer who simply included the software 
in an integrated system sold to the end user. In fact, in Step-Saver the 
party contesting applicability of the licensing agreement had been 
assured the license did not apply to it at all. . . . Such is not the case 
here, as Mortenson was the end user of the Bid Analysis software and 
was never told the license agreement did not apply. Further, in Step-
Saver the seller of the program twice asked the buyer to sign an 
agreement comparable to their disputed license agreement. Both times 
the buyer refused, but the seller continued to make the software 
available. . . . In contrast, Mortenson and Timberline had utilized a 
license agreement throughout Mortenson’s use of the Medallion and 
Precision Bid Analysis software. Given these distinctions, we find 
Step-Saver to be inapplicable to the present case. 
Id. 
406 998 P.2d at 312 n.9. 
407 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-104(1) (2003). 
 (1) “Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or 
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to 
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of 
an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds 
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language of subsection (3),408 and detailed explanatory comment 
2409 to RCW 62A.2-104. All make it clear that for purposes of 
contract formation and terms, Mortenson, as a national 
construction contractor purchasing software in its business 
capacity for business use, was a merchant. 
Once the court mistakenly concludes that Mortenson is not a 
merchant, it observes that section 2-207 “does not specify when 
additional terms become part of a contract involving a 
nonmerchant,” as though that section gives no instruction with 
respect to what the legal significance of the additional terms is and 
                                                          
himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
408 Id. § 62A.2-104(3). (3) “‘Between merchants’ means in any transaction 
with respect to which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of 
merchants.” Id. (emphasis added). 
409 Comment 2 provides: 
 The term “merchant” as defined here roots in the “law merchant” 
concept of a professional in business. The professional status under the 
definition may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods, 
specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized 
knowledge as to both and which kind of specialized knowledge may be 
sufficient to establish the merchant status is indicated by the nature of 
the provisions. 
 The special provisions as to merchants appear only in this Article and 
they are of three kinds. Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 
dealing with the statute of frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda 
and modification rest on normal business practices which are or ought 
to be typical of and familiar to any person in business. For purposes of 
these sections almost every person in business would, therefore, be 
deemed to be a “merchant” under the language “who. . . . by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to 
the practices . . . involved in the transaction . . .” since the practices 
involved in the transaction are non-specialized business practices such 
as answering mail. In this type of provision, banks or even universities, 
for example, well may be “merchants.” But even these sections only 
apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank 
president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not status as to 
particular kinds of goods. 
Id. at cmt. 2 (West 2003). (emphasis added). 
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what happens to them in such a situation.410 The court appears 
unaware of the relationship between UCC section 2-207(1) and 
UCC section 2-207(2), and in particular, that section 2-207(2) 
comes into play only if a contract has been formed—by informal 
oral agreement or by offer and shipment as acceptance or by a 
definite written expression of acceptance albeit with some 
additional boilerplate terms.411 That contract, of course, already 
has terms that the parties agreed to by their words or conduct, 
supplemented by any Code gap-fillers. The court also appears to be 
unaware of the first sentence of section 2-207(2) that provides, 
“[t]he additional terms are to be construed as proposals for 
additions to the contract.”412 Thus, it is not as though section 2-207 
gives no guidance as to what is to become of the additional terms. 
Its guidance is clear: the additional terms are simply proposals for 
addition to the existing contract. Again, proposals (just another 
term for “offers”) do not become anything unless they are accepted 
by the one to whom they are made. Absent an actual acceptance, 
they simply lapse after a reasonable period of time. 
The opinion assumes that Easterbrook is correct that section 2-
204 is the only relevant Code provision. It justifies the “terms 
later” rule by sketching the facts and holdings in ProCD, Hill, and 
Brower, with an added conclusion that the approach of those cases 
“represents the overwhelming majority view on this issue [as] 
demonstrated by its adoption into the UCITA.”413 Its conclusion 
drawn from the adoption of UCITA by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) was 
premature. As of January 2004 only two states, Virginia and 
Maryland, have adopted versions of the UCITA,414 and three have 
enacted “bomb shelter” legislation precluding enforcement of 
choice of law provisions selecting a state that had adopted the 
UCITA.415 Moreover, the UCITA never gained the support of 
                                                          
410 U.C.C. § 2-207. 
411 See supra note 31 (providing the text of UCC section 2-207(1)-(2)). 
412 U.C.C. § 2-207(2). 
413 998 P.2d at 338 n.10. 
414 VA. CODE ANN. 59.1-501.1 (Michie 2002); MD. CODE ANN., Comm. 
Law § 22-101 to 816 (2003). 
415 IOWA CODE § 554D.104(4) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2004); 
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American Bar Association,416 and in August of 2003 NCCUSL 
officially abandoned further efforts to get it enacted by state 
legislatures.417 
D. I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp. 
The court in I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 
another software purchase case, also falls short in Code analysis as 
it embraces ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule in the context of a 
click-wrap license that purported to limit liability to the amount of 
the license fees paid.418 In response to the purchaser’s written 
purchase order, the seller delivered the software that contained the 
“terms later” in click-wrap form that displayed on the screen 
during the installation process.419 The I.Lan court, like 
Easterbrook, fails to take into account the UCC section 2-206(1)(a) 
and (b) formation rules under which the seller’s shipment of the 
software in response to the order constitutes acceptance of the 
offer, forming a contract on the terms in the purchase order plus 
Code gap-fillers. It states its choice with respect to contract 
formation rules is between UCC sections 2-204 and 2-207.420 
Analysis under UCC section 2-204 would be simple; I.Lan 
manifested assent to the click-wrap license agreement when in 
clicked the “I agree” box.421 
The court notes that analysis under section 2-207 would be 
more complicated. In the course of describing how that analysis 
would operate, the court discloses its misunderstanding of the 
                                                          
W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2003). 
416 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Statement from 
NCCUSL President Burentt to all NCCUSL Commissioners on UCITA (Aug. 1, 
2003), available at http://www.nccusl.org./nccusl/DesktopModules/News 
Display.aspx?ItemID=46K. King Burnett, NCCUSL President and the 
organization’s representative to the House, withdrew the resolution approving 
UCITA from consideration by the House of Delegates “[w]hen it became 
evident that a clear consensus on the act was unlikely to emerge. . . .” 
417 See infra note 479 and accompanying text. 
418 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002) 
419 Id. at 330. 
420 Id. at 335-36. 
421 Id. at 336. 
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meaning and effect of UCC section 2-207(3).422 It assumes that the 
language in the click-wrap terms has the effect of an acceptance 
expressly conditioned on agreement by the purchaser to its terms, 
thus not forming a contract on the basis of the exchange of 
writings.423 It further concludes that under such circumstances 
conduct of the parties formed the contract and notes its awareness 
of the applicability of section 2-207(3) in such a setting.424 
It ignores, however, the plain language of section 2-207(3) that 
provides the terms of such a contract “consist of the terms on 
which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of 
this Act.”425 Although it cites to section 1.3 of the White and 
Summers Treatise,426 it ignores the most crucial portion of that 
section on the issue and concludes that the terms were those in the 
seller’s writing if after the completed purchase and sale transaction 
the purchaser clicked the “I agree” button in order to install the 
program it had bought.427 But according to the cited authors: 
Section 2-207(3) is only applicable when the writings of 
the parties do not otherwise establish a contract yet their 
conduct evidences a contract. Additionally, it presumes that 
there have been “writings of the parties” in which they 
failed to reach an agreement. Absent such, 2-207(3) is 
inapplicable and the proper analysis focuses on 2-204. Note 
that contract formation under subsection (3) gives neither 
                                                          
422 Id. at 336-37. 
423 Id. 
424 Id. at 336. 
425 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1995). 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a 
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the 
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such 
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which 
the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms 
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act. 
Id. 
426 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 1.3 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 2001). 
427 I.Lan, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
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party the relevant terms in its document, but fills the 
contract with the standardized provisions of Article 2. As a 
practical matter this solution may put a seller at a 
disadvantage, for seller will often wish to undertake less 
responsibility for the quality of his goods than the Code 
imposes or else wish to limit its damages liability more 
narrowly than would the Code.428 
Rather, the I.Lan court treats the click-wrap terms like a 
traditional common law counter-offer, and the purchaser’s clicking 
of “I agree” in order to install the program that it had bought and 
paid for as though it were an acceptance under the common law’s 
“last shot” rule. In addition, it erroneously treats as relevant to the 
determination of the terms of the contract UCC section 2-207(2), a 
subsection that, coupled with section 2-207(1), rejects the “last 
shot” rule and has applicability only in settings where additional 
terms are proposed after a contract has been previously formed by 
a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance to an offer. Its 
erroneous analysis contributes to the court’s willingness to 
embrace ProCD’s “terms later” rule as “a practical way to form 
contracts.”429 
E. 1-A Equipment Co. v. Icode, Inc. 
In yet another software case, a Massachusetts appellate court 
embraced ProCD/Hill’s “terms later” rule without any independent 
                                                          
428 Id. at 24-25 (emphasis added). White and Summers follow that 
observation with a reference to the history behind comment 7 to § 2-207, and 
quoted that comment which should have been of special import to the I.Lan 
court, but was not: 
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for 
before any dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has 
been made. In such cases, where the writings of the parties do not 
establish a contract, it is not necessary to determine which act or 
document constituted the offer and which the acceptance. See § 2-204. 
The only question is what terms are included in the contract, and 
subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule. 
Id. 
429 183 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
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statutory analysis or critical inquiry regarding the validity of 
Easterbrook’s rationale.430 Here, it was a forum selection clause of 
which the buyer was not aware until after placing the order, paying 
the full price, and receiving the software.431 It first became aware 
of the “terms later” when they appeared as it was loading the 
software.432 The buyer submitted a purchase order form prepared 
by the seller that stated, “Please read the End User License and 
Service Agreement,” but did not indicate the terms or their 
purported legal effect. 433 The terms purported to make the 
purchaser’s retention of the software for more than seven days 
after installation operate as acceptance of the terms.434 
To support its application of the “terms later” rule the court 
merely references the Massachusetts federal district court’s 
opinion in I.Lan Systems, quotes Easterbrook in ProCD and Hill, 
and cites the Brower court’s conclusion that “[t]ransactions 
involving ‘cash now, terms later’ have become commonplace.”435 
It parrots Easterbrook’s quotation from the Farnsworth treatise that 
“[n]otice on the outside, terms in the inside, and a right to return 
the software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable . . . may be a 
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike,” as 
though it supported the “terms later” rule.436 Yet that section of the 
Farnsworth treatise stands for the opposite proposition with respect 
to “terms later.”437 
The court also quotes excerpts of Easterbrook’s illustrations 
about the binding effect of terms not called to a buyer’s attention 
prior to purchase, including his theater ticket illustration, as though 
they were credible proof of a general rule of law validating terms 
withheld initially from buyers.438 Easterbrook’s suggestion as to 
                                                          
430 1-A Equipment Co. v. Icode, Inc., No. 1460, 2003 WL 549913 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2003). 
431 Id. at *1. 
432 Id. 
433 Id. 
434 Id. at *2. 
435 Id. 
436 I-A Equipment Co., 2003 WL549913 at *2. 
437 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
438 1-A Equipment Co., 2003 WL 549913, at *2. 
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the binding effect of the theater ticket stub on the purchaser is 
directly contrary to existing law, and his other illustrations are 
merely his views on what courts would hold rather than upon 
actual holdings.439 Likewise Easterbrook’s conclusions in Hill that 
customers as a group are better off with “terms later” is quoted and 
apparently accepted as though it were an established economic 
fact. The willingness of courts to embrace—without the slightest 
question—the numerous novel legal and economic assertions upon 
which Easterbrook built his “terms later” rule is truly amazing, and 
disappointing. 
F. Bischoff v. Direct TV, Inc. 
Some courts have embraced Easterbrook’s “terms later” rule in 
transactions involving services rather than sale of goods. In 
Bischoff v. Direct TV, Inc. the United States District Court for 
California’s Central District applies the “terms later” rule to hold 
that customers of television programming services are bound by an 
arbitration clause of which they were not aware until after they had 
purchased the Direct TV equipment, ordered the service, and 
Direct TV activated the service.440 The court does not analyze the 
order and installation of service under traditional common law 
formation rules and the objective theory of contracts. Had it done 
so, it would have found customers had reason to believe the 
contract had been formed by their order and activation of the 
service in response, and that the “terms later” were offers to 
modify that would lapse absent affirmative agreement to them by 
the purchasers. It also declines to treat by analogy earlier Code 
cases in which additional terms were sought to be introduced after 
an oral or written agreement between the parties for purchase and 
sale had been made. Rather it chooses to characterize the later 
disclosed terms of the Customer Agreement as merely “terms of 
the ongoing contractual relationship between Direct TV and its 
subscribers,”441 embracing the “terms later” rule that envisages no 
                                                          
439 See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text. 
440 180 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
441 Id. at 1104 (emphasis added). 
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final contract until after the time period for rejection passes, 
euphemistically referred to as the “rolling contract” approach.442 
The Bischoff court finds support for that approach in Carnival 
Cruise Lines,443 in ProCD and Hill, and in some other unreported 
decisions from other lower courts (whose dates of decision were 
subsequent to ProCD and Hill).444 Although the evidence was 
disputed with regard to how long it was after service had been 
activated before the terms were disclosed to the purchasers, there 
was no dispute that some time had elapsed after activation and 
before disclosure.445 The court rebuffs the customers’ efforts to 
distinguish Hill on the basis that the “terms later” in that case came 
at the same time as delivery.446 It finds that the length of time 
between the two events is not dispositive on the issue of whether 
the “terms later” are part of the parties’ agreement.447 “The more 
controlling issue is the economic and practical considerations 
involved in selling services to mass consumers which make it 
acceptable for terms and conditions to follow the initial 
transaction,”448 citing ProCD and quoting approvingly from Hill 
the argument about the “droning voice” and its conclusion that 
“[c]ustomers as a group are better off”449 when sellers disclose 
terms after the purchase. “Practical business realities make it 
unrealistic to expect DirecTV, or any television programming 
service provider for that matter, to negotiate all of the terms of 
their customer contracts, including arbitration provisions, with 
                                                          
442 Hillman, supra note 5, at 743. “In a rolling contract, a consumer orders 
and pays for goods before seeing most of the terms, which are contained on or in 
the packaging of the goods. Upon receipt, the buyer enjoys the right to return the 
goods for a limited period of time.” Id. at 744. 
443 499 U.S. 585 (1991); see supra note 67 and accompanying text 
(demonstrating the holding in that case rested on the stated assumption that the 
Shutes had knowledge of the terms prior to making their purchase). 
444 Birschoff, 108 F. Supp. at 1105. 
445 Id. at 1101. 
446 Id. at 1105-06. 
447 Id. at 1105. 
448 180 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. (emphasis added). 
449 Id. 
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each customer before initiating service.”450 
The bottom line is that it is not practical to require mass 
marketers of services to do what other sellers of services have 
always been required to do—state the terms on which they are 
willing to sell as part of their offers. For the court it is as though 
the objective theory of contract formation is nothing more than an 
archaic relic, and as though the moral authority for courts to 
enforce promises, derived from objectively judged assent in order 
to protect reasonable expectations, is a mere nicety that can be 
ignored for practicality’s sake. 
G. Lozano v. AT&T Wireless 
A few months later, in Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, another 
California district court applied the “terms later” rule of 
ProCD/Hill in a services case.451 This time the context was a 
cellular service transaction in which the service provider first 
disclosed a mandatory arbitration term after the purchaser had 
signed a service plan.452 Its terms appeared in a welcome guide 
within the box containing the newly purchased phone to be used 
with the service.453 
The service provider asserted that plaintiff had received a rate 
plan brochure that stated service “is subject to the Terms and 
Conditions contained in your . . . Welcome Guide, which is 
included with your phone or available at point-of-purchase.”454 
That latter phrase suggests that the case might not strictly have 
been one of “terms later.” If the terms were actually and 
reasonably available for inspection prior to the purchase decision, 
and the purchaser simply chose to not read them, the purchaser 
might be held bound by such terms under traditional contract 
principles.455 
The court, however, taking the lead from Bischoff, does not 
                                                          
450 Id. (emphasis added). 
451 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
452 Id. at 1073. 
453 Id. 
454 Id. (emphasis added). 
455 FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at § 4.26. 
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choose that path. Rather, it simply begins with its conclusion “that 
providing customers with terms and conditions after an initial 
transaction is acceptable, and that such terms and conditions are 
enforceable, including arbitration clauses.”456 Relying heavily on 
Bischoff and its extensive quotations from ProCD and Hill, the 
court embraces the “economic and practical aspects of selling 
services to mass customers” rationale and the rationale that 
“[c]ustomers as a group are better off” with “terms later.”457 It 
applies to a cellular telephone service provider the Bischoff court’s 
conclusion that vendors cannot realistically negotiate all of the 
contract terms before initiating service.458 For the Lozano court, 
perceived “practical business realities” trump any legal or 
economic considerations to the contrary.459 
Several other courts have made favorable reference to the 
“terms later” rule of ProCD/Hill in cases that did not involve clear 
fact settings of order by a consumer, full payment and then 
delivery with new terms.460 A few others have distinguished 
                                                          
456 216 F. Supp. 2d at 1073. 
457 Id. (quoting Bischoff, 180 F. Supp 1097, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). 
458 Id. 
459 See also Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corporation, 726 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001). In yet another services case in the telecommunications realm, 
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, relies upon the ProCD/Hill 
“terms later” rule earlier embraced by Brower, to hold subscribers to a high 
speed internet service are bound by disclaimer of warranties first disclosed to 
them on an installation CD-ROM provided by Bell Atlantic after subscribing to 
the service. Id. at 63. The subscribers contended that it was possible to use the 
service without having actually read the terms and conditions. The court rebuffs 
that contention on two grounds. Id. The pleadings did not allege that any of the 
subscribers used the service without reading the terms, “and, with regard to the 
location or conspicuousness of the terms and conditions within the installation 
package, it has been held that such does not impair the enforcement of the 
agreement,” citing the trilogy. Id. at 64. The Scott court thus treats those cases as 
teaching the unimportance of not only the timing of the disclosure but also of the 
actual likelihood it will be noticed by the purchaser. Like the decision in 
Westendorf, it confirms that assent for purposes of binding a purchaser to “terms 
later” is purely fictional at best. 
460 See Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574, 577-78 (W.D.N.C. 2000) 
(finding plaintiff credit cardholder agreed to an amendment to his credit card 
agreement limiting his ability to arbitrate class actions because plaintiff did not 
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ProCD/Hill.461 With respect to the latter, it is not clear whether the 
courts felt it necessary to distinguish them on the belief that they 
were good law, or whether it was just easier to distinguish them 
than to refute the erroneous position for which they stand. 
H. Licitra v. Gateway, Inc. 
Except for the United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas, in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,462 the only other court 
expressing criticism of ProCD/Hill appears to be the New York 
City Civil Court in Licitra v. Gateway, Inc.463 Confronted with the 
controlling authority in its jurisdiction that had fully embraced 
ProCD/Hill,464 the court in Licitra pays deference to the 
conclusion that the contract was not formed until the time for 
rejection had passed, but refuses to hold that such conclusion 
compels the inclusion of the arbitration term, finding to enforce it 
would be contrary to the public policy of the state of New York 465 
and also UCC section 2-207.466 The court cogently notes: 
                                                          
cancel his account after receiving notification of the amendment, but continued 
to use the card); Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, 994 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 
1998) (upholding arbitration clause in an amendment to plaintiff’s cardholder 
agreement despite plaintiff not signing the amendment); Hunt v. Up North 
Plastics, 980 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Minn. 1997) (finding plaintiff agreed to 
arbitration clause incorporated in invoices because failed to reasonably object to 
the clause); Boyd v. Homes of Legend, 981 F. Supp. 1423 (M.D. Ala. 1997) 
(upholding arbitration clause in an agreement “subject to specific terms to be 
decided at delivery” and that plaintiff assented to arbitration clause upon signing 
purchase agreement when delivery of plaintiff’s mobile home was made). 
461 See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Mattingly v. Hughes Elecs. Corp., 810 A.2d 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
462 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000). 
463 734 N.Y.S.2d 389 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001). 
464 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988). 
465 734 N.Y.S.2d at 393-97. 
466 Id. at 396. 
Finally, assuming that the UCC applies to the transaction, under UCC 
2-207 in New York, between merchants, new terms in a written 
confirmation do not become part of the parties’ agreement if they 
materially alter the terms of the agreement . . . and it has been held that 
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 The first issue presented is whether or not a contract 
exists between the parties and, if so, what are the terms of 
the contract? Common sense tells us that if you pay money 
and receive a product in return, a contract has been 
created. The unique issue with the purchase of computers is 
that there is no negotiation of the terms of the agreement. 
The written “Agreement” arrives with the product and by 
retaining the computer for 30 days, the consumer consents 
to be bound by the terms of the entire writing. As cited 
above, courts have held this procedure creates a binding 
agreement between the parties. But in the words of Ira 
Gershwin, “It ain’t necessarily so.” 
 Accepting these holdings as being applicable, if the 
defendant, as a term and condition of filing a claim, 
required the consumer to sing “O Sole Mio” in Yiddish 
while standing on his or her head in Macy’s window, only 
Mandy Patinkin would qualify to object to the receipt of 
defective equipment. This cannot be so. What these 
decisions must mean is that a contract has been formed 
with the price, the equipment and time of delivery agreed 
to, but almost nothing else. All other terms of the 
“Agreement” proposed by the computer company must be 
subject to interpretation by the courts as being additional 
terms because, if not, they might conflict with state law or 
be against public policy. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . .The Court, in Brower, applied the Marie Antoinette 
“let them eat cake” defense when it determined that this is 
not a “take it or leave it” situation and, therefore, not a 
contract of adhesion because the consumer has 30 days to 
                                                          
an arbitration clause is presumptively a material alteration when 
introduced as an additional term. . . If both parties are not merchants, 
such as this case where there is a merchant-seller and consumer-
purchaser, additional terms are to be construed to be proposals for 
additions to the contract and therefore must be specifically agreed to by 
the other party in order to be binding. . . . 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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reject the item and return the merchandise and has the 
ability to purchase the equivalent equipment from another 
vendor. Is this a real option or only a paper one?467 
One must applaud the courage of the Licitra court in the face of 
the Brower precedent. One can only wonder why other courts, 
especially those which were not restricted by controlling precedent 
as it was, could not also see and reject the nonsense of 
Easterbrook’s “common sense” and his clear misapplication of the 
law, or, if they saw it, why they lacked the will to stand against it. 
That a number of courts have expressly embraced Easterbrook’s 
rationale and his “terms later” rule is astounding in light of its utter 
lack of legal, economic, or moral foundation. 
V. BAD FRUIT—UCITA 
Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion was the first judicial affirmation 
of the “terms later” that was being vigorously pressed by industry 
groups in the drafting process of UCC Article 2B468 and what 
ultimately came to be the free-standing UCITA.469 ProCD, for the 
first time, gave the appearance of legal legitimacy to the “terms 
later” method of transacting business; and henceforth provided the 
“legal” authority argument for its proponents in their continued 
efforts to reflect that principle in UCC Article 2B and the 
UCITA.470 
                                                          
467 Id. at 391 (emphasis added). 
468 Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The 
Never Ending Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683 (1999); 
Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 
54 SMU L. REV. 787 (2001). 
469 Rusch, supra note 468, at 1686 n.10. 
470 ProCD and Hill made their first appearance in the January 20, 1997 
draft of UCC 2B, with the drafting committee’s approvingly referring to them in 
Reporter’s note 2 to 2B’s Mass Market Licenses provision. Note 2 stated, in 
pertinent part: 
With respect to single form, shrink wrap cases, while the cases split, in 
situations dealing with single form settings involving shrink wrap 
licenses, no appellate case law rejects the contract-based enforceability 
of the forms and recent cases generally support it. See Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 1997 WL 2809 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
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A. History 
In spite of vigorous opposition from a host of groups, on July 
29, 1999, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for introduction to the state 
legislatures.471 The project had begun in earnest in 1995 in 
response to objections by the Business Software Alliance to the 
inclusion of software under the larger project to revise Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code.472 At that time the executive 
                                                          
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software 
Link Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (Ariz. 1993). 
The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Commercial Code 
Article 2B, Jan. 20, 1997, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ 
ulc_frame.htm (last visited November 13, 2003). The Reporter’s suggestion that 
Arizona Retail is support for enforcing shrink-wrap terms not disclosed until 
after purchase was erroneous. See supra notes 114-16. 
471 See, e.g., Cem Kaner, Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 440-44 (1999) (identifying various 
groups in opposition to UCITA including forty-five state attorneys general, the 
staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Society for Information Management, 
retailers, fifty intellectual property law professors, the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association, The Committee on Copyright and Literary Property, 
the Communications and Media Law Committee, the Entertainment Law 
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, libraries, 
trade associations representing the press, the Association for Computing 
Machinery, the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers (USA), the 
American Society for Quality, the Independent Computer Consultants 
Association, the Free Software Foundation and the Software Engineering 
Institute.); David G. Mayhan & Patricia A. Fennelly, The Uniform Computer 
Information Act: Ready Or Not, Here It Comes, 28-Dec. COLO. LAW. 63 (1999) 
(recognizing the Motion Picture Association, the Recording Industry 
Association of America and law professors of contracts and commercial law as 
having spoken out in opposition to UCITA.); Joseph B. “Jobe” Tichy, 
Comment, Computer Software Transactions in Washington State—What 
Commercial Laws Can The State Provide For This Industry? Is UCITA The 
Answer?, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 377, 385 (2001) (noting the Americans for Fair 
Electronic Commerce Transactions also oppose UCITA on the basis of its unfair 
nature towards consumers.). 
472 Stephen Y. Chow, UCITA: A 1990’s Vision of E-Commerce, 18 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 323, 324 (1999). 
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committee of NCCUSL spun off a separate UCC Article 2B 
designed as the “licensing spoke” of a proposed “hub and spoke” 
Article 2. 473 
The American Law Institute was highly critical of proposed 
Article 2B for its failure to require pre-transaction disclosure of 
terms, even in Internet transactions where such disclosure could 
easily be made.474 In 1999 the ALI Council Ad Hoc Committee on 
UCC Article 2B stated that, “[t]he provisions on assent to post-
transaction terms are inconsistent with sound contract policy,”475 
and that “[t]here is no good reason in contracts formed over the 
Internet why the terms could not be made available to the potential 
licensee through links on the relevant website at the time of 
contracting, rather than supplied later.”476 Lacking ALI support for 
Article 2B, NCCUSL in 1999 adopted the Article 2B product as a 
freestanding statute dealing with transactions in computer 
information, in the form of UCITA.477 NCCUSL never presented 
the proposed statute to the ALI for its final approval.478 Nor did it 
ever receive final approval from the American Bar Association, its 
final effort in that regard being abandoned in February of 2003.479 
                                                          
473 Id. 
474 See Jean Braucher, Motion to Disapprove Proposed Final Drafts of 
Amendments to UCC Articles 2 and 2A, Presented to Members of the American 
Law Institute 9 (May 1, 2003). 
475 Id. (emphasis added). 
476 Id. 
477 Rusch, supra note 468, at 1686 n.10. 
478 Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View From the Trenches, 
52 HASTINGS L. J. 607, 611 (2001). 
479 Press Release, Uniform Law Commissioners: UCITA Withdrawn From 
ABA Agenda Without Action (February 10, 2003), at 
http://www.nccusl.org./nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=46. 
In relevant part it stated: 
A resolution concerning the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA) which was before the American Bar 
Association’s governing body, the House of Delegates, was withdrawn 
today without consideration or substantive debate by the President of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL). K. King Burnett, NCCUSL President and the 
organization’s representative to the House, withdrew the resolution 
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B. UCITA: Assent Expanded 
Sections 112 and 113 of the UCITA introduce an expanded 
concept of “manifestation of assent” as a necessary predicate to 
binding purchasers to terms not disclosed by sellers until after 
sellers have received payment and the products have been 
delivered. Section 112, entitled “Manifestation of Assent,” 
provides that a person manifests assent by “acting with knowledge 
of, or after having an opportunity to review” the record or term.480 
Section 113, entitled “Opportunity to Review,” provides that a 
person has the opportunity to review a record or term even if it is 
“available for review only after a person becomes obligated to pay 
or begins its performance” if he has a right to return the item if he 
rejects the term. 481 Comment c. to section 113 states: “The right to 
                                                          
approving UCITA, citing requests by a number of ABA sections and 
leaders to defer an extensive debate on the floor over the substantive 
merits of the Uniform Act. “When it became evident that a clear 
consensus on the act was unlikely to emerge, we were advised by a 
number of ABA Section officers and other leaders that the members of 
the House of Delegates would prefer not to take a formal position on 
UCITA, for or against, at this time. We withdrew the act from 
consideration in response to this advice.” 
Id. 
480 Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 112, at 
http://www.law.upeen.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm(2002) [hereinafter UCITA] 
(emphasis added). In pertinent part Section 112 provides: 
(a) [How person manifests assent.] A person manifest assent to a record 
or term if the person, acting with knowledge of, or after having an 
opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it . . . (2) 
intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to 
know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the 
conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
481 UCITA § 113 (emphasis added). In pertinent part Section 113 provides: 
(a) [Manner of availability generally.] A person has an opportunity to 
review a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that 
ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person and permit 
review. . . . (c) [When right of return required.] If a record or term is 
available for review only after a person becomes obligated to pay or 
begins its performance, the person has an opportunity to review only if 
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return creates a situation where meaningful assent can occur.”482 
Section 202 of the UCITA, entitled “Formation in General,” 
and its comment 4, embrace the layered or rolling contract concept 
to bind purchasers to terms first disclosed only after payment for 
and receipt of the product.483 Comment 4 states: “This subsection 
lays a foundation for the layered contracting that typifies many 
areas of commerce and is recognized in Uniform Commercial 
Code Section 2-204 (1998 Official Text), as well as in the common 
law and practice of most States.”484 This is an obvious reference to 
Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion, the first to distort section 2-204 and 
the common law in this fashion, and to its progeny, albeit without 
                                                          
it has a right to a return if it rejects the record. . . . 
Id. 
482 UCITA § 113, cmt. 2. 
483 UCITA § 202. In pertinent part Section 202 (a) provides: “A contract 
may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and 
acceptance, or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic agents which 
recognize the existence of a contract.” Id. (emphasis added). 
484 UCITA § 202 cmt. 4. That comment provides, in pertinent part: 
This subsection lays a foundation for the layered contracting that 
typifies many areas of commerce and is recognized in Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-204 (1998 Official Text), as well as in the 
common law and practice of most States. This foundation is further 
developed in Sections 208 [Adopting Terms of Records], 209 [Mass-
Market License], 304 [Continuing Contractual Terms], and 305 [Terms 
to be Specified]. . . . Contract formation is often a process, rather than 
a single event. A rule that a contract must arise at a single point in time 
and that this single event defines all the terms of the contract is 
inconsistent with commercial practice. Contracts are often formed over 
time; terms are often developed during performance, rather than before 
performance occurs. Often, parties expect to adopt records later and 
that expectation itself is the agreement. Rather than modifying an 
existing agreement, these terms are part of the agreement itself. . . . 
During the time in which terms in a layered contract are developed or 
to be proposed, it is not appropriate to the [sic] apply default rules of 
this Act. . . .In layered contracting, the agreement is that there are no 
terms on the undecided issues until they are made express by the 
parties. Applying a default rule would be applying the rule despite 
contrary agreement, rather than when no such agreement exists. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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express citation in this comment. 
The reference is explicit in comments to subsequent sections. 
Section 208 of the UCITA, entitled “Adopting Terms of Records,” 
provides in subsection (1) that a party “adopts the terms of a 
record, including a standard form, as to the terms of the contract if 
the party agrees to the record, such as by manifesting assent.”485 
When linked with sections 112 and 113 regarding assent after one 
has opportunity to review later supplied terms, section 208(1) 
would appear sufficient to fully bind purchasers in settings like that 
in ProCD. Lest there be any doubt, section 208(2), entitled “Later 
terms,” is explicit on the matter, stating, “[t]he terms of a record 
may be adopted after beginning performance or use if the parties 
had reason to know” that other terms that could not have been 
reviewed earlier would be provided later.486 Comment 3 to section 
208 states that “subsection [2] reflects the reality of layered 
contracting,” noting “many transactions involve a rolling or 
layered process,” and expressly adopting the rule of ProCD and 
one of its progeny.487 Comment 5 to section 208 is explicit that 
“subsection [2] “applies in the mass market.”488 
                                                          
485 UCITA § 208(1) (emphasis added). 
486 UCITA § 208(2). That subsection provides, in pertinent part: 
[Later terms.] The terms of a record may be adopted after beginning 
performance or use if the parties had reason to know that their 
agreement would be represented in whole or part by a later record to be 
agreed on and there would not be an opportunity to review the record 
or a copy of it before performance or use begins. . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
487 UCITA § 208(2), cmt. 3 (emphasis added). Comment 3 provides: 
3. Later Terms: Layered Contracting. Subsection (b) [sic] reflects the 
reality of layered contracting. While some contracts are formed and 
their terms defined at a single point in time, many transactions involve 
a rolling or layered process. The commercial expectation is that terms 
will follow or be developed after performance begins. This Act rejects 
cases that narrowly treat contracting as a single event despite ordinary 
practice. It adopts a rule in cases that recognize that contracts are often 
formed over time. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, M.A. 
Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp. 
Id. 
488 UCITA § 208(2) cmt. 3. 
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Section 209 of the UCITA, entitled “Mass-Market License,” 
provides that a party may adopt the terms of a mass-market license 
by manifesting assent thereto “before or during the party’s initial 
performance or use of or access to the information.”489 This, of 
course, is the very setting presented in the typical shrink-wrap 
transaction. Comment 5 to section 209 elaborates the point, 
explicitly relying on ProCD and its progeny, stating with respect to 
the effect of terms presented after initial agreement: 
 Mass-market licenses may be presented after initial 
general agreement from the licensee. In some distribution 
channels this allows a more efficient mode of contracting 
between end users and remote parties; this is especially 
important where the remote party controls copyright or 
similar rights in the information. . . . 
 Most courts under current law enforce contract terms 
that are presented and assented to after initial agreement 
[citing Carnival Cruise Lines, ProCD, Hill v. Gateway, 
Brower v. Gateway, Mortenson, and I. Lan Systems, and 
parenthetically noting I. Lan’s observation that] “Step-
Saver once was the leading case on shrinkwrap agreements. 
Today that distinction goes to . . . ProCD . . . . ‘Money 
now, terms later’ is a practical way to form contracts, 
especially with purchasers of software.”490 
Section 304 of the UCITA, entitled “Continuing Contractual 
Terms,” is another section resting on the foundation of layered 
contracting. It presents the opportunity for a mass-market seller to 
reserve the right to change terms of the contract in the future.491 
                                                          
489 UCITA § 209(a) (emphasis added). That section provides, in pertinent 
part: “Adoption of the terms of a mass-market license under Section 208 is 
effective only if the party agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent, 
before or during the party’s initial performance or use of or access to the 
information.” Id. 
490 UCITA § 209, cmt. 5. (emphasis added). 
491 UCITA § 304. Section 304 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Terms of an agreement involving successive performances apply to 
all performances, even if the terms are not displayed or otherwise 
brought to the attention of a party with respect to each successive 
performance, unless the terms are modified in accordance with this 
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The seller could first present that reservation only after payment, 
and it could be made effective by the “assent” permitted by 
Sections 112 and 113. When the seller asserts this reserved right, 
and presents a change in terms to the other party, the latter has no 
right to reject the change and continue with the terms of the 
original contract. Rather, the change, if proposed in good faith, 
becomes part of the contract unless the one to whom it is proposed 
can show that it “alters a material term” and that his determination 
that it is unacceptable is made in good faith—in which case, the 
party to whom the change is unacceptable can avoid it only by 
terminating the contract as to future performances. 
Section 305 of the UCITA, entitled “Terms to be Specified,” is 
likewise founded on the layered contracting theory.492 Among 
other things, it assures that an agreement such as one authorized by 
section 304 reserving to one party the right to unilaterally change 
the terms of the contract in the future will not cause the contract to 
be invalid.493 
C. Opposition to UCITA 
UCITA and its predecessor, proposed UCC Article 2B, have 
been vigorously opposed on a variety of grounds and by a host of 
                                                          
[Act] or the contract. (b) If a contract provides that terms may be 
changed as to future performances by compliance with a described 
procedure, a change proposed in good faith pursuant to that procedure 
becomes part of the contract if the procedure: (1) reasonably notifies 
the other party of the change; and (2) in a mass-market transaction, 
permits the other party to terminate the contract as to future 
performance if the change alters a material term and the party in good 
faith determines that the modification is unacceptable. 
Id. 
492 See supra note 487. 
493 UCITA § 305. Section 305 provides in pertinent part: 
An agreement that is otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract is 
not invalid because it leaves particulars of performance to be specified 
by one of the parties. If particulars of performance are to be specified 
by a party, the following rules apply: (1) Specification must be made in 
good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness. 
Id. 
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individuals and organizations.494 For example, thirteen attorneys 
general and the Administrator of the Georgia Fair Business 
Practices Act jointly registered their written opposition to 
NCCUSL’s promulgating UCITA, noting that its rules “thwart the 
common sense expectations of buyers and sellers in the real 
world,” and reflect policy choices that “almost invariably favor a 
relatively small number of vendors to the detriment of millions of 
businesses and consumers who purchase computer software and 
subscribe to internet services.”495 A group of forty-five law 
professors also voiced their opposition in a letter to the President 
of NCCUSL and its Commissioners on the eve of NCCUSL’s 
promulgating the UCITA. The letter notes, among other things, 
that “UCITA is out of step with modern commercial contract 
                                                          
494 See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA On The Road: What Lessons 
Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 167, 206 (2001) (criticizing 
UCITA’s authorization of anticompetitive terms preventing reverse 
engineering); Braucher, supra note 5, at 1837-43, 1852-59 (criticizing delayed 
disclosure of terms as deceptive acts and a violation of FTCA § 5); Chow, supra 
note 472, at 324 (stating that UCITA is “stuck in the 1992-1995 model of 
making terms available in the retail market only after a purchaser paid for the 
product and opened the box holding the software”); James S. Heller, UCITA: 
Still Crazy After All These Years, and Still Not Ready for Prime Time, 8 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 5, 56-58 (2001) (expressing concern over UCITA’s threat to fair 
use of copyrighted material); Jeffrey A Modisett & Cindy M. Lott, Cyberlaw 
and E-commerce: A State Attorney General’s Perspective, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
643, 651 (2000) (stating that UCITA “stacks the deck against consumers”); 
Kaner, supra note 471, at 440-45 (criticizing UCITA as permitting publishers to 
eliminate competition from used software by barring consumers from 
transferring used copies of the software they buy); Jeffrey M. Rosenfeld, Spiders 
and Crawlers and Bots, Oh My: Efficiency and Public Policy of Online 
Contracts That Restrict Data Collection, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 45 (2002) 
(criticizing UCITA’s treatment of preemption issue); Pratik A. Shah, Intellectual 
Property: A. Copyright: 5. Preemption: a) Contract enforceability: The Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 92-96 
(exploring consumer protection concerns). 
495 Letter from the Attorneys General of Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Kansas, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington and the Administrator of the Georgia Fair 
Business Practices Act to Gene Lebrun, President, National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 23, 1999). 
BERNMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  1:12 PM 
 “TERMS LATER” CONTRACTING 781 
law.”496 
Consumers Union, the nonprofit publisher of Consumer 
Reports magazine, was also among the many groups registering 
opposition to the adoption of UCITA by NCCUSL. It noted, 
among other things, that UCITA “is fundamentally unbalanced,” is 
“riddled with loopholes favoring license drafters,” “interferes in a 
wholesale way with all other applicable state statutes on four key 
issues,” including consent and agreement, and “turns upside-down 
the Conference’s long tradition of deferring to state consumer 
protection law.”497 
                                                          
496 Letter from forty-five professors of contracts and commercial law in 
Opposition to UCITA to President Gene Lebrun and Other Commissioners, 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (July 16, 1999) 
(emphasis added). The professors pertinently stated: 
 UCITA . . [makes] it very easy for a vendor to escape default rules 
without meaningful assent by the other party. Although UCITA Section 
112 defining “manifesting assent” is unclear, judging from the 
Reporter’s Notes, the intent seems to be that a business organization’s 
employee who opened a shrinkwrap package or clicked through terms 
while installing software would “manifest assent” to the vendor’s 
terms. . . . Even if a purchaser negotiated terms in advance of delivery, 
it would have to be concerned that those terms might be changed by 
shrinkwrap or clickwrap terms that came with the product. 
 . . . . 
 In short, UCITA’s contract rules are not needed to protect software 
makers against copying or to allow them to limit use in reasonable 
ways. Indeed, UCITA’s contracting rules govern all terms, making it 
easy for publishers to get all the form terms they desire, for example 
excluding all warranties of quality, without meaningful assent by the 
other party. They also protect software vendors from having to honor 
oral agreements actually made. This one-sided approach even extends 
to permitting vendors to use a term in shrinkwrap or clickwrap to give 
themselves power to keep changing material terms unilaterally. UCITA 
Section 304. This section misuses the terms “modified” and 
“modification” to refer to unilaterally-dictated changes, rather than the 
usual meaning of modification, a change agreed to by both parties. 
Professor Perillo has it exactly right when he describes UCITA as a 
“command and control” regime. 
Id. 
497 Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Senior Attorney at the West Coast 
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A year and a half earlier, while UCITA was still in the UCC 
Article 2B format process, the Subcommittee on Proposed UCC 
Article 2B of the ABA Section on Science and Technology 
expressed its opposition to the “terms later” approach of UCC 
Article 2B, particularly in the context of mass-market licenses.498 It 
noted that “[l]icensors frequently include provisions in mass 
market licenses to impose restrictions or limitations which they 
know would discourage sales if they were disclosed prior to 
purchase,” and that “a statutory ‘right of return’ does not give 
adequate protection to a licensee who has expended time and 
effort to shop for and purchase a product in reliance on 
promotional materials which conceal material aspects of the 
product and the terms governing its use.”499 It concluded: “[i]n 
sum, we believe that a statute that permits a licensor to eliminate 
virtually all of its obligations and impose significant use 
restrictions without effective advance disclosure only encourages 
sharp practice and tends to reduce the customer confidence that is 
essential to the functioning of a mass market.”500 
D. UCITA “Terms Later” Contra Fundamental Principles of 
Justice 
UCITA also violates fundamental principles of justice.501 In 
particular, it violates the tsedeq principle in that it replaces 
common law and statutory law that protects reasonable 
expectations with a rule that defeats reasonable expectations and 
protects unreasonable ones. It thus does not constitute a righteous 
moral standard. It also violates the mishpat principle of 
evenhanded (impartial) treatment of all in that it is premised upon 
favoritism of sellers over buyers in all transactions to which it 
                                                          
Regional Office of Consumers Union, to each Uniform Law Commissioner 
(July 21, 1999). (emphasis added). 
498 Letter from the Subcommittee on Proposed UCC Article 2B of the ABA 
Section on Science and Technology to the Drafting Committee of UCC Article 
2B (January 29, 1998). 
499 Id. 
500 Id. 
501 Bern, supra note 247; see also supra text accompanying notes 340-45. 
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applies, permitting sellers to dictate after the sale the terms on 
which they will be bound, apparently upon the utilitarian 
presumption that this will be best for society. 
Fortunately, this abrogation of fundamental principles of 
justice was ultimately thwarted. Although versions of UCITA 
obtained quick passage in Maryland502 and Virginia,503 it could not 
garner support from any other state legislature. Some states 
responded with “bomb shelter” statutes,504 anti-UCITA statutes to 
prevent UCITA from governing any computer information 
transaction contract within their borders.505 Facing continued 
overwhelming opposition even to its attempts to make UCITA 
more palatable, NCCUSL discharged its standby committee of the 
UCITA at its annual meeting on August 1, 2003.506 The press 
release announcing the discharge of the standby committee, 
continued: “We have determined to focus the Conference’s 
energies on the items related to our larger agenda and not expend 
any additional Conference energy or resources in having UCITA.” 
With that, NCCUSL’s effort to promote its ill-conceived UCITA 
thankfully came to an end but not until after it, and the powerful 
industry lobby it had galvanized, had contaminated the Article 2 
revision process. 
VI. BAD FRUIT—PROPOSED ARTICLE 2 AMENDMENTS 
Some of the proposed amendments to UCC Article 2 are yet 
additional bad fruit from ProCD/Hill’s bad seed.507 In particular, 
                                                          
502 MD. CODE ANN., Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transfer 
Act §22-211 (2002). 
503 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-505.6 (Michie 2003). 
504 IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2002); W. 
VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2003). 
505 Brian D. McDonald, V. Business Law: B. Computer Information: a) 
Contract Enforceability: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 
16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 463 (2001). See also, David A. Szwak, Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act [U.C.I.T.A.]: The Consumer’s 
Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27, 29 (2002). 
506 Press Release, U.C.I.T.A. Standby Committee is Discharged (Aug.1, 
2003). 
507 These Proposed Amendments to UCC Article 2 were approved by the 
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the proposed amendments to sections 2-204, 2-211, and 2-207 
sprout directly from it and the appearance of legal legitimacy the 
decisions gave to business interests who pressed hard for 
imposition of their will in the drafting process, as they had in the 
drafting process of Article 2B and UCITA.508 
A. Proposed Sections 2-204 and 2-211(4): Validating “Terms 
Later” under the Guise of Adapting to Technological 
Change 
The proposed amendments to UCC section 2-204 adopt 
ProCD’s conclusion that clicking through messages on a screen by 
the purchaser of software in order to load or use that software is 
agreement to whatever those messages state.509 Proposed comment 
                                                          
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at its annual 
meeting in August of 2002 and by the American Law Institute at its meeting on 
May 13, 2003. The amendments referred to in this article are from the August 
2002 Final Draft adopted by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in August 2002, 
with the portions underlined in the notes infra indicating the changes proposed 
to existing Article 2. They may be accessed online at The National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, 
Official Site, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited 
November 13, 2003). 
508 See supra note 468 and accompanying text. 
509 U.C.C. § 2-204 (2002) (Proposed Draft). 
FORMATION IN GENERAL. (1) A contract for sale of goods may be 
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including offer and 
acceptance, conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
such a contract, the interaction of electronic agents, or the interaction of 
an electronic agent and an individual. (2) An agreement sufficient to 
constitute a contract for sale may be found even though the moment of 
its making is undetermined. (3) Even though one or more terms are left 
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis 
for giving an appropriate remedy. (4) Except as otherwise provided in 
Sections 2-211 through 2-213, the following rules apply:(a) A contract 
may be formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, 
even if no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents’ 
actions or the resulting terms and agreements. (b) A contract may be 
formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and an individual 
acting on the individual’s own behalf or for another person. A contract 
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5 makes explicit that subsection (4)(b) “substantiates an 
anonymous click-through transaction.”510 It notes: 
The requisite intent to contract by the individual is found 
by the acts of the individual that the individual has reason 
to know will be interpreted by the machine as allowing the 
machine to complete the transaction or performance, or that 
will be interpreted by the machine as signifying acceptance 
on the part of the individual.511 
Of course the machine that is likely to be interpreting the 
keystrokes of the purchaser of the software is the purchaser’s own 
computer. For purposes of “interpretive ability,” the owner’s 
computer is deemed capable of interpreting his keystrokes in an 
effort to load or to use the software he has already paid for as 
meaning he accepts the new terms. Still, adding a new subsection 
(4) to the proposed amended section 2-211 makes clear that his 
computer is deemed to be not capable of interpreting any other 
keystrokes he makes, such as “I R-E-J-E-C-T T-H-E-S-E N-E-W 
T-E-R-M-S.”512 
Perhaps in an effort to allay fears about the impact of amended 
section 2-204, or perhaps to just strategically understate its impact, 
the proposed comment notes that “[t]his intent is only found, 
though, when the individual is free to refuse to take the actions that 
the machine will interpret as acceptance or allowance to complete 
                                                          
is formed if the individual takes actions that the individual is free to 
refuse to take or makes a statement that the individual has reason to 
know will: (i) cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction or 
performance; or (ii) indicate acceptance of an offer, regardless of other 
expressions or actions by the individual to which the electronic agent 
cannot react. 
Id. (underlined material is proposed amended language). 
510 U.C.C. § 2-204 prop. cmt. 5 (2002) (Proposed Draft). 
511 Id. 
512 U.C.C. § 2-211(4) (2002) (Proposed Draft). That section provides: 
(4) A contract formed by the interaction of an individual and an 
electronic agent under Section 2-204(4)(b) does not include terms 
provided by the individual if the individual had reason to know that the 
agent could not react to the terms as provided. 
Id. (underlined material is proposed amended language). 
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the transaction.”513 Then it gives the example of a common 
Internet transaction where the seller presents the terms before the 
purchaser or user has made any commitment at all,514 atypical of a 
“terms later” setting such as ProCD or Mortenson. But subsection 
4(b) also applies to validate, as did ProCD and its shrink-wrap case 
law progeny, and as does UCITA, the click-on as assent in pure 
“terms later” settings.515 In such settings, based on the relevant 
economic considerations and considerations of human behavior 
noted above, one must ask realistically how “free” is the individual 
to refuse to take key stroke actions? “Free,” only if it means it is 
costless to give up the deal he had already made, return the 
software, and engage in a new search for a substitute. 
B. Section 2-207: Legitimizing “Terms Later” Contracting 
The Prefatory Note to the August 2001 proposed Amendments 
to Article 2 signals in a not very subtle way the affirmation of 
ProCD/Hill’s terms later rule in proposed changes to section 2-
207.516 It states, “section 2-207 is amended to state the terms of 
contract formed in any manner, not just those as to which there is a 
battle of the forms.”517 This supports Easterbrook’s ProCD/Hill 
premise that the current section 2-207 was confined to battle of the 
forms settings; a premise contrary to the clear language of current 
section 2-207 and its comments, and contrary to the decisional and 
scholarly commentary on the matter prior to Easterbrook’s ProCD 
decision.518 
                                                          
513 § 2-204 prop. cmt. 5. 
514 THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UCC: AMENDMENTS TO UCC 
ARTICLE 2SALES, § 2-204 prop. cmt. 5, 33 (American Law Inst. 2002). 
515 Id. (providing that a purchaser advised that the transaction will be 
completed by clicking “I agree” will be bound if purchaser had reason to know 
that the click would be interpreted as acceptance of the terms). 
516 Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, Amendments to 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, Aug. 10-17, 2001, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). 
517 Id. (emphasis added). 
518 THE EMERGED AND EMERGING NEW UCC: AMENDMENTS TO UCC 
ARTICLE 2SALES, § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3, 37 (American Law Inst. 2002). 
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The Prefatory Note also understates the significance of the 
decision to move some of the language of the current section 2-
207(1) up into a new section 2-206(c). Proposed section 2-206(c) 
pertinently provides, “[a] definite and reasonable expression of 
acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even if it contains 
terms additional to or different from the offer.”519 That language 
appears in the current section 2-207(1)520 in conjunction with the 
current section 2-207(2)521 and had a two-fold impact. 
First, it constituted a rejection of the common law mirror image 
rule. Second, it established the “first-shot” rule that favored the 
offeror by giving full effect to that language so that a definite 
expression of acceptance that contained terms different from or 
additional to those in the offer did operate as an acceptance of the 
terms of the offer.522 Current section 2-207(2) prescribes the effect 
of proposals for additional terms, precluding imposition of such 
terms on a consumer absent express agreement to them by the 
consumer.523 It also precludes imposition of additional terms that 
materially alter the contract already formed on the basis of the 
offeror’s terms in the case of transactions between merchants. 524 
Referring to the repositioning of the language from section 2-
207(1) to proposed section 2-206(c), the Prefatory Note states, 
“[t]he formation rule—that ‘a definite and seasonable expression 
of acceptance’ operates as an acceptance even though it does not 
mirror the offer—is set forth as an amendment to the section 
dealing with offer and acceptance generally.”525 But it leaves 
unsaid that the proposed rewrite of section 2-207 radically 
transforms the meaning of the repositioned language from its 
normal legal meaning and that which it has under current section 
                                                          
519 U.C.C. § 2-206(3) (2002) (Proposed Draft). 
520 U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (1995). 
521 See § 2-207(1)-(2). 
522 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 132, at § 3.21a. 
523 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.. 
524 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
525 See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws, 2001 Annual 
Meeting Draft, Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, 
Aug. 10, 2001, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ 
ucc2/ucc0612.htm (last visited April 20, 2004). 
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2-207. The proposed rewrite of section 2-207 effectively neuters 
the normal legal effect of a definite expression of acceptance that 
contains terms different from or additional to the terms of the offer. 
Although the repositioned language still expressly states that such 
expression of acceptance “operates as an acceptance,” proposed 
section 2-207 does not recognize that such expression of 
“acceptance” is an acceptance in the normal legal sense of the 
exercise of a power that forms a contract on the basis of the terms 
offered. Rather, an expression of “acceptance” may have no legal 
significance beyond evidencing that the parties are in some sort of 
a generic relationship sufficient to permit a court to treat it as a 
contract for purposes of the court’s prescribing its terms under the 
provisions of proposed section 2-207. 
Proposed section 2-207 is indeed the card that trumps whatever 
the reasonable belief of the offeror may be as to the terms of the 
contract in instances where the offeree has made what appears to 
be a definite expression of acceptance, albeit with different or 
additional form terms.526 It also trumps whatever the reasonable 
                                                          
526 U.C.C. § 2-207 (2002) (Proposed Draft). 
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from 
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. (2) The 
additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract 
unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the 
offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them 
has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice 
of them is received. (3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale 
although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a 
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of 
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with 
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of 
this Act. If (i) conduct by both parties recognizes the existence of a 
contract although their records do not otherwise establish a contract, (ii) 
a contract is formed by an offer and acceptance, or (iii) a contract 
formed in any manner is confirmed by a record that contains terms 
additional to or different from those in the contract being confirmed, 
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belief of the offeror may be as to the terms of the contract in 
instances where the offeree has made what appears to be an 
unqualified acceptance but thereafter sends a writing with 
additional or different terms. This is because proposed section 2-
207 makes no distinction among: (1) a contract established by 
conduct although the records of the parties do not agree, (2) a 
contract formed by an offer and acceptance, or (3) a contract 
formed in any manner that is confirmed by a record that contains 
terms additional to or different from those in the contract being 
confirmed.527 All are treated on par and their terms are the: 
(a) terms that appear in the records of both parties; (b) 
terms, whether in a record or not, to which both parties 
agree; and (c) terms supplied or incorporated under any 
provision of this Act.528 
As proposed comment 3 makes clear, subsection (b) is the 
blank check given to the court to enable it to exercise its “wise 
discretion” in determining the terms to which the parties 
“agree.”529 That comment is explicit that the agreement 
contemplated by the revision is not limited to an express 
agreement. It notes, in pertinent part: 
 By inviting a court to determine whether a party 
“agrees” to the other party’s terms, the text recognizes the 
enormous variety of circumstances that may be presented 
to a court under this section, and the section gives the court 
greater discretion to include or exclude certain terms than 
original Section 2-207 did. In many cases mere 
performance should not be construed to be agreement to 
terms in another’s record by one that has sent or will send 
its own record with additional or different terms. . . . By the 
                                                          
the terms of the contract, subject to Section 2-202, are: (a) terms that 
appear in the records of both parties; (b) terms, whether in a record or 
not, to which both parties agree; and (c) terms supplied or incorporated 
under any provision of this Act. 
Id. (strikethrough shows current text) (underlined shows proposed text). 
527 Id. § 2-206(3) (Proposed Draft). 
528 Id. 
529 Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft). 
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same reasoning performance after an original agreement 
between the parties (orally, electronically or otherwise) 
should not normally be construed to be agreement to terms 
in the other’s record unless that record is part of the 
original agreement. 
  . . . . 
 In some cases a court might find nonverbal agreement to 
additional or different terms that appear in only one 
record. 
 . . . . 
 . . . There is a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal 
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to 
another’s record. The section leaves the interpretation of 
that behavior to the wise discretion of the courts.530 
Thus, if an offeror submits a written offer to which the offeree 
responds with what appears to be a definite expression of 
acceptance, but with different or additional terms, the “contract” 
formed by such acceptance is not necessarily the one that the 
offeror offered. It will be for the court in its “wise discretion” to 
determine whether some nonverbal conduct by the offeror should 
be deemed to be agreement by the offeror to such terms. The “first 
shot” favored position of the offeror under current section 2-207 is 
rejected by the language of the proposed revision of section 2-207, 
a matter explicitly noted in proposed comment 2.531 As noted 
above, it has been the “first shot” preference of current section 2-
207 (1), coupled with section 2-207(2), that, prior to the distortion 
                                                          
530 Id. (emphasis added). 
531 Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 2 (Proposed Draft). In pertinent part, that 
comment provides: 
This section applies only when a contract has been formed under other 
provisions of Article 2. This section functions solely to define the terms 
of the contract. When forms are exchanged before or during 
performance, the result from the application of this section differs from 
the original Section 2-207 and the common law in that this section 
gives no preference to the first or the last form; it applies the same test 
to the terms in each. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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of section 2-207 by Easterbrook’s ProCD opinion, had protected 
such an offeror from imposition of adverse terms included in the 
form acceptance. 
Likewise, under the proposed revision of section 2-207, if an 
offeror buyer makes an offer by telephone that the offeree seller 
orally accepts without qualification in that same conversation, it is 
apparent that such an offeror cannot be sure at that moment that a 
contract has been formed, or, if it has been formed, on what 
“terms.” These matters must await potential future conduct by the 
seller. If the seller presents “terms later” in a subsequent writing, 
perhaps those will be the terms of the contract. Comment 3 says 
that “performance after an original agreement between the parties 
(orally, electronically or otherwise) should not normally be 
construed to be agreement to terms in the other’s record.”532 
Translation: In some cases mere performance may be construed to 
be agreement to terms in another’s record. After all, the comment 
also recognizes “a limitless variety of verbal and nonverbal 
behavior that may be claimed to be an agreement to another’s 
record.”533 Therefore a buyer’s retention of goods in the face of a 
seller’s “terms later” provision declaring the same to be acceptance 
could be deemed to be behavior signifying agreement, if that 
appeared appropriate in the wise discretion of the court. 
Further, the appropriateness of such a determination is fortified 
by proposed comment 5, which legitimizes Hill’s distortion of 
current section 2-207 and common law principles to bind a buyer 
to a seller’s “terms later” in such a setting.534 Proposed comment 
                                                          
532 Id. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 3 (Proposed Draft) (emphasis added). 
533 Id. 
534 U.C.C. § 2-207 prop. cmt. 5 (Proposed Draft). 
The section omits any specific treatment of terms on or in the container 
in which the goods are delivered. Amended Article 2 takes no position 
on the question whether a court should follow the reasoning in Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Section 2-207 does not 
apply to these cases; the “rolling contract” is not made until acceptance 
of the seller’s terms after the goods and terms are delivered) or the 
contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.1991) (contract is made at time of oral 
or other bargain and “shrink wrap” terms or those in the container 
become part of the contract only if they comply with provisions like 
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5’s assertion that “[a]mended Article 2 takes no position with 
respect to whether a court should follow the reasoning in Hill v. 
Gateway 2000 . . . or the contrary reasoning in Step-Saver Data 
Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology” is pure sophistry.535 For the 
“reasoning” of Step-Saver rested squarely upon current section 2-
207’s “first shot” rule that favored the offeror, which proposed 
section 2-207 expressly rejects; and upon section 2-207(2)’s 
prescription with respect to the treatment of additional terms, the 
very language that proposed section 2-207 eliminates. The 
proposed revision and its comments cut away the entire basis for 
Step-Saver’s “reasoning.” Nothing in the language of proposed 
section 2-207 or its proposed comments supports the “reasoning” 
of Step-Saver, but everything in them accommodates the 
“reasoning” of Hill’s terms later “rolling contract” analysis. After 
much initial resistance to the aberration of ProCD/Hill’s “terms 
later” doctrine,536 the drafters of the revision ultimately caved in.537 
                                                          
Section 2-207). 
Id. 
535 Id. 
536 Rusch, supra note 468, at 1683-90; Speidel, supra note 478, at 614-17. 
See, e.g., March 21, 1997 Draft subsection (a) of Section 2-206, “Consumer 
Contracts, Records,” available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_ 
frame.htm (providing: “[i]n a consumer contract, if a consumer agrees to a 
record, any non-negotiated term that a reasonable consumer in a transaction of 
this type would not reasonably expect to be in the record is excluded from the 
contract, unless the consumer had knowledge of the term before agreeing to the 
record”). Comment 1 to that draft section stated: 
The question is when a consumer who agrees to a record, usually by 
authentication or by conduct indicating assent to terms in the record, 
[is] bound by the terms in the record? The answer in a consumer 
contract under Section 2-206 is that the terms [sic] is excluded when a 
term is not negotiated, a reasonable consumer in this type of transaction 
would not expect it, and the consumer had no knowledge of the term 
before the agreement. The ALI supported this principle by a 2 X 1 
votes at the Annual Meeting in May, 1997. 
Id. See also March 21, 1997 Draft comment 4 to Section 2-205 “Offer and 
Acceptance in Formation of Contract,” available at http://www.law.upenn. 
edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm (describing the ProCD and Hill cases and notes that 
they “raise questions about the adequacy of the proposed contract formation 
provisions,” one of which was “[d]oes Article 2 adequately neutralize the risk of 
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Apparently for strategic reasons, they couched their capitulation in 
terms designed to make it appear that they have merely raised 
Hill’s pure distortion of the Code and common law principles to a 
level of parity with decisions like Step-Saver that had accurately 
applied them. Only the most naïve could believe the feigned 
neutrality of the proposed revision on the issue of “terms later.” 
C. Proposed Article 2’s Sanction of “Terms Later” Contra 
Fundamental Principles of Justice 
Proposed Article 2’s sanction of “terms later” violates 
fundamental principles of justice.538 The click-through method of 
assent to bind purchasers to “terms later” prescribed by sections 2-
204 and 2-211(4) mandates a fictitious assent, contrary to the 
essence of justice based on truth. It violates the tsedeq principle in 
that replaces a clear rule of law that protects reasonable 
expectations with a rule that defeats reasonable expectations and 
protects unreasonable expectations. It thus does not constitute a 
righteous moral standard. It also violates the mishpat principle of 
evenhanded (impartial) treatment of all in that it is premised on a 
policy of favoritism toward sellers, permitting sellers to dictate 
after the sale the terms on which they will be bound, apparently 
upon the utilitarian presumption that this will be best for society. 
The proposed revision of section 2-207 also violates three of 
the four “Requisites for Law and Justice.”539 It violates the tsedeq 
principle in two respects. First, it removes a clear rule of law that 
guards against imposition of “terms later” and replaces it with a 
non-rule. Second, it extends an invitation to courts to exercise their 
“wise discretion” to state when and to what extent it deems parties 
have agreed, and to even engage in multiple fictions for that 
purpose. The first fiction is that no contract is formed when a 
buyer orally orders goods and pays for them and the seller in 
response orally agrees to ship the goods and/or actually ships them. 
                                                          
unfair surprise in these cases? If not, what revisions should be made?”). Id. 
537 Speidel, supra note 478, at 617-20. 
538 Bern, supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 340-43. 
539 Id. 
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The second fiction is that the buyer’s continued retention of the 
goods that he has bought and paid for constitutes an agreement to 
disadvantageous terms in the shipping carton even if the buyer was 
not aware of them. 
It also violates the mishpat principle of evenhanded (impartial) 
treatment of all in that it invites the courts to apply ProCD/Hill’s 
“terms later” doctrine to openly favor sellers and what is desired 
by them, upon the utilitarian presumption that this will be best for 
society. That principle of evenhanded treatment of all, so deeply 
embedded in American law and reflected in the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,540 is openly repudiated by Easterbrook with his 
favor-the-sellers “terms later” rule of contract formation. 
The proposed revision of section 2-207 also violates the 
meshar principle. Because it disclaims any standard for 
determining the legal status of “terms later” and invites courts to 
engage in fictions in determining when and to what parties will be 
deemed to have agreed, one can have no confidence that like 
outcomes will occur in like cases. It all depends on the “wise 
discretion” of the court, which may vary considerably from judge 
to judge. 
VII. PROPOSAL 
Had the NCCUSL not abandoned its push to have UCITA 
adopted, the first proposal of this paper would have been its defeat 
in any state in which it had not been adopted and repeal in each of 
the two states in which it had been. Now the proposal is more 
limited—a call for the repeal of UCITA in Virginia and Maryland. 
With respect to the proposed amendments to Article 2 of the 
Code, prior to the aberration of ProCD/Hill no cases or 
commentary had in any way suggested that UCC section 2-207 
required anything less than actual, knowing agreement by 
consumers to additional or different terms first proposed after a 
contract had been formed. Nor had cases or commentary suggested 
that section 2-207 gave too many rights to consumer buyers. 
                                                          
540 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Nothing prior to those cases suggested that, as far as consumer 
transactions were concerned, section 2-207 was “broken.” 
Certainly nothing in the cases or commentary had suggested that 
section 2-204 was some kind of a roving wild card that trumped 
the contract formation terms of section 2-206 or the objective 
theory of contract law. It is remarkable, indeed, that these aberrant 
cases should prompt any perception that the section needed to be 
“fixed” in order to accommodate the aberration. 
In the end, the proposed revision would “fix” what had not 
been broken, and would embrace the aberration. The fix achieved 
would have all of the appearances of a “fix” in its most unsavory 
sense, exposing consumers to all of the abuse and opportunism 
afforded sellers who can force adverse “terms later” upon them. 
The Code is already tipped so heavily in favor of sellers with, for 
example, section 2-719 that permits sellers to limit remedies and 
preclude consequential damages.541 The proposed revisions permit 
the imposition of those and other adverse terms secretly via “terms 
later.” They would thus add one more heavy weight to the sellers’ 
side of the scale, and leave on the buyers’ side only the light 
weight of the unpredictable unconscionability doctrine to police 
against the statutorily sanctioned abuse. 
For the reasons stated above, current sections 2-204, 2-206, and 
2-207 should be left alone and their counterparts in the proposed 
amendments should be rejected. Proposed section 2-211(4), which 
has significance only as it facilitates imposition of terms later, 
should also be rejected. Only by rejecting these proposed 
amendments, which encourage sellers to withhold adverse terms 
until after payment, can the legislatures keep consumers from 
being subjected to calculating overreaching and abuse by sellers. 
Only by rejecting these proposed amendments and expressly 
repudiating the ProCD/Hill “terms later” doctrine as a distortion of 
law contrary to public policy can state legislatures assure justice in 
the contracting process. 
                                                          
541 U.C.C. § 2-719 (1995). 
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CONCLUSION 
Easterbrook’s pronouncements in ProCD and Hill are without 
moral justification, his purported legal analysis is transparently 
fallacious, and his purported economic analysis is patently 
bogus—all demonstrating that his “terms later” rule is nothing 
more and demonstrate that his “terms later” rule is nothing more 
than the rank exercise of raw judicial power. As such, his 
ProCD/Hill “terms later” rule is a classic example of legal realism 
in operation and of the accuracy of the assessment of Critical Legal 
Studies theorists that what courts engage in is the mere exercise of 
power, not the application of law.542 
That should come as no surprise because for some time now it 
has been a part of the “ordinary religion” of the law school 
classroom.543 And in more recent years it has come to be 
understood by a greater share of the general population,544 the very 
problem Roscoe Pound had identified over seventy-five years 
ago.545 Though it is not a surprise, law reduced to nothing more 
than power is a matter of no small import. Once law is severed 
from its historic transcendent moorings and relegated to a 
transparent exercise of power, it loses its authoritative force, and 
the implications for instability of society are ominous. Why should 
the public believe the decision-makers have made the right 
decisions, or even that they have authority to do so? When law 
loses its authoritative force, an accompanying disregard for what 
masquerades as law is inevitable, as is a disdain for those who 
purport to pronounce it. Thus the implications of law as naked 
power so openly displayed in cases such as ProCD and Hill reach 
well beyond contract law and the Commercial Code. 
 
                                                          
542 UNGER, supra note 177, at 169-81. 
543 Cramton, supra note 368 and accompanying text. See also GERBER, 
supra note 368. 
544 BERMAN, supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
545 POUND, supra note 248. 
